Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

BRISTOL CORPORATION BILL

CHESHUNT URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL

SALFORD CORPORATION BILL

STOCK EXCHANGE CLERKS' PENSION FUND BILL

Lords Amendments considered, pursuant to Order [25th July], and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions — ARCHDEACON OF THE SEYCHELLES

Mr. E. Fletcher: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether it was with his authority that consultations took place between the Governor of the Seychelles and the Bishop of Mauritius, as a result of which, after the refusal of the Archdeacon of the Seychelles to resign his post, he has now been informed, on behalf of the Governor, that he will not be allowed to return to the Seychelles.

The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs (Mr. Henry Hopkinson): My right hon. Friend is aware that the Governor of Seychelles has had correspondence with the Bishop of Mauritius on this subject. The question of Mr. Roach's return as Archdeacon is, however, a matter for the decision of the Bishop.

Mr. Fletcher: Is not this a monstrous interference with freedom of speech in the Seychelles? Is it not scandalous that the Governor of the Seychelles should use his influence, or attempt to use his influence, with the Bishop of Mauritius to prevent the return to the Seychelles of the Archdeacon, merely because he has thought fit to criticise the administration of Government in the Seychelles? Is the

Minister aware that a petition is being widely signed in the Seychelles asking for the return of the Archdeacon?

Mr. Hopkinson: I do not think that there has been any question of criticism of the Administration. There is no doubt whatever that the Archdeacon has criticised a number of individuals and made allegations which have not been well-founded in many cases.

Mr. S. Silverman: How does the right hon. Gentleman know that?

Mr. Hopkinson: But the point is that no formal request was made by the Governor to the Bishop for the Archdeacon's removal. All the Governor did was to make it clear that in his opinion it was in the interests of the Colony and in the interests of the Anglican community that Mr. Roach should not return. I should like to say that everybody will agree on many of the Archdeacon's good qualities, on his sincerity and courage, but at times he has certainly been lacking in wisdom and certainly lacking in tact in a Colony where the situation is of great delicacy.

Mr. Silverman: So have the Government.

Mr. Nicholson: How does the Governor come into the picture, if the Archdeacon has not broken the law? I have not understood my right hon. Friend to say that the Archdeacon has broken the law. Is it not a most dangerous precedent that the Governor should intervene in Church matters, purely on matters of private opinion, when he has no legal right or status so to do? This may be a far-away Colony, but the ordinary rights of freedom of speech and common sense should be observed.

Mr. Hopkinson: This is not a question of free speech, but the Governor has had correspondence with the Bishop of Mauritius in the past on the subject of the Archdeacon's activities, and there is no doubt whatever that the Governor is entitled to express his opinion, a perfectly private opinion, about whether the Archdeacon's presence is in the interests of the Colony and the Anglican community, which is greatly divided on this subject.

Mr. Dugdale: Will the right hon. Gentleman state exactly what it is of which the Archdeacon has been accused?


Has there been any public hearing of these accusations?

Mr. Hopkinson: No, Sir. There is no question of any public hearing of accusations. This is a matter, as I said at the beginning, for the Bishop of Mauritius to decide.

Mr. J. Griffiths: The Minister is leaving this matter in a rather unsatisfactory state. Are we to gather that because this man expressed views which were unwelcome or unpopular he is to be deprived of the opportunity of going back to the Seychelles, and is to be without any opportunity of meeting the charges?

Mr. Hopkinson: The Archdeacon has had an opportunity of having these charges, which he has made against individuals, investigated in the past through the Governor, and he has also been in correspondence on the subject with the Colonial Office. They are allegations against individuals, and there is no question of the Governor's administration. But the fact is that he has stirred up a lot of trouble in a community where there is very great delicacy between the different denominations, and there is no doubt whatever that he has caused very great difficulties there.

Mr. Fletcher: On a point of order. In view of the most unsatisfactory nature of the reply, and in view of the very serious constitutional issues involved, I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible opportunity.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH GUIANA

Housing

Mr. Marquand: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the estimated expenditure by the Government of British Guiana during the next quinquennium upon workers' housing; and what proportions of this are allocated to urban and to rural housing, respectively.

Mr. Hopkinson: Two million eight hundred thousand pounds is allocated for Government low-cost housing in the revised five-year development plan; about 60 per cent. is for urban housing. The greater part of this sum will be absorbed by the initial programme for 4,500 houses, and further provision may be required.

Mr. Marquand: Is the right hon. Gentleman really satisfied that either the total amount or the very large percentage to be devoted to urban housing is satisfactory? Surely, in view of the great need for resettlement of the growing population, there should be an increase in the amount and a revision of the percentages?

Mr. Hopkinson: It is certain that a further development of the housing programme will be required and that further financial provision will also be necessary. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that, of course, in addition to these Government houses, the Credit Corporation is making loans available for those who wish to build for themselves, and then there are further houses being constructed by the sugar companies.

Mr. Marquand: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many persons in British Guiana have been rehoused during the last twelve months, or other convenient period, in new areas on the coast land or riversides which are to be used for farming.

Mr. Hopkinson: None, Sir, but arrangements are nearing completion for the acquisition of new areas on the coast lands and riversides where houses will be built and necessary clearing and improvements to drainage carried out as soon as possible.

Mr. Marquand: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied with this achievement? Will he bear in mind what I suggested to him some time ago, that it is the lower ranks of the administration who are lacking in this Colony; and now that a new Governor, to whom we all wish success, is going out there, can he do something to build up the lower ranks in the administration so that progress in these matters can be accelerated?

Mr. Hopkinson: I am aware of the deficiencies in the administration, and we will certainly do our best to remedy them. On the actual issue of the resettlement of lands which have to be reclaimed, there have been great difficulties about titles and other matters which have had to be overcome, but I know very well from my own visit there how important it is to press on with land settlement in British Guiana.

Mr. Marquand: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware that thousands of workers in British Guiana, now being assisted to build their own houses on sugar estates, are unlikely in future to secure sufficient employment to enable them to maintain these houses; and the policy of the Government of British Guiana on this matter.

Mr. Hopkinson: According to my information, the number of sugar workers rehoused so far is not in excess of future labour requirements but the position will be carefully watched. A survey is shortly to be made, with the assistance of the International Labour Office, to find out the extent of unemployment and underemployment on the sugar estates. The policy of the British Guiana Government is to develop other resources which will support the population, and in particular by major drainage and irrigation schemes to provide new land for agricultural settlement.

Mr. Marquand: If all the information is not available to the right hon. Gentleman, will he study the statement which has recently been made by Dr. Giglioli, a great expert in the sugar industry, who has suggested that rationalisation and mechanisation in the sugar industry is so reducing employment prospects that many of these people who have built their houses with aid from the sugar companies may find themselves unable to maintain them?

Mr. Hopkinson: Yes, Sir. I am aware of that statement. That was why I said that the situation would be very carefully watched. So far we do not think that the provision outruns the demand for housing.

Oral Answers to Questions — COLONIAL OFFICE (ENVELOPES, ECONOMY LABELS)

Mr. Knox Cunningham: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to what extent it is the practice of his Department, when envelopes are in use for the first time, to send them out with economy labels containing the recipient's name and address affixed thereto; and whether, in the interests of economy, he will take steps to stop such a practice.

Mr. Hopkinson: I find that there has been some departure in the Colonial

Office from the Service rule on this matter, and the staff concerned have been reminded of the proper procedure.

Mr. Knox Cunningham: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the use of two pieces of paper, an ungummed envelope, and an economy label, is not an economy when one envelope could be used?

Mr. Hopkinson: Yes, Sir. I have that point in mind.

Oral Answers to Questions — WEST INDIES

Trinidad (Elections)

Mr. D. Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the elections are to be held in Trinidad in 1955, as provided for by the 1950 Constitution.

Mr. Hopkinson: My right hon. Friend hopes shortly to authorise the Governor of Trinidad to make an announcement about this matter.

Mr. Jones: Will the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, assure us that there is no truth in the suggestion which has been circulated in this Colony that in fact elections are to be suspended?

Mr. Hopkinson: I should prefer not to say anything more on this matter at present, but I must remind the hon. Gentleman that there have been discussions in the Legislative Council on this question, as a result of which a Resolution calling for an extension of the life of the present Legislative Council was passed, so that the matter certainly has been discussed. As we hope to be able to make an announcement very soon, I prefer not to say any more now.

Mr. Jones: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is precisely the danger, that because the existing Legislative Council wants to continue the life of the Administration in the Colony there is a danger that the elections will be held up?

British Guiana (Federation)

Mr. D. Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what steps are being actively taken by the nominated Legislative Council of British Guiana to bring this territory within the proposed West Indies Federation.

Mr. Hopkinson: The Council passed a Resolution expressing the opinion that British Guiana should join the Federation. The Resolution also asked the Governor to keep British Guiana in close touch with the action being taken to set up the Federation and to ascertain the state of public opinion in British Guiana towards participation in Federation. My right hon. Friend is considering, in consultation with the Officer Administering the Government, what steps should be taken on the last two parts of the Resolution.

Mr. Jones: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this Legislative Council is a completely nominated body, that some of its members were defeated at the polls and others have never tested the electorate? Why, therefore, is this Council, however desirable the objective might be, attempting to bring British Guiana into the West Indies Federation without first consulting the people of British Guiana?

Mr. Hopkinson: It is precisely on that point, on the question of ascertaining public opinion on this subject, that we are at the moment considering the Acting Governor's recommendations. Certainly we want to go into the question whether it would be possible for British Guiana to join the Federation before the restoration of representative Government in the Colony.

Mr. Marquand: While the right hon. Gentleman is considering ways of ascertaining public opinion in British Guiana, is he considering the desirability now of abolishing the ban on public meetings so that public opinion can be expressed?

Mr. Hopkinson: That is a different question.

Mr. Gower: Does my right hon. Friend consider that the fact that the British islands in the Caribbean combined with British Guiana to form what is called a West Indies cricket team is a good augury?

Jamaica (Development and Welfare Finance)

Mr. D. Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he is aware of the disappointment that has been expressed in the Colony, at the allocation to Jamaica of £4,250,000 under the colonial development and welfare allocations, and

that the Jamaican Government are committed to a programme of expenditure over the next five years of some £30 millions; and whether, in the light of this burden, he will have the matter reconsidered.

Mr. Hopkinson: I know that there was some disappointment at the size of Jamaica's new colonial development and welfare allocation of £3 million. My right hon. Friend was very glad to meet Mr. Nethersole, the Jamaican Minister of Finance, last month; he had full discussions in the Colonial Office on sources of finance for Jamaica's future development needs, during which it was explained that there was no possibility of reconsidering the C.D. and W. allocation to Jamaica. This allocation, together with the carry-over from the previous allocation, will permit a substantially greater rate of C.D. and W. expenditure than hitherto.

Mr. Jones: In spite of that, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable apprehension in Jamaica that, as a result of this grant, the five-year plan will have to be substantially curtailed? As the degree of unemployment in Jamaica is very high at present, is he aware that there is a serious danger that if this plan has to be curtailed unemployment will increase still further?

Mr. Hopkinson: I know it is true that there was disappointment in Jamaica about the amount of the grant, but the matter was discussed with the Chief Minister, Mr. Manley, during his recent visit, and with other Ministers, and the reasons have been fully explained to them and accepted by them.

New Coinage

Sir R Robinson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when the new West Indian coinage is to be put into circulation.

Mr. Hopkinson: Depending on shipments, the issue of the new coinage is expected to begin in September or October.

British Honduras (Development Programme)

Sir R. Robinson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what assistance in the development programme of


British Honduras is being given by the Foreign Operations Administration of the United States of America.

Mr. Hopkinson: The Administration has agreed to provide technical assistance in the fields of agriculture, health, education, community development and such other fields as may be mutually agreed upon. The sum which the U.S. authorities expect to be able to spend, in the form of visits by experts and training courses, in the twelve months from July, 1955, is about $200,000. I should like to take this opportunity of recording the appreciation both of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of British Honduras of this assistance.

Jamaica (Emigration)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what investigation he is making into the reasons for the continued emigration from Jamaica to this country.

Mr. Hopkinson: I do not think any special investigation on this point is necessary. Jamaica is an over-populated island, and it is customary for some of its people to seek work abroad, and entry to other countries to which they went in the past is now greatly restricted.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the right hon. Gentleman trying to create the impression that there is any restriction in this country? If so, he is incorrect. Does not he realise that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also have some responsibilities in the matter? Will he reconsider some of the representations which were made to the Colonial Office on the subject last January by a deputation from the Metropolitan Borough Council of Lambeth?

Mr. Hopkinson: That is a different question.

Caribbean Federation (Freedom of Movement)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will seek to have included in the terms of the Caribbean Federation a provision removing all restrictions on the free movement of West Indian citizens between the islands of the Federation.

Mr. Hopkinson: This question was considered by representatives of West

Indian Governments at a conference in Trinidad last March. The arrangements to which they agreed were set out in my reply on the 23rd March, to which I cannot add.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is not reasonable to expect of the various islands in the West Indies the same sort of mutual freedom of entry as all these islands expect of the Government of this country? Is it not quite fantastic that, for example, a Jamaican should not be allowed free entry into Trinidad, whereas he has every right to come into this country?

Mr. Hopkinson: The position is that, although the arrangements agreed upon at the conference do not provide for that freedom at the moment, they represent a compromise between conflicting interests and opinions in the different islands as to what can be done. This is essentially a matter for the West Indian Governments themselves to settle.

Oral Answers to Questions — MALAYA AND SINGAPORE

Chief Minister, Singapore

Mr. Fenner Brockway: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement on the position in Singapore following the proposed resignation of the Chief Minister.

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what further information he has in respect of the notified resignation of the Chief Minister of Singapore; and, pending his inquiry into all the circumstances, if he will state the reason attached to the request for the appointment of extra Ministers.

Mr. Elwyn Jones: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement on the constitutional crisis in Singapore.

Mr. Hopkinson: Early this month, the Chief Minister of Singapore asked the Governor to appoint four additional assistant Ministers in order to strengthen the Ministries concerned. The Governor agreed to appoint two assistant Ministers, but refused to appoint the others because he did not consider that there was a real need for them.
The Constitution provides that the Governor may appoint assistant Ministers after consultation with the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister contends that the Governor should accept his advice in all cases where the Constitution requires that the Governor should consult him. In the Governor's view, which my right hon. Friend shares, the correct interpretation of the Constitution is that in such cases the Governor, after consulting the Chief Minister, is bound to exercise his own discretion and that to accept the Chief Minister's interpretation would amount to an amendment of the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the Legislative Assembly has adopted a resolution endorsing the Chief Minister's view and adding a request that a new Constitution providing for self-government should be granted immediately.
My right hon. Friend is arriving in Singapore on Sunday and has suggested that this matter should be included among the subjects for discussion between himself and the Chief Minister during his visit.

Mr. Brockway: May I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that very full answer? While hoping that Mr. David Marshall will continue to serve as Chief Minister, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will convey to the Secretary of State, before the conversations take place, the feeling of many hon. Members of this House that the peoples of Singapore and Malaya are now as determined to end colonialism as the peoples of India were in 1946, and that steps should be taken for the realisation of full self-government in these territories?

Air Commodore Harvey: Will not my right hon. Friend agree that, in the interests of all concerned, this matter ought to be left over until the Secretary of State has had his meeting in Singapore?

Mr. Hopkinson: I very much hope that it will be possible to avoid discussion of the merits of the Chief Minister's claim until after there has been this opportunity, which we all very much welcome, of my right hon. Friend discussing it with him in person in Singapore next week.

Mr. J. Griffiths: While welcoming the fact that the Secretary of State will be

meeting the Governor, the Chief Minister and other Ministers on Saturday, do I therefore gather that when he meets them he will not of necessity be bound by the statement made today that the views of the Governor must prevail, but that it will be open to him to discuss the whole situation?

Mr. Hopkinson: Certainly, the discussions will cover this point and a number of others. I would, of course, remind the right hon. Gentleman that the present Constitution came into force less than three months ago, and one would have to consider very carefully before embarking on any changes in it. The right hon. Gentleman and the whole House can rest assured that we are most anxious to secure a settlement of this question, and that we appreciate the help which the Chief Minister and his Government gave in the matters of the strikes and riots last month, and the strength which they showed. We are most anxious to secure a settlement.

Mr. Griffiths: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider one other suggestion? We all welcome the fact that in the course of these discussions there was correspondence between Mr. Nkrumah and Mr. Marshall. May I ask him whether he will consider the fact that there are a number of Colonies which have reached the constitutional stage of having Ministers, and that it might be helpful to this development if in the not-too-distant future Ministers who occupy these offices in the various territories were called together in conference to discuss their related problems?

Mr. Hopkinson: I will bring that point to the attention of my right hon. Friend when he returns.

Mr. Sorensen: While also sharing the hope that the meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr. Marshall will issue in some reasonable compromise, may I ask the Minister whether, meanwhile, he will consider whether it is advisable for the Governor—although it is his prerogative—at least to consider sympathetically the acceptance of the proposal put forward by Mr. Marshall in the interests of all concerned?

Mr. Hopkinson: The question has, of course, gone very much wider than the


original issue of the appointment of these assistant Ministers. The Governor's decision was based on purely practical grounds—that he did not think there was a need for the addition of two further Ministers, which would mean fourteen Ministers out of a House of thirty-two, apart from the fact that he did not think there was work for them to do. That decision was taken on its merits, and I think that, with the wider issues now under discussion, it would be quite wrong to go back on the original decision.

Personal Case

Mr. V. Yates: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he is aware that Mr. P. L. D. Pointon, of Ladywood, Birmingham, when serving as a police lieutenant in Malaya, was accommodated in a storeroom 6 ft. by 6 ft., full of rats, from November, 1953, to January, 1954, and that failing to obtain redress of grievances he tendered his resignation; and why this man, before returning to this country, was compelled to pay £290, which included a refund of his passage to Malaya as well as his return fare home.

Mr. Hopkinson: Police in the Federation of Malaya who, like Mr. Pointon, volunteered for special operations duties, must have appreciated that their living conditions might sometimes be hard, but I have no evidence to support this particular complaint. He resigned after serving for less than half of his three-year engagement, in the full knowledge of the liabilities he would incur according to the terms of his contract.

Mr. Yates: Is the Minister not aware that this man contracted scrub typhus disease as a result of these conditions, and had to be taken to hospital? Surely the authorities must have been aware of these conditions. This man is not making frivolous complaints. He was awarded the British Empire Medal by the late King for distinguished service in Malaya. He was entitled to have his grievances attended to—and there were a series of them. Will the Minister consider this matter further in the light of further evidence which I will submit to him, if he needs it, to prove conclusively that this man made a series of complaints which were not remedied?

Mr. Hopkinson: I shall certainly be glad to look at any evidence and informa-

tion which the hon. Member cares to send me.

MAURITIUS (LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DELEGATION)

Mr. Fenner Brockway: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to make a statement on the progress of negotiations with the Mauritian delegation regarding constitutional changes.

Mr. Hopkinson: The discussions with the members of the Mauritius Legislative Council representing the Mauritius Labour Party, the Mauritian Party and nominated members, which began on 12th July, were concluded by my right hon. Friend on the 22nd. Agreement was reached on a number of proposals designed to improve and strengthen the machinery of government, on the need for a change in the status and powers of the present liaison officers, and on the appointment of a Speaker for the Legislative Council from outside the island.
There remained differences of opinion among the Mauritian representatives on certain other proposals, including an increase in the membership of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, whether the portfolio holders should be called "Members" or "Ministers," and the introduction of universal adult suffrage. These proposals will be further considered in the light of the views expressed during discussion and the views of Her Majesty's Government will be conveyed to the Governor at as early a date as possible.

Mr. Brockway: May I again thank the right hon. Gentleman for that very full reply? May I ask him whether it is the case that the representatives of the Mauritius Labour Party, which has thirteen out of the nineteen elected Members, were in favour of universal suffrage for Mauritius; and, if so, whether Her Majesty's Government will bear in mind the fact that the overwhelmingly dominant opinion in the Legislative Council desires adult suffrage in the island?

Mr. Hopkinson: I prefer at this stage not to go into details of the various proposals which were submitted during the course of these talks, at which I was present throughout. Of course, universal


adult suffrage was one point which it was well known the Mauritius Labour Party favoured, but we believe that the question of constitutional advance in Mauritius has to be looked at as a whole. Our aim is to do so by providing more responsibility for the unofficial Members, with the appropriate safeguards for the very large minority groups, and we want to do so in such a way as to lessen racial tension and bring about the disappearance of the differences between the various groups.

Oral Answers to Questions — KENYA

Mau Mau (Land Forfeiture)

Mr. Fernyhough: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the total acreage of the land which the Kenya Government recently confiscated from 3,097 rank and file Mau Mau and 324 Mau Mau leaders.

Mr. J. Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement upon the confiscation of terrorists' land in Kenya.

Mr. Hopkinson: On 8th June, when it was announced that the surrender offer of 18th January would be withdrawn on 10th July, it was also announced that the Forfeiture of Lands Ordinance would be amended to provide a more effective procedure for depriving of their land and land rights those terrorists who failed to take advantage of the offer and continued to resist the forces of law and order. This was done and since 10th July Orders have been made against 324 Mau Mau leaders and 3,097 adherents. The boundaries of the land affected are identified after the Orders are made and the total acreage is not yet known. Forfeited land will be used for communal purposes.

Mr. Fernyhough: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that this is creating a very dangerous precedent? Does he not appreciate that this is unadulterated Communism? Could he give the House an assurance, for the sake of the peace of mind of the landowners of this country, that Her Majesty's Government have no desire, either now or at any time in the future, to introduce a similar practice in this country?

Mr. Johnson: Is the Minister aware that in most cases boundaries do not exist on these holdings because, particularly among the Kikuyu, land is held in common land units? Is it therefore not a fiction to talk in those terms? Is he aware that many people think this is another punitive action against the Kikuyu gangsters? Is he aware that since May, 1952, since the gangsters went into the forests, the women have been tending these holdings and that he will punish women and children by taking the land? Is he aware that much of the land is fallow? Is not it just a fiction to talk in these terms of confiscating these alleged holdings?

Mr. Hopkinson: This is an extension of a previous practice which was introduced last year—that of the forfeiture or setting aside of land of persons who have been convicted of certain offences. The Government of Kenya believe that it will reinforce the effect of the announcement of the withdrawal of the surrender offer. It is the case that many of these persons do not possess individual holdings, and they will lose their rights in the planned or commonly held land. The deterrent effect of this measure is expected to be very considerable.

Public Works, Kikuyu Native Land Unit

Mr. J. Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what public works by forced labour are being carried out in the Kikuyu Reserve; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Hopkinson: Under the authority of Emergency Regulations projects to improve communications and agricultural potential are being carried out by communal labour in all districts of the Kikuyu Native Land Unit. These projects include land clearing and soil conservation works, protecting water supplies, and necessary protection works as a result of the Emergency, such as ditching and fencing of cattle bomas, and food stores.

Mr. Johnson: Is the Minister aware that much anxiety has been felt by the Christian Churches—particularly the Church of Scotland—in this matter? Women have been working long hours—from seven in the morning until the evening—and leaving their babies at home, with consequent neglect and malnutrition, especially in the Fort Hall area. If this


ordinance means anything, does it mean a tidying up of abuses of powers, and a checking of the actions of Kikuyu headmen? Does it mean that we can look forward to a change in the actual conditions there?

Mr. Hopkinson: I have noted what the hon. Member has said about this matter. We have discussed it together before. I will see that the points which he makes are brought to the attention of the Governor of Kenya.

Oral Answers to Questions — CYPRUS

Anarghyros Stamatopoulos (Entry Permit)

Mrs. Castle: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies on what grounds Anarghyros Stamatopoulos, a senior member of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus, has been given 14 days' notice to leave the island.

Mr. Hopkinson: The person concerned was admitted into Cyprus on a temporary entry permit, subject to cancellation at fourteen days' notice. I am informed that he has been engaging in political agitation among Cypriot youth and that the Governor is satisfied that there are adequate reasons for refusing to renew the residence permit.

Mrs. Castle: Is the Minister aware that the information which he has is directly contrary to the representations now being made to hon. Members by Christian institutions in Cyprus, who declare that this distinguished Churchman has been doing purely Christian missionary work in Cyprus for the last five years and that repeatedly his permit has been renewed during that period, until the last few weeks? Is he aware that they regard this as purely religious persecution which is doing grave damage to the British cause as well as to the Christian cause in Cyprus?

Mr. Hopkinson: I should be glad to examine any evidence or information which the hon. Lady cares to send to me, but the Governor was fully satisfied that the gentleman in question is an ardent and dangerous agitator—[Laughter]—this is no laughing matter—who has played a prominent part in promoting and encouraging a violent youth movement in Cyprus.

Detention Law

Mrs. L. Jeger: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many people have so far been detained without trial under the new detention law in Cyprus.

Mr. Hopkinson: Twelve.

Mrs. Jeger: Is the Minister satisfied that the conditions in Cyprus justify the maintenance of this repulsive and undemocratic method of keeping order?

Mr. Hopkinson: I would certainly say that I sympathise deeply with anyone who feels that an order of this sort is repugnant, and something which we would wish to avoid, but it is the view of the Governor and of my right hon. Friend that the present conditions in Cyprus fully justify its introduction.

Mr. J. Griffiths: Can the Minister tell us when it is proposed to hold the conference about Cyprus? Is there not urgency about this matter? Can he tell us when it will be held?

Mr. Hopkinson: Discussions are still going on in regard to the date, but I think that it will take place towards the end of next month.

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will state briefly the provisions of the recently promulgated detention law in Cyprus; and what rights of appeal are available.

Mr. Hopkinson: I would refer the hon. Member to my right hon. Friend's reply to the hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) on 20th July.

Mr. Robinson: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that this type of law is wholly abhorrent to any country that professes to believe in freedom? Does not he think that this sort of legislation in Cyprus can only exacerbate the present unrest, and cannot do anything whatever towards solving it?

Mr. Hopkinson: I have already made it quite clear that this type of legislation is as repugnant to me as to my right hon. Friend. It is directed against active terrorists and not against any non-violent advocates of political change. The fact is that the nature of the terrorist organisation in Cyprus is such that people will not


come forward with information or evidence if it entails their appearance in court, because of their fear of reprisals. Both the Governor and my right hon. Friend are entirely satisfied that this legislation is justified under present circumstances.

Greek Subjects

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many Greek subjects are resident in Cyprus; and how many have been requested to leave during the last twelve months.

Mr. Hopkinson: One thousand seven hundred and sixty-five Greek subjects are resident in Cyprus. During the past twelve months three have been requested to leave on grounds of undesirable political activity, and about fifty for reasons such as the expiry of their temporary employment permits.

Oral Answers to Questions — COLONIAL TERRITORIES

Co-operative Organisations

Mr. R. Edwards: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what Cooperative organisations are registered in each Colony, Protectorate, and/or Trusteeship Territory; and the membership in each case.

Mr. Hopkinson: The list would comprise the names of over 8,000 organisations with a total membership in the region of some 960,000. While I appreciate the hon. Member's interest in the Co-operative movement in the Colonies, I do not feel that the value of such a list would justify the work involved in obtaining the necessary information from each colonial Government. I should, however, be glad to obtain the information for the hon. Member in respect of any territory in which he is particularly interested.

Trade Unions

Mr. R. Edwards: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what trade unions are registered in each Colony, Protectorate, and/or Trusteeship Territory; and the membership in each case.

Mr. Hopkinson: A comprehensive list of registered trade unions, numbering over 1,400, giving their approximate membership where known, is compiled

from time to time by my Department. I am arranging for copies of the latest edition to be placed in the Library.

Minimum Wages

Mr. R. Edwards: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies in which Colonies and Protectorates statutory minimum wages are in operation; and what these minimum wages are.

Mr. Hopkinson: The Governments of all territories except Bermuda and the Borneo territories have power to fix minimum wages. In a few territories, notably Hong Kong, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and Tanganyika, this power has not so far been used but its use is under consideration in Tanganyika. It would be a very lengthy task, involving consultation with each Government, to obtain and compile complete and up-to-date details of all wage orders in force. If the hon. Member will let me know the territories in which he is particularly interested, I will do my best to obtain the information for him.

Ministers (Business Directorships)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies under what circumstances governors have in recent years used their discretion to allow Ministers in Colonial Territories to continue their business directorships; in what Colonial Territories at present Ministers or chairmen of public boards are also continuing as business directors; if he is aware that in the Bahamas and elsewhere contracts have been and are being given to business firms whose directors are Ministers; and what steps he proposes to take in this matter.

Mr. Hopkinson: There are no Ministers under the Bahamas Constitution. More generally, there is no obligation on governors to report exemptions to my right hon. Friend and the information is not therefore available here. I am consulting the governors of the territories which have a Ministerial system and will communicate with the hon. Member as soon as I have received their replies.

Mr. Sorensen: Apart from pointing out that the Minister has not answered the last part of my Question, may I ask him whether he does not consider that it is reprehensible that the Ministers should


continue to hold their directorates? Is it not desirable that the Secretary of State should have the information which I seek in the Question?

Mr. Hopkinson: It has been the practice to draw the attention of unofficial Ministers in the Colonial Territories to the rules and customs which govern Ministerial conduct in the United Kingdom. They are expected to divest themselves, for the period of their office, of business interests which might conflict with their public responsibilities but, as I told the hon. Member in reply to an earlier Question, there are provisions for exemption. I am asking the governors of the territories concerned to let me have the information for which he now asks. I would point this out: in the case of territories such as the Bahamas, where there is no Ministerial system, there has never been any rule that members of the Executive Council should not hold business appointments, and if one were to try to insist on any such rule we should find, particularly in the smaller Colonies, that we were unable to get men of the right calibre to join the Executive Council.

Oversea Officers (Careers)

Mr. Tilney: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether, in view of the uncertainty concerning the careers of administrative officers in certain Colonial Territories, of which the hon. Member for Wavertree has advised him, he will consider steps to safeguard the financial future of these officers.

Mr. Hopkinson: On 17th June last year Her Majesty's Government published in Colonial No. 306 a statement making known its intentions in regard to all oversea officers serving in territories which attain self-government. My right hon. Friend has the future of these officers very much in mind, especially in Nigeria, to which I understand my hon. Friend's Question refers. I am not, however, in a position to make a further statement at the present time.

Oral Answers to Questions — NORTHERN RHODESIA

Native Trust Land

Mr. Zilliacus: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will require that the proposed Section 28 (a) of the

Interpretation Ordinance of Northern Rhodesia should be revised so that, until the Legislature is elected by all races on a democratic basis, orders setting aside land in the Native Reserves, or grants of rights of occupancy in Native Trust Lands or the acquisition of Native Trust Land for public purposes, or the setting aside of Native Trust Land for game and forest reserves, should be given under the hand of the Governor and not of the Minister.

Mr. Hopkinson: This Ordinance applies only to the interpretation of local legislative enactments and Government notices. The responsibility of the Governor for the matters mentioned in the Question is established by United Kingdom Orders in Council, on which the new Section 28A of the Interpretation Ordinance has no effect.

Mr. Zilliacus: Does that mean that it is the Governor who is responsible for grants of rights of occupancy of Native Trust Land, and not the Minister?

Mr. Hopkinson: Yes, Sir.

Honorary Game Rangers

Mr. Zilliacus: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies why only Europeans are appointed as honorary game rangers in Northern Rhodesia.

Mr. Hopkinson: Native authorities issue game licences and make local orders, and are empowered to enforce game legislation. There has therefore been no need to appoint Africans as honorary game rangers.

Mr. Zilliacus: Does not the Minister think that, although there is no need to do so, it might be highly advisable to do so, because the native inhabitants resent the implication that they are not fit to be entrusted with this responsibility, and consider that the game is much more theirs than that of the white inhabitants, particularly as some of the game wardens are Afrikaners, and Afrikaners have a bad reputation for poaching.

Mr. Hopkinson: In fact Africans are already carrying out many of these functions and there is nothing whatever to stop them being so nominated. I think it is quite likely that some chiefs will be nominated in the near future.

Chiefs and Native Officials

Mrs. White: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many chiefs and native authority officials in Northern Rhodesia have been deposed or dismissed or officially threatened with deposition or dismissal because of their association with the African National Congress.

Mr. Hopkinson: None, Sir.

False Reports (Imprisonment)

Mr. Dugdale: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what period of imprisonment can be imposed for the offence of the publication of false reports likely to cause public fear and alarm or to disturb public peace in Northern Rhodesia.

Mr. Hopkinson: The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for three years.

Oral Answers to Questions — WEST AFRICA

Gold Coast Constitution (Select Committee)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the present position of the demand by the National Liberation Movement in the Gold Coast; how far proposals have been made for the amicable settlement of the political controversy over a federal form of government; and to what extent economic grievances by Ashanti cocoa farmers are relevant to that political agitation.

Mr. Hopkinson: The report of the Select Committee to which I referred in reply to the hon. Member on 4th May is to be tabled and debated during the present Session of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, which began yesterday. Economic grievances have been mentioned by the National Liberation Movement, but the main issue now appears to be primarily a constitutional one. I am sure the House will share my hope that all Members of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly will make their full contribution towards reaching agreement on these matters when the Select Committee's Report is debated.

Sierra Leone (Delegation)

Mrs. White: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what progress has been made in the discussions with the delegation from Sierra Leone.

Mr. Hopkinson: The discussions with Sierra Leone Ministers and representatives of Sierra Leone Selection Trust have not yet finished, but progress has been made, and my right hon. Friend is hopeful that it will be possible to make a public announcement very soon.

Mr. E. Fletcher: On a point of order. The Minister keeps on referring to his right hon. Friend. Can we have some explanation why his right hon. Friend is not here to answer these thirty-seven Questions addressed to him?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL NAVY

Oil Stocks, Far East (Claim)

Mr. Dodds: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will make a statement on the claim by oil companies for compensation for oil stocks which disappeared in the closing days of the fighting in the Far East in the second world war.

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Commander Allan Noble): The claim will shortly be heard by a court in Singapore.

Mr. Dodds: As many feel that this Government are much too soft with the oil companies, can we have an assurance that at least in this instance every opportunity will be taken to see that the oil people do not get any more money from the people of this country?

Commander Noble: I am sure that the hon. Member would not expect me to make any statement when this matter is sub judice in the courts.

Departmental Envelopes (Economy Labels)

Mr. Knox Cunningham: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to what extent it is the practice of his Department, when envelopes are in use for the first time, to send them out with economy labels containing the recipient's name and address affixed thereto; and whether, in the interests of economy, he will take steps to stop such a practice.

Commander Noble: The standard practice is to use economy labels only for used or ungummed envelopes or with mechanical addressing equipment.

Simonstown Base

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty why Her Majesty's Government agreed to the transfer of the Simonstown naval base to the Union of South Africa.

Commander Noble: I would refer the hon. Member to the statement made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 4th July, 1955.

Mr. Freeman: Is it not a fact that this base was held by Great Britain for many years under a treaty, and as a result of that all the inhabitants enjoyed citizenship, with all rights and privileges, and that as a result of this action they are denied the right to any citizenship? Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman reconsider this matter, in view of these facts?

Commander Noble: We were at Simonstown for many years under an agreement with the South African Government. We had no territorial rights there whatsoever. I think that if the hon. Member studies my right hon. Friend's statement and the following White Paper, he will see that very adequate safeguards have been arranged for employees of the past, the present and the future.

Speed Marches

Mr. D. Howell: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty (1) the steps he has now taken to secure stricter control and supervision of speed marches, following the death of Marine D. Rhyce-Rees on such a march; and whether he will include the instruction that when a man collapses the man next to him shall remain with him until he is removed to medical care;
(2) whether the speed march held on 31st March, during which Marine D. Rhyce-Rees collapsed, was in full kit, and whether he is aware that the task of speed marching nine miles in ninety minutes is too rigorous; and, as on this occasion two men were looking rather distressed and thus caused the cancellation of the intended range-firing exercise, he will review such arrangements with a view to making the task of speed marching more reasonable.

Commander Noble: For the march on 31st May, the men were in light denim uniform, open at the neck, and they did not wear headgear; their equipment, including rifle, weighed 17½ lb. The

speed march is a well-established and important part of Commando training, and I do not consider it too rigorous for fit men who have been trained up to it by planned stages.
The marine in question died on 4th June, not as a result of the march, but of an acute virus infection. Further precautions have been added to those already observed in these tests. The arrangements will be supervised by a captain or more senior officer in addition to the officer who accompanies the men, and tests will not take place in very hot weather. The squads will be counted at the beginning and end of the march—[Laughter.]—and they may be subdivided, according to the capacity of the men, into groups each of which will move at the pace of the slowest man. This last precaution should ensure that a man cannot fall out unobserved.

Mr. Howell: Is the Minister aware that on this occasion the man next to the man who collapsed saw that he was going to faint and collapse? The arrangements were quite inadequate. The man was left for an hour in long grass and was not detected by the N.C.O. behind or by the follow-up lorries. Is it not a matter of elementary decency that when a comrade sees a man faint, he should be detailed to stay with him until he is collected and removed to medical care? Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman not aware that the British Navy record for walking ten miles is only one hour fifteen minutes, or just under, for a man suitably clad? In view of that, it is not undesirable that men should be asked to walk nine miles in ninety minutes in full kit and with rifles, and will the Minister look into this matter?

Commander Noble: This man was not in full kit. I did, in my Answer, state the actual kit carried. The rate of marching was decided upon as a result of operational experience and of the reasonable training required. I am most grateful to the hon. Member for the trouble which he has taken over this, and I hope the arrangements we are making for these marches will be in accordance with what I feel is the opinion of this House. May I say, with regard to hon. Members thinking what I said was very funny, that the point of counting the men was implied in the Question and was a factor in the case.

Major Wall: Is it not a fact that the Marines work up to these speed marches after a six weeks' course and Commandos are required to march at this speed over difficult country? Is he aware that several hon. Members have undergone similar speed marches and, therefore, it is utterly ridiculous for the hon. Member for Birmingham, All Saints' (Mr. D. Howell) to say that this is too rigorous?

Volunteer Reserve, Dundee

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty the present strength of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in Dundee.

Commander Noble: Fifty-nine officers and three hundred and sixty ratings.

Mr. Thomson: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that one way of supplementing the potential strength of the R.N.V.R. in Dundee would be to encourage the ownership of small craft, many of which are ex-naval craft, and that the present owners of small craft in Dundee are being deprived of any adequate, satisfactory harbour facilities? Will he do what he can to assist in this matter.

Commander Noble: As on previous occasions, it is likely that the Royal Navy would have use for small craft in an emergency, and we certainly hope that the owners will keep them going. I am aware of the point which the hon. Member has raised, and I hope very much that the owners will be able to find other billets.

Her Majesty's Ships (Visits)

Sir I. Fraser: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many visits by Her Majesty's ships are being paid to coastal resorts this summer; and which places have been or will be visited.

Commander Noble: Excluding visits by ships in the course of their fishery protection duties, operational visits generally, and those by ships of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Divisions, Her Majesty's ships will have made one hundred and eight visits in the United Kingdom this summer.
I will, with permission, circulate a list of the places visited, or to be visited, in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Sir I. Fraser: Can my hon. and gallant Friend say whether a ship is going to Morecambe this summer?

Commander Noble: No, Sir. There is no ship going to Morecambe this summer.

Following is the list:


Aberdeen.
Liverpool.


Aberystwyth.
London.


Bangor, Co. Down.
Lowestoft.


Barry.
Margate.


Bembridge.
Mevagissey.


Berwick-on-Tweed.
Newcastle.


Bexhill.
Newhaven.


Blackpool.
North Berwick


Bootle.
Norwich.


Boston.
Oban.


Bournemouth.
Oulton Broad.


Brighton.
Paignton.


Bristol.
Pembroke Dock.


Brixham.
Penzance.


Broadstairs.
Poole.


Burghead Bay.
Porthleven.


Channel Islands
Portree.


Cowes.
Portrush.


Cromer.
Portstewart.


Dartmouth.
Ramsgate.


Deal.
Sandown Bay.


Dover.
Scarborough


Douglas, Isle of Man.
Scillies.


Eastbourne.
Seaton.


Exmouth.
Shanklin.


Falmouth.
Shoreham.


Fleetwood.
Southampton.


Folkestone.
Southend.


Fowey.
South Shields.


Great Yarmouth
Stornoway.


Hastings.
Sunderland.


Holyhead.
Swanage.


Hove.
Teignmouth


Invergordon.
Torquay.


Kings Lynn.
Troon.


Kingston-on-Thames.
Ullapool.


Kirkwall.
Worthing.


Lerwick.

Wireless Telegraphy Station, New Waltham

Mr. Osborne: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty in view of the further interference to local television reception caused by the New Waltham Naval Wireless Telegraphy Station, if he will have an investigation made of the new frequencies introduced at this station since 1st July, 1955.

Commander Noble: Yes, Sir. The new frequencies are in accordance with international radio regulations. The Admiralty will, however, continue to make every effort to prevent interference with local television reception. A scientific officer visited the station last week and has made


some suggestions which I hope will alleviate the interference.
A fuller investigation will take some time but will be carried out as soon as possible. Meanwhile all possible steps are being taken to reduce the interference, although some interruption to Admiralty communications is involved.

Mr. Osborne: May I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for sending an officer there to investigate. Is he aware that the interference is still continuing? If it develops again, will he give the local officer at the station the authority to receive complaints from local constituents, and so help to minimise the difficulty?

Commander Noble: As my hon. Friend will realise, this is a very difficult technical problem, which we are doing all we can to solve. I will certainly go into the point which he has raised about local complaints.

"The Health of the Navy"

Mr. Dugdale: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty when it is intended to publish the next edition of "The Health of the Navy"; and if he will make this publication available to hon. Members.

Commander Noble: Preparation is well advanced, but I cannot give the probable date of publication at present. A copy will be placed in the Library of the House as soon as it becomes available.

Mr. Dugdale: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that what are thought to be extracts from this document have been published in the Press, saying that the health of the Navy is not all it should be, and, in particular, that there is a very heavy incidence of tuberculosis? Can he confirm or deny that? It seems to be in the interest of the Navy that that should be known as soon as possible.

Commander Noble: I am very glad that the hon. Gentleman asked this Question. There is not a lot of tuberculosis in the Navy; in fact the figure is 0·2 per cent. That figure may seem high in comparison with others, owing to the importance which we attach to regular and universal examination.

Oral Answers to Questions — SHIPBUILDING

South African Orders (South Coast Shipyards)

Captain Pilkington: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to what extent south coast shipyards may expect to receive orders for some of the smaller vessels which the South African Government are to have constructed in this country.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Wingfield Digby): The phasing of the programme is still being worked out with the South African Government and until this has been settled the allocation of the orders cannot be determined.

Captain Pilkington: Will my hon. Friend remember the high quality of the work which he will find at Poole?

Mr. Digby: Certainly the claims of all shipyards in this country will be considered when allocating orders.

Shipping Companies (Orders Abroad)

Dr. King: asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will make a statement on the request which he has received from the Confederation of Shipbuilding Unions for a public inquiry into the placing of shipbuilding orders abroad by shipping companies.

Mr. Digby: No such request has been received from the Confederation but one from the Mersey District Committee, containing a request for an inquiry into the placing of shipbuilding orders in Germany, has reached me.
As my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer implied on 19th July, any attempt to go back on the policy of allowing United Kingdom owners to order ships in European yards might well lead to retaliation against the United Kingdom industry, which is substantially dependent on orders from abroad. I do not consider that an inquiry would serve a useful purpose at the present time.

Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that the Merseyside District Committee of the Confederation is alarmed that nine shipping companies have placed orders for sixteen ships in Germany, and that it holds the view that the profit margins demanded by the shipowners is pricing us out of the international market? Will he


convey to the President of the Board of Trade, to whom I addressed the Question, the need for getting shipowners and men together to see what we can do to build up our shipbuilding trade abroad?

Mr. Digby: It must be remembered that this is part of the price which we have to pay for a very full order book, which means that our own shipyards are not able to quote delivery dates as early as those of our foreign competitors. That is partly a matter for satisfaction.

Mr. P. Williams: Would not my hon. Friend agree that the position generally in the British shipping industry is very satisfactory but that one of the greatest difficulties that must be overcome is the demarcation between different trades in the shipbuilding industry?

Mr. Digby: I agree that there are various difficulties, but the rate of ordering in recent months has very considerably improved.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. H. Morrison: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business for the week when the House resumes?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for the next week in which we shall be sitting, which is the week after the Summer Recess, will be as follows:
TUESDAY, 25TH OcTonER—Consideration of a Motion in usual form relating to the arrangements to be made for private Members' Time.
Committee and remaining stages of the Sudan (Special Payments) Bill.
Second Reading of the Diplomatic Immunities Restriction Bill.
Second Reading of the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill, and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.
WEDNESDAY, 26TH OCTOBER—Second Reading of the Sugar Bill, and Committee stage of the necessary Money and Ways and Means Resolutions.
THURSDAY, 27TH OCTOBER—Debate on Education in Scotland until 7 o'clock.
Afterwards, Report and Third Reading of the Agriculture (Improvement of Roads) Bill.
FRIDAY, 28TH OCTOBER—Second Reading of the Dentists Bill, and Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.

Mr. Grimond: Is it the intention of the Government to give time fairly soon after we come back for a discussion of the Phillips Report, which I think was first spoken of before Christmas?

Mr. Crookshank: There will be quite a lot of time after we return in which a number of subjects will no doubt be debated. I would not like to prejudge any one yet.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Will the debate on Scottish education be again postponed if there is another economic crisis?

Sir I. Fraser: Would it not be better to put the Scottish business second on the Thursday, so that those of us from England can leave it to our Scottish comrades?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Leader of the House aware of the great anxiety among the large number of company directors on the Government side of the House lest they incur penalties for holding offices of profit under the Crown, because they will be liable to be fined £500 per day during the Recess without opportunity of getting the necessary indemnity legislation? Will he say something to dispel their fear that they will be liable to enormous sums in fines as long as the Recess lasts?

Mr. Crookshank: If there is any anxiety on this side of the House, I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite who may be in a similar position will also be anxious. I do not think that the hon. Member knows any more about this matter than he does about common land in Scotland.

Mr. G. Wilson: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether and, if so, when there will be time to debate an item which appeared on the Order Paper last Friday, and which read:
Animals,—Copy presented,—of Order, dated 21st July, 1955, made by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, authorising the landing at London of one Giraffe [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

Mr. Crookshank: I really do not know about that, but it does remind me of an Order laid long ago, when some eggs were ordered to lie upon the Table.

Mr. J. Hynd: I hope I am in order in asking a question about business. The Leader of the House announced that the Dentists Bill will be taken on the Friday. In view of the fact that there are wide implications in it in which a large number of Members are interested, can he explain why it is necessary to take the Bill on a Friday instead of earlier in the week, when more attention could be given to it?

Mr. Crookshank: It certainly is a Bill of some importance, but something has to be debated on Friday. I thought that, on the whole, it might meet the convenience of the House, and the importance of the subject, that the Bill should be taken then.

Mr. Ross: Can the right hon. Gentleman not change his mind about the Scottish education debate finishing at 7 o'clock? He will bear in mind that he has put this Order down for the Thursday although it is fairly obvious that even at the moment, after a quiet Thursday's discussion of business, we rarely get the actual business of the House started at half-past three.

Mr. Crookshank: It is not my fault that the business does not start till half-past three. The hon. Gentleman himself has made sure today that it has not started at half-past three. I promised earlier that, as a result of representations made by the Opposition, there would be a two-day debate on Scottish affairs, of which there was to be half a day on Scottish education. For reasons known to himself and other hon. Members, that was not done. Therefore, I found the earliest possible corresponding time when we returned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Proceedings on Government Business exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. Crookshank.]

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE

House to meet Tomorrow at Eleven o'clock; no Questions to be taken after Twelve o'clock; and at Five o'clock Mr. Speaker to adjourn the House without putting any Question.—[Mr. Crookshank.]

ADJOURNMENT (SUMMER)

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 25th October.—[Mr. Crookshank.]

3.37 p.m.

Mr. Herbert Morrison: Having regard to the Standing Order about calling the House together, if necessary, may I ask the Leader of the House whether we may take it that if the need should arise and, in the public interest, in some unexpected event or emergency, the Government will avail themselves of this Standing Order to recall the House?

Mr. Crookshank: Yes, Sir, of course. It is in a Standing Order, and therefore it does not have to appear in the Motion moved at this time of the year. The right hon. Gentleman has my full assurance that if there were any such necessity we would approach Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Morrison: In those circumstances, having consulted my colleagues who sit with me on this Bench, I say that we recommend our hon. Friends not to challenge a Division on this Motion.

3.39 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: I have often admired the ingenuity of the Leader of the House, but I must confess that on this occasion I did not admire his somewhat negative attitude. This is a very important Motion to present to the House. We are being asked to adjourn for a period of three months. In my recollection and, I think, in the recollection of many hon. Members, this is somewhat unusual. We have adjourned for nine or ten weeks but I cannot recollect a period of three months, at any rate since the War. Perhaps the Leader of the House, if he deigns to reply, will correct me if I am wrong.
I must say, with the very greatest respect to my right hon. Friend the deputy Leader of the Opposition, that merely to ask for the application of the usual formula that the Government should recall the House in the event of an emergency is hardly enough. I do not believe that it is desirable that this Motion should go by default, and I venture to give my reasons for that belief. There are two


matters that ought to be mentioned. One is that if one cares to oppose a Motion of this kind one may be accused of seeking publicity. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That is precisely what I expected—but what is one publicity-monger among so many? [Interruption.] I am delighted to find that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) has now associated himself with me. That is what might be regarded as a true affinity.
I suggest, however, that this proposal to adjourn for a period of three months ought to be treated with the seriousness which it deserves. After all, we are always exhorting the workers outside to work harder. In the course of a debate on the coal situation the other week—the merits of which debate I will not discuss, as I have no desire to infringe the rules of the House—hon. Members opposite, if not directly, at any rate by implication, exhorted the miners to work harder. Indeed, it is a commonplace nowadays when there is talk of economic difficulty and the like to assume that all that is required is that those outside this House should pull their full weight and everything would be lovely in the garden. In those circumstances, it appears to me to be invidious—to put it very mildly—that we should ask those outside to work harder and then ourselves adjourn for three months.
A point that might be urged against me—it is always wise to anticipate the arguments that may be used subsequently —is that previously, under a Labour Administration and under other Administrations, we adjourned for a period of nine or ten weeks. I have always regarded that as too long. If one is presented with circumstances over which one has no control, it is essential to acquiesce, but I say in all gravity that even nine or ten weeks is far too long a Recess if we are to set an example to the people.
I make the humble submission to hon. Members that two months is adequate, and perhaps I may give my reasons, as otherwise that might seem to be an arbitrary figure. I believe that hon. Members need a holiday. Obviously, the right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Bench opposite are very much in need of a rest. They have been assailed very hotly in recent weeks. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who by?"] If the hon. Members on the back

benches opposite do not recognise it, their right hon. Friends certainly do. I presume that one of the reasons for the long adjournment is that they require more holiday. Some of us would be only too willing to concede an even longer holiday to the Government as a whole, but that is not the proposition before us. [Interruption.] It is quite obvious that, although the hon. Member opposite who is speaking up—I think it is the hon. Member for Louth, is it not?

Mr. Cyril Osborne: Yes.

Mr. Shinwell: Why, I do not know—although the hon. Member looks very healthy, that cannot be said of every hon. Member on the other side. I have no doubt that the Government need a holiday, but one month would be sufficient for that. We are told that we cannot afford more than one month's holiday. We are told by the Chancellor not to promote further inflation. Therefore, having regard to the expenditure entailed, one month's holiday would be ample.
What about the other month—the other four weeks of the eight? Hon. Members go to their constituencies. They avail themselves of the opportunity in order to undertake the work of their constituencies which, on other occasions, they are unable to do. That is my reply to those who would suggest that because we have had a two and a half months' holiday on previous occasions there is no reason why we should not extend it by another ten or fourteen days.
May I now venture to touch upon the merits of questions which, I think, ought to come before the House from time to time and should certainly be under review in the next few months? I would suggest certain questions which I think are important. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, we had a long and very necessary debate on the economic situation. Although he endeavoured to put up what he thought was an adequate defence, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to admit that the situation, while not to be regarded in the nature of a great crisis, might contain very serious consequences for the country. Surely that is a matter which calls for consideration by the House in the course of the next few months. There may be no guarantee given by the Government that the inflationary situation and its consequences will not drive the country into serious difficulty.
What is the position of hon. Members in those circumstances? We can address letters to Ministers of the Crown; we can telephone them; we can approach them personally to ascertain their views, but there is no platform—no proper platform—upon which hon. Members on either side of the House holding strong views about the economic situation and its development can express themselves during those three months. So far as the economic position is concerned, I believe that there is a case for a shorter adjournment.
What about foreign affairs? There is to be a debate today, and I do not want to hold it up—I have no doubt that hon. Members have a great deal to say. Presumably, the Prime Minister may wish to make a statement. That I do not know—we are not fully informed of the Government's intention—but, arising from what occurred at Geneva, surely we may expect some consequences in the course of the next two or three months—about which, if this Motion is carried, hon. Members will not be permitted to express a single opinion here. We know that the matters considered by the representatives of the various nations at Geneva have been referred to the Foreign Ministers, but a situation may develop—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Whether hon. Members opposite like it or not, they are going to have it, and if they want to begin their holiday now they have my consent. They can leave now if they wish.
I repeat that on this matter of foreign affairs the situation may develop in such a fashion as to justify—I put it no higher than that—this House dealing with it but, if this Motion is accepted, all we are entitled to in such circumstances is the usual formula that if, in the opinion of the Government, it is thought necessary, the House can be recalled from time to time. That is not enough.
What about the question of National Service? I know that we cannot discuss the merits of that subject now, but I would direct the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Privy Seal to this matter. First, may I have his attention? He has not started his holiday yet, has he? I am not asking the right hon. Gentleman to turn his face in my direction. I am only asking him to look intelligent and to appear to be awake and

alive to the situation. I would direct his attention to the Motion on the Order Paper, signed by over fifty hon. Members, calling for a reduction of compulsory National Service. I have not appended my signature to it. I never do sign. There is also an Amendment signed by a score of hon. Members. This is a matter of high and acute controversy, and, judging by the letters we all receive from time to time—even hon. Members opposite, although they do their best to conceal them—it is obvious that there is controversy in the country on this important and vital topic of National Service and how long it should continue. Nothing will be done in the next three months if the Government get this Motion. I think it quite wrong.
I want to mention another matter which arose recently and which caused considerable controversy and aroused emotions, and that is the subject of the death penalty. Here I am on firm ground, because I know that hon. Members opposite are in accord with hon. Members on this side of the House in seeking either the abolition of the death penalty or its modification. For the next three months we have no redress at all. Nothing can be done.
Apart from these issues, which I regard as important, let me put the final issue, which is this. We must exercise the greatest care to ensure that this House of Parliament, and, in particular, the House of Commons with which we are primarily concerned, is not brought into disrepute. One means of bringing the House of Commons into disrepute and reflecting on the integrity of hon. Members is to take a holiday much in excess of the requirements, and, in my judgment, a holiday at the expense of much needed discussion, if not legislation.
The right hon. Gentleman may feel that one of the reasons for a long adjournment is that the Government have nothing to bring before the House. I listened with great attention to his recital of the items that are to come before us in the first week after the Recess, and it seemed to me that it contained a vast number of miscellaneous items which call for prolonged debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross) and others have indicated how necessary it is in the interests of Scottish education that they should not be fobbed off with


a half-day's debate. Why could we not return the week previous in order to have a full debate?
Are the Government so barren of ideas, so lacking in political fertility—I am speaking politically—and the necessary ingenuity that they cannot promote discussion or legislation? Is this the sort of thing that is to happen in the next three or four years? Is the House of Commons to be completely barren? Surely that will not help Parliamentary institutions of this kind.
I do not know whether some hon. Members opposite regard this as a matter for amusement. Let them tell their constituents so if they like. I say in all seriousness that these very important and vital topics to which I have referred ought to receive, I do not say the daily consideration of this House, but the frequent consideration of hon. Members, and it seems to me that three months is far too long. Therefore, I beg the right hon. Gentleman, even at this eleventh hour, to consider a shorter Recess.
I must say that if I am asked in my constituency why we are having a three months' holiday, although usually I am not lacking in finding an answer, I should find myself in a very difficult situation. I do not know what hon. Members will say to their constituents if they are asked that question. What is to be the answer? Do they need a holiday of three months? Surely not. I challenge hon. Members opposite, particularly those who have just come into the House, to say, if asked that question by their constituents, that a holiday of three months is essential. What answer will they give? Will they refer to what has happened in the past few weeks? If so, they will be told by their constituents, and quite rightly, that if the workers and others outside this House are rarely granted a holiday of more than two or three weeks, or in the case of a privileged person four weeks, there can be no case for Members of Parliament having a holiday of three months' duration. In those circumstances, I beg the right hon. Gentleman to reconsider the matter.
If I am asked whether I am going to vote against the Motion—and it may very well be asked by the Lord Privy Seal; I know him only too well, for we have been in the House together for a long time,

and I know his adaptability in these circumstances—I tell him at once, quite honestly, that I am not. If he wants the reason I will tell him. The reason is that I have the common sense to know that if the matter has been considered by my Front Bench and, in their opinion, it is unwise to challenge the Motion by going into the Lobby, I should not vote against the Government, but I think it would have been a mistake to allow this Adjournment Motion to go by default without any protest.
Although I have not the least doubt that asking to have a shorter Recess than three months will not enhance my popularity, that is of little concern so long as, at any rate, some Members on this side of the House, if not on the other side, make their protest.

3.58 p.m.

Mr. John Hall: I listened to the speech of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) with attention if not altogether with interest. I gathered from the right hon. Gentleman that he will find some difficulty in explaining to his constituents the fact that he has a three months' holiday. I can imagine that that may well be so, if he does take a three months' holiday. Some of us on this side of the House may not find it quite so difficult, because many of us on these benches and, I have no doubt, on the other side as well, use that three months' interval to get back to some of our professional and business activities so that we can make a constructive contribution to the productive effort of the country. Furthermore, it does not do any harm to get back into contact with our professional and trading interests so that we can see the effect of the legislation that has been passed in this House.
The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that if we came back earlier we might have more time and more legislation. He seems to desire more legislation. It seems to me that over the last few years, since 1945 at any rate, the country has suffered not from too little legislation but from far too much. It does us all a lot of good if we are able to get away for a period and get down to some constructive thought, instead of being constantly bedevilled by the activities of the House, to which we can return refreshed and perhaps with new ideas,


on both sides of the House, which may be to the benefit of the country.
I do not know the purpose of the right hon. Gentleman's intervention unless it be to take up a good deal of time, but let me assure him that it would be wrong for the country to get the impression that hon. Members leave this House for a three months' holiday. They do not.

4.0 p.m.

Mr. Percy Daises: There is much of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said with which I am in complete agreement, though I must say that I made a mental reservation that if he objected to long Recesses when he was a Minister, then his thoughts must certainly have been expressed in silent prayer and not vocally.
There is no great difference between Labour and Conservative Governments on this issue. It is in the nature of Governments, after they have been under pressure from the House, to want to send us packing and to breathe the air quite freely. I think that a quite natural thing, and I have not the slightest doubt that the Lord President will find, when he goes through the precedents, that there is possibly only a week or two difference between this Recess and those which we have had in the past.
But what we have to consider this afternoon is not the question of past precedents, but what is the situation which faces us today, and it is from that point of view that I propose to approach this problem. I would also say to some of my hon. Friends that if the sole criterion of Opposition has always to be what we did when we were the Government, then we shall not get very far without spiking our own guns. [Laughter.] There is nothing very funny about that. I do not see any reason why we should allow our past to inhibit us so that we cannot evaluate the situation with which we are actually faced.
I say quite seriously to the Government that quite a lot of very vital and serious questions were put yesterday to which no answer was given and which the country wants answered. I notice that Mr. Speaker's face does not exactly register pleasure at this state of affairs this afternoon, so I must be extremely guarded,

but, without going into the merits of yesterday's debate, I think that there are many loose ends which this House should still debate. There are great administrative problems. How does it come about that the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation can announce a large programme, the Minister of Education can make a public statement which also involves a great expenditure of public money, the Minister of Health can do the same, and then bang, right in the middle of it all, we can have the Chancellor's statement of yesterday which may have torpedoed the lot?
Are we to go away for three months and ignore all these problems? Are these not questions upon which the public demands information, or are we to have from the Government a series of Ministerial broadcasts which are not party broadcasts? I do not know whether the House realises that by this weekend we shall have had six non-party broadcasts to the country by the Prime Minister since the General Election. Is that to be the role of Government or are we to have answerability to the House? Are we to adopt the Roosevelt system or the system which is applied behind the Iron Curtain where the chief figure of Government is above question and is, therefore, not answerable to a Parliament?
These are great questions which the House should face. I would say to the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) that I cannot go out and follow a profession, get acquainted with business circles and come back financially refreshed as can some hon. Members. That goes for most of my colleagues on this side of the House. However, that is not the issue. The issue is that we are here and prepared to work and make our democracy flourish. It is not only a question of unfinished Bills. There is a lot of work which wants doing upstairs in Committee and which cannot afford to wait if the welfare of the country is really the paramount interest of Members.
I strongly object, as I did when I supported the Government, to a three months' holiday. It is far too long. I would make one constructive suggestion. If hon. Members are not wanted in the House for three months, why not send some of them to look at the mines which we so often discuss? Why not let them see the opencast system of mining and the


railways at work? [HON. MEMBERS: "You do."] We do not, because we cannot afford to do so. That is the simple fact. We need a revolution in the sense of taking us away from a paper and ivory-tower type of existence in order to do practical work. I object to the waste of the time of so many of us who are prepared to give service to the country and who are prevented from so doing because of an effete and out-of-date system of controlling this House, a system which reflects the conditions of a hundred years ago and which has no reference at all to 1955.

4.6 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I understand that many hon. Members are here for the foreign affairs debate, so I can quite understand their impatience at this debate continuing. But the remedy is in the hands of the Government. All that the Leader of the House need do is to rise in his place and announce that there will be a holiday of two months instead of three, when the way will immediately be open for the historic debate on foreign affairs.
It is not our fault that this debate is taking place. It is entirely due to the mismanagement of the business of the House by the Leader of the House and the feeling of many hon. Members on this side that the Government would prefer to have the country run without Parliament sitting at all. The Government do not like to be questioned day after day on matters affecting the interests of the country, because they have no adequate answer to the questions put to them. Therefore, it is much easier for them to become modern Cromwells, to take away their bauble and to close the place for three months than to have the House meeting and discussing international and domestic affairs.
I believe that my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) has done a very great service to the House and to the country by focussing attention on the fact that a very large number of hon. Members do not want a prolonged holiday. They believe that after two months' absence they will be refreshed, healthy, intellectually alert and able once again to devote attention to the pressing matters that affect the country.
The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. John Hall) talked about the following of occupations during the Recess. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman contemplates going into the mines during the Recess, but, after all, two or three months would not be long enough for that. Most of us represent the interests of people who, quite honestly, do not begrudge Members of Parliament a decent holiday, but when they see us getting a holiday of three months they think that we, as legislators, have too good a time. Of course, this habit of having a three months' holiday is dictated by the fact that hon. Members opposite used to migrate to Scotland from 12th August onwards. They will probably migrate there during this Recess, when they will no doubt find the answer to the question why common land does not exist in Scotland.
The Leader of the House will, I hope, have an opportunity during the Recess of carrying on his researches, when he may well discover that the reason there is no common land in Scotland is that his predecessors on the benches opposite "pinched" it a very long time ago. That was the answer which I tried to get from the Prime Minister yesterday, but neither the Prime Minister nor the Leader of the House understood my question.
I suggest that the grouse-shooting season does not last from 12th August to 1st November. Hon. Members on this side of the House could finish their grouse shooting within 24 hours of its commencement. There is no excuse at all for carrying on grouse shooting for so many weeks. I speak on behalf of the grouse of Scotland as well as on behalf of the grousers of Scotland.
A long summer vacation originated in the past when times and habits were different, when social conventions were different and problems were different. I appeal to the Leader of the House to let the foreign affairs debate proceed immediately by announcing, magnanimously and generously, that hon. and right hon. Members opposite will leave Scotland at the end of September and come back to Westminster to do some honest work.

4.11 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: I am not impressed by the arguments which have so far been advanced from the Government benches in favour


of the Motion. Such as they were, they have been more than effectively demolished by my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Daines).
We are adjourning for a longer period than three months—no fewer than 88 days. I think we ought to talk about 88 days rather than three months so that the public may understand what a liberty we are taking on this occasion. It is a liberty we are taking in allocating to ourselves such a lengthy period of absence from our duties here in Westminster. In a few days' time we shall discover the position of our gold and dollar reserves. I am afraid that that will reveal a very unpleasant state of affairs. Could we not at least carry on deliberations in the House until those figures become available? I think they will indicate an even more serious state of affairs than was disclosed in the course of the debate yesterday.
What is to happen as a result of our disappearance from Westminster for 88 days? In effect, we shall be handing over the economic destinies of this country to the bank managers of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland—[HON. MEMBERS: "And Wales."] and Wales. Instead of the elected Members of the House exercising some control over the economic destinies of the country, in effect that control will be exercised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the cohorts of bank managers throughout the country. That is a dereliction of duty on our part. Many other maters require much earlier consideration than can be given them if we go away until 25th October.
For all these reasons, I hope that when the Leader of the House replies he will be able to afford us a little satisfaction. If rumour be correct, this will be the last occasion on which he appears before us as Leader of the House if various changes contemplated during the Recess take place. Let us at least ensure that his swan-song will take the form of a concession to the democratic principles we have been trying to advocate during the last few minutes.

4.14 p.m.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Perhaps the House is getting ready to pass to the more important business to follow discussion of this

Motion, but I must say a word or two in reply to the speeches which have been made upon it.
The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said that anyone who took part in this debate was likely to be accused of seeking publicity. I take it that that applies to other hon. Members who have spoken, but I can assure the right hon. Member that I do not need to seek publicity in that way in this House. I have plenty of other opportunities of speaking should I feel moved. He went on to say that at the end of the discussion he would not vote against the Motion. In fact, he would have the best of both worlds, publicity on one side and restraining himself from the unpopularity—indeed, from disobedience to his Front Bench—involved in carrying the matter to a vote.
I rather wondered, when I heard the right hon. Member, whether the deputy Leader of the Opposition was now glad or sorry that the right hon. Member for Easington was no longer a member of the Opposition's Shadow Cabinet. It was clear from the observations of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) that it was intended to let this Motion go without anything being said upon it, as was the case in 1951, the last time that a Motion of this kind was moved by the Labour Government. On that occasion it was not a Motion to rise for a two months' Recess, which the right hon. Member for Easington thinks adequate, but for a Recess only a fortnight short of what we are now proposing. The right hon. Member was a member of the Cabinet and can reflect on his own inconsistencies.
There is only one point I think I need deal with in the speech of the right hon. Member. He has dealt with a number of topics which we might debate if we did not rise. Of course, anyone can think of innumerable subjects which it might or might not be useful to discuss, but the chief point was the personal difficulty in which the right hon. Member will find himself. He said that it was common in this House to urge upon the nation as a whole the need for more productivity and harder work. What was to be said if he and the rest of us left the Palace of Westminster for a period approaching three months? The inference was that the work of a Member of Parliament


is done only by sitting in this Chamber. That, of course, is not the fact.
The right hon. Member wondered what answer he was to give his constituents if they asked him why he was in his constituency. One answer he could give is that they have elected him and that it is his duty from time to time to visit them. I cannot put it better, if the right hon. Member wants the real answer to his constituents, than in the words used by the deputy Leader of the Oppositon when dealing with a somewhat similar debate. I will read out the words and the right hon. Member, if he likes, may write them down and have the answer ready for any constituent who approaches him. This is what the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South said and it is a classic statement of the case:
Members need to renew contact with their constituents to lead them in the path of light and learning,"—
I am not quite sure whether "they" means constituents or Members—
and that refreshing renewal of intimacy will be all to the good.
That is all right. The right hon. Member for Easington can also tell his constituents this on the authority of the deputy Leader of the Opposition:
Members of Parliament need time for reading.

We should all have time to read the right hon. Member's book and also the classic on Parliament written by his right hon. Friend. It is true that hon. Members need time for reading and the right hon. Member can tell his constituents that. The deputy Leader of the Opposition also said:
They will need to read during the Recess to improve their minds.
I am sure that all the constituents of the right hon. Member will appreciate that and that he has to go off and improve his mind. The last hope which the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South expressed was:
I hope, also, that all Members will busy themselves in the country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 13th August, 1947; Vol. 441, c. 2476.]

Mr. Shinwell: Two months is enough for that.

Mr. Crookshank: The right hon. Member has now got his marching orders and he knows what to tell his constituents when they object to seeing him. If they object so much, he can remind them that some day—not just yet, but some day—there will be another Election and they can get rid of him altogether.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 25th October.

Orders of the Day — VALIDATION OF ELECTIONS (No. 2) BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

4.20 p.m.

The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The Second Report of the Select Committee on Elections is before the House, it sets out very shortly the facts of this case, and I am sure that the House would not wish me to summarise them again in view of the other business before the House today. I need only draw attention to the recommendations of the Select Committee that legislation should be introduced at once to indemnify Mr. Holland-Martin from any penalties he may have incurred and to validate his election. It is obviously desirable that during the Recess no person should be left in the position in which Mr. Holland-Martin now is, with the risk that during that Recess proceedings by a common informer might be started against him.

4.21 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: It is in the highest degree unfortunate that the Second Reading of this Bill should be moved at this time on this day. It is true that every Member of the House is most anxious to hear the Prime Minister's report of the momentous events which took place recently in Geneva and to proceed to discuss them. It is extremely unfortunate that that debate should be delayed by a matter which, however important it may be, has no importance proportionate to that.
But it would be equally unfortunate if the House should allow itself to be, as it were—I do not apologise for the word—blackmailed into accepting a Bill of this kind on the nod, unexamined, uncriticised and not looked at or discussed at all, because we can only discus it by delaying a more important matter which the House wishes to discuss.
What is the urgency? Mr. Holland-Martin did not feel any urgency for four years. While the House might be prepared, subject to its right to amend the Bill in Committee, to give the Government a Second Reading of the Bill today,

I think that if there were any intention to take the Bill beyond that, most Members of the House would feel that that was a very wrong thing to do.
I do not want to delay the House very long about this but, at the same time, I do not want to connive at the implied proposition that what we are dealing with is a mere matter of form and that there is nothing in it which the House need consider, and that the Government are entitled to the Second Reading, Committee stage, Report stage and Third Reading of this indemnity Bill without consideration.
This was a very bad case indeed. There was never any excuse of any kind for supposing that the office which this gentleman held was not an office of profit under the Crown. It was plain beyond argument. For four years he held that office simultaneously with membership of the House. For four years he received the salary of both offices.
It may be that the House ought to amend the existing legislation. It may be that some day it will do so, but until it does amend this legislation the law is binding on everybody and has to be enforced by Ministers. While the House may be prepared to grant indemnities on suitable occasions when what takes place is trivial or inadvertent, it ought not to do so in circumstances like this, where the case is neither trivial nor inadvertent.
The case might be inadvertent, perhaps, if the gentleman did not know, but he ought to have known, and there have been plenty around him who ought to have known. The Government has some responsibility in the matter and they, too, ought to have known. It cannot be regarded as inadvertent, nor can it be regarded as trivial, when there is an appointment of this kind at a quite substantial salary.
I am not saying that the House would wish the very grievous penalties which would normally follow if the law were to be rigorously applied to be enforced. Five hundred pounds a day would be altogether too high a penalty and the House would readily agree, I think, to excusing Mr. Holland-Martin most—or, at any rate, some—of those penalties. But when we are asked, without discussion, without argument and without consideration of any kind, to declare that his position four years ago was the direct


opposite of what the general law provides, that he is to be excused all penalties of every kind, that he is to remain in possession of the salaries of both offices and that his constituents are not to be allowed to have any say in the matter at all—because his election is to be declared valid when, in fact, it was invalid—then I say that the House, with proper regard to its own prestige and standing in the community, has absolutely no right to allow such a Bill to go through without proper and complete and full examination.
If the Attorney-General says that all the Government are asking for today is the Second Reading, I would be prepared to leave it at that for the time being; but if that really were their intention, it is impossible to understand why the Bill is put down for debate today at all. If the Government put down the Second Reading for today because they want to force the whole thing through in one day, there is some point in it although, for the reasons I have given, I would not agree with it.
If, on the other hand, the Government do not want to force it all through today and cannot possibly get the Bill until after the long Recess, what was the point of putting it down for Second Reading between a Motion for a three months' adjournment of the House, which we had to discuss, and a most important—perhaps the most important of all—foreign affairs discussion later in the day? The only possible purpose—and I say that it is an improper purpose—could have been to use the pressure of the desire of the House to get on to the more important subjects to persuade it to accept the Bill without the examination and consideration that it would otherwise have given.
I hope that the House will not give the Government the Second Reading of the Bill until at least we are assured that it is not the intention of the Government to ask us to go further with the matter today.

4.27 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), I apologise for speaking on the Second Reading of this Bill, but it has been made imperative on us by the conduct of the Government. Why should a Bill of this kind, which is regarded as important and in which important precedents will be quoted, be sandwiched between two

debates of the kind that we have today, in the hope that hon. Members would not properly discuss what was contained in the Bill?
May I point out that the evidence of the Select Committee has not been in the hands of hon. Members to give them sufficient time to consider what is before them? There have been two copies of the Report of the Select Committee. The first, which was without any evidence at all, appeared in the Vote Office only late last night, and I doubt—I say this without disrespect to the House—whether a dozen Members of the House, apart from the Select Committee, have had an opportunity of examining the evidence. In the Report of the Select Committee there is a long, abstruse explanation from the Attorney-General of the law relating to Members who are bankers. I defy anybody except the most erudite legal Members of the House to make head or tail of the statement by the Attorney-General.
What are, briefly, the facts about the case of Mr. Holland-Martin? During the time in question, he has been a subsidiary director of a New Zealand bank and during this time he has drawn a quite substantial salary of £550 a year.
In Question No. 31 of the evidence given to the Select Committee, he says:
I am a Director of another Bank which has a local board, and I am also a Director of one of the local boards.
I submit that all hon. Members who have been, or are, bank directors will be greatly disturbed by the evidence which appears in this Report. There are a number of hon. Members who may think, "Have we committed the same offence as Mr. Holland-Martin? Mr. Holland-Martin was not only a director of the Bank of New Zealand, but he appears to have been a director of another bank." As an old bank director myself, I should like to know how we are placed.
Is every hon. Member of this House who has been a bank director since 1946 likely to incur the penalties which may be imposed upon Mr. Holland-Martin? Take, for example, the Prime Minister, who may find himself in difficulty. When he was not the Prime Minister, the right hon. Gentleman was a director of a bank. I am sure that the whole House will hope that the Prime Minister has not inadvertently committed an offence which would


make him liable to a fine of £500 for every sitting of the House of Commons since 1946. Then there are other hon. Members who have been bank directors—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): There probably are, but this Bill deals only with one, Mr. Holland-Martin, and we must confine the debate to that.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I have no intention of voicing the anxieties of my fellow ex-bank directors any further.
I suggest that here is a very important Bill which is being slipped through, and that it is not such an innocuous Bill. I suggest that if the Attorney-General gets his Second Reading, we should not rush this Bill through all its stages without the position of bank directors and ex-bank directors who are hon. Members of the House being cleared up.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Question is—

Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: Mr. Deputy-Speaker—

Hon. Members: Order.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: This is just an example of what some of us feared—that this matter would be rushed through without at least some answer from the Attorney-General, who, I think, is willing to do the House the courtesy of dealing with the points which have been raised by my hon. Friends. I am sure that if the Attorney-General wishes to give the House the information asked for, no difficulty would be placed in the way.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Question is—

Hon. Members: No.

4.32 p.m.

Mr. John Paton: I think that the House is entitled to have an explanation from the Attorney-General before it gives him this Bill. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has been asked specific questions by hon. Members. Surely we are entitled to have that information from him. Surely also the House is entitled to have from the right hon. and learned Gentleman some explanation of the extraordinary fact

which was brought out so well by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman). Why has this Bill been produced at all today, when it could well have waited until the House reassembles in October, since the further stages cannot be taken until then? These, surely, are matters on which the Attorney-General should give the House some information.

4.33 p.m.

Mr. Herbert Morrison: I think that the request of my hon. Friends that they should have an answer from the Attorney-General—even though it may necessarily be brief—is reasonable, and I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will make some comment on the points which my hon. Friends have raised. We on the Opposition Front Bench feel that it is not unreasonable that this Bill should go through today. There is another Bill on the stocks which will have to be considered when we reassemble, and which deals with the whole complicated problem of the disqualification of Members; and which, I may say, worried the Labour Government, who had plenty of trouble about it; and it seems to be worrying this Government.
It may be that this case is somewhat different from others, but both Governments have had the same trouble. My hon. Friends will have an opportunity of discussing matters on the Second Reading and the Committee stage of the House of Commons Disqualification Bill. The other point is that this case, with the other case which was debated, I think, at some length, or two other cases—

Mr. S. Silverman: Not this one.

Mr. Morrison: I never said this one, I said two others. They were debated on Friday at some length, and not improperly either.
But this is a case, like the others were, where the Select Committee has recommended that the appropriate action—what has become the customary action—should be taken in order to cover the hon. Member. It is said, "Let it wait until we come back." But, if I may say so, I think that when a Select Committee has recommended, it is right and proper for the House to deal with the matter as expeditiously as it can.
I am sorry that this matter happens to come up between a Motion for the Adjournment and a debate upon foreign affairs, but I have given a reason for the hurry and I think it decent that the House of Commons, when it has a Report from a Select Committee, should not leave an hon. Member in suspense without good reason. I think that the proper thing to do is to proceed with this Bill, because I do not think that we shall lose anything thereby.
I would remind my hon. Friend that when the Labour Government were in a similar trouble, the Opposition swallowed it—I forget how much they said about it, but it was nothing much—and my impression is that they were reasonable. In all the circumstances, I think it not unreasonable that on this last day we should get this Bill through, and I hope that it will go through.

Mr. Silverman: Before my right hon. Friend sits down, may I say that he has referred to cases at the beginning of the 1945 Parliament and that I know about those cases—I was a member of the Select Committee which considered them. I think that if my right hon. Friend will bring his recollection to bear on the matter—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Gentleman cannot make a second speech.

Mr. Silverman: I am not making a speech.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I beg the hon. Member's pardon. It sounded to me rather like a speech.

Mr. Silverman: I am sorry if it sounds rather like a speech, but, nevertheless, I am not making one. What I am drawing the attention of my right hon. Friend to is that there is no parallel whatever between the cases—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order.

Mr. Silverman: —he has mentioned and this case.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: In my opinion, this is a speech and it must be discontinued.

4.38 p.m.

The Attorney-General: With the leave of the House, I would add a word to what has been said by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison).
This Bill was put down for all stages today, because it was understood that it was agreeable to hon. Gentlemen opposite, as, indeed, it was to the Government. The need for the Bill today is this, and I should have thought that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) would have understood it. Unless this Bill reaches the Statute Book before the Recess, Mr. Holland-Martin will be in peril of an action being started against him by a common informer.
I cannot agree with the opinion of the hon. Member, nor does the Select Committee. It has agreed that Mr. Holland-Martin acted in good faith and that the matter was raised on his own initiative. We may be able to discuss all the aspects, and no doubt we shall discuss them, when we debate the House of Commons Disqualification Bill. In those circumstances, I hope that the House will now give this Bill a Second Reading. I hope that, to make Mr. Holland-Martin's position safe, we shall be able to carry the Bill through all its stages, as it was understood that course was agreeable.

Mr. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. May I ask your guidance on this point? If the House should give the Government the Second Reading of the Bill, for which they ask, and for which I think provision is made upon the Order Paper, is the House bound, on the Motion of the Government, to proceed with the Committee stage and Third Reading, or can that be objected to?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is a hypothetical question. The Motion for the Second Reading is the only matter now before the House. I will deal with the other question when it arises.

Mr. Silverman: My vote will depend very much on the consequences of passing such a Motion today. Therefore, it is not a hypothetical question, in view of what has been said by speakers on both Front Benches about what they had understood was to happen. Whether I vote or refrain from voting against the Motion for the Second Reading of this Bill depends on whether the consequence of giving a Second Reading would be to compel the House to proceed to the further stages. If that be so, I shall vote against it.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not know what is to happen, but if the Motion for the Second Reading is agreed to, and, subsequently, there is a Motion to proceed immediately with the Bill in Committee, the hon. Member can vote against that if he wants to, when the time comes.

Mr. Harold Davies: May I ask for your guidance on this point, Mr. Deputy-Speaker? The notice on the Order Paper is for the Second Reading of the Bill. There is no notice whatever on the Paper to indicate any proposal to take further stages of the Bill today. Can the Government propose to go further than Second Reading today, without giving notice?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It was impossible to give notice on the Order Paper of any further stage of the Bill, because it is not known yet whether the Bill will be read a Second time or not. If the Bill is read a Second time and it is then proposed that a further stage be taken today, the House can divide on that, and register its approval or disapproval.

Mr. G. Lindgren: But can we assume a Government defeat on the Question being put? You, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, put the Question and collect the voices, and the Chair usually determines that the Ayes have it, which, in the majority of cases, is reasonable; but how do we know that that will not happen on this occasion?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Chair collects the voices, and if it thinks the Government side have the majority, it says so. Then it is up to those who disagree to disagree, and then there is a Division. There is nothing very subtle about that.

Dr. Barnett Stross: Assuming, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that the Motion for Second Reading is carried, as, I am sure it will be, cannot other stages of the Bill be taken after ten o'clock tonight?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No. That would not be possible.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. R. Allan.]

Mr. S. Silverman: Is this Motion debatable, Mr. Deputy-Speaker?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is not debatable.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly committed to a Committee of the whole House.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House will immediately resolve itself into a Committee on the Bill.—[Mr. R. Allan.]

4.43 p.m.

Mr. Silverman: I desire to invite the House not to accept the Motion. I think it would be an example of most undignified and unseemly haste and of neglect—abdication almost—of the responsibility of this House to allow an indemnity Bill of this kind to be rushed through in this fashion. What have the Government to hide? Do they want to prevent Members of the House from reading the evidence submitted to the Select Committee before they ask for the indemnity of this man? There are pages and pages of it. The Select Committee's Report was not in the Vote Office until about ten o'clock last night. Nobody has had the opportunity of reading the evidence.
Is it to be said that because there have been other cases and that because in other cases the House has given indemnity and that because a Select Committee recommended indemnity in this case, therefore the House of Commons has to act as a rubber stamp for the Select Committee? A Select Committee has no right to legislate. A Select Committee has no right to expect its Report to be accepted and acted upon without discussion. There have been times without number when Select Committees have made Reports which the Government have been unable to accept and have refused to accept. There have been other cases in which the Government have wished the Report of a Select Committee to be accepted and in which the House has had other views.
There was a very important case in 1947, when a Select Committee inquired into the case of a Member—I do not propose to mention his name, but those of us who were here at that time will remember it very well—and when the Select Committee recommended that only very lenient action should be taken, but


when the House decided, as it was entitled to decide, to reject that Report and to proceed with the expulsion of the Member.
I dissent respectfully but quite fundamentally from the proposition of my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) that because a Select Committee has recommended us to do it, therefore we are in some way bound to do it. We are not bound to do it. It may be true that a Select Committee's recommendation carries a good deal of authority and ought always to carry a great deal of authority with Members of the House. I would concede that the House should not lightly reject the recommendations of a Select Committee in such a case. That, however, is a very, very different thing from saying we are to adopt a recommendation of a Select Committee merely because it has made it—and that without any opportunity whatever of even reading the evidence which led it to that conclusion, let alone of considering whether we are of that opinion ourselves.
My right hon. Friend just now suggested that when this party was in the Government the Government then had the same difficulty. The four cases to which he referred were cases which the House unanimously accepted could be described as trivial and inadvertent. No one in his senses would regard this case as either trivial or in any real sense inadvertent. This is a matter which the House ought to consider very carefully. We are asked—does the right hon. Gentleman want to intervene?

4.47 p.m.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Certainly. I was going to say that I did not want this debate to continue in view of the very important statement the Prime Minister is to make. I was proposing that this Motion be withdrawn. I thought that might save the hon. Gentleman from continuing his speech. I shall propose that course unless the hon. Member wants to continue further.

Mr. Silverman: If the right hon. Gentleman had indicated that he desired to intervene for any purpose in a rather more courteous way than he did just now, I should, of course, have given way much earlier, and since the right hon. Gentle-

man has now indicated that he accepts the arguments now which he rejected fifteen minutes ago, I shall be delighted to sit down now to enable leave to be asked for the Motion to be withdrawn.

Mr. Crookshank: I do not accept the arguments at all, but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) made an appeal to the House to be generous in this matter. The hon. Member is, no doubt, perfectly within his rights, and I am not denying—

Mr. Silverman: Not mine, but the rights of the House of Commons.

Mr. Crookshank: —the right of any hon. Member to speak on any subject when it is in order to do so, but there are certain occasions when we try to restrain our eloquence. This appeared to be one of them.
The House generally is very generous to any of its Members and feels great sympathy with them if and when they fall inadvertently into misfortune, as is the case here. Mr. Holland-Martin, as the Select Committee has pointed out, had no idea that he was in error. However, it was he himself who thought he might be at risk, and it was he who raised the issue, and nobody else, and the Select Committee has reported in his case. That being so, and as we are about to rise for a considerable period, the Government thought, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South agreed, that it would be the right and decent and proper thing to pass this Bill through all its stages today.
However, we certainly do not wish—I am sure that nobody in the House, in the country, or indeed anywhere—to delay for one moment the important speech that my right hon. Friend is to make, even though it may cause some injustice to Mr. Holland-Martin if we put off further proceedings on the Bill. Knowing him as I do, I am perfectly certain that he would waive his own feelings in a case like this, which is more than the hon. Gentleman is prepared to do. As the right hon. Gentleman opposite says, the whole issue will be debated on another Bill later this Session.
I have, naturally, asked the Attorney-General what would be the position of Mr. Holland-Martin if, in the meantime,


we left the Bill merely at the stage of having been read a Second time only. My right hon. and learned Friend advises me that he thinks that Mr. Holland-Martin is fully covered, the Second Reading having been given, but for further security he would have to advise the House, he now thinks, to insert in the Bill a retrospective Clause when we take the further stages of the Bill. That is something which the House is always very unwilling to do and, therefore, we are in that dilemma, but we will proceed on those lines. I think that it is a very great pity that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) did not take the advice of the deputy-leader of his party today, but as objection has been taken we certainly do not want to continue this debate one moment further.

Mr. Silverman: Do not be so provocative.

Mr. Crookshank: If it comes to provocation, I must say that the speech of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne was a champion of that. I do not think that we shall need to discuss this matter any further. Therefore, I suggest that the Motion be withdrawn.

Mr. Robert Allan: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Committee upon Tuesday 25th October.

FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, GENEVA

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Buchan-Hepburn.]

4.51 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): I want to take this opportunity to give the House a general account of the Geneva Conference, which has just concluded, and some estimate of its results. Our objectives at that Conference have been many times declared, notably in the invitation sent out and accepted last May. What I think the House would like to consider this afternoon is how far these objectives have been realised, and I also want to give some explanation of the various proposals put forward by the United Kingdom delegation. Indeed, I want to deal with those in some detail, and that is not because they were themselves more important than the proposals, some of them very imaginative and far-reaching, put forward by other delegations, but because in my judgment this House is always entitled to a full account of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in these important matters.
I should like also to take the opportunity to thank the House and particularly, if I may, the leaders of the Opposition for the restraint they showed in not asking for a debate before the talks began and in not pressing us to catalogue too definitely our intentions in a meeting of this kind. That certainly helped us in our work.
First, of course, we wanted to improve the atmosphere of international relations and to bring an end to the state of tension between East and West. This we tried to do at the Conference itself by discussion, both candid and conciliatory, of the real international issues which divide us, about which I will say something in a moment. We tried to do it also by frequent private discussions outside the Conference room. I believe that the latter had real value in removing some of the distrust and some of the mutual suspicion which had been the root cause of many of our difficulties for so long. They also drew closest to the purpose which my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) had in


mind when he proposed such a meeting. As so many times before, his was the foresight and the instinct of what we should do.
Ten years have passed since the heads of Governments of the four Powers last met at Potsdam, a period which will be in the minds of some right hon. Gentlemen opposite, when the change of Government took place during the Conference. In that time there have been many changes, not least among the personalities concerned. Therefore, it was right that the new leaders should meet and get to know each other. Their meeting has certainly changed the climate of international relations.
Now for the practical issues of the Conference—First to reduce tension, second to secure the unity of Germany and the right of a unified Germany to determine her own future in freedom. There is no doubt that this is the dominant issue in Europe today. So long as Germany is divided, there can be no real security or mutual confidence in Europe. At Berlin our delegation put forward, as the House will remember, a plan for free elections, for the formation of an all-German Government, and for the negotiation and the conclusion with that Government of a peace treaty. That is what we did at Berlin. It is necessary to recall that we have never asked that Germany should be integrated with the West. To do so would not be consistent with Germany's freedom of choice. Germany, under our plan, would in fact have three choices—association with the West, association with the East, or neutrality.
Admittedly—and I have said it in the House many times—we do not believe that it is a practical policy to try to impose neutrality on Germany. We also accept, and I think that we must accept it if we are to face the European scene fairly, that a united Germany today would probably choose of her own free will to associate with the West. But the principle is there all the same. The choice would be Germany's alone, and that has always been our position. It is not, therefore, quite just to say that the position of the Western Powers is that Germany must anyway be integrated with N.A.T.O. The position of the Western Powers is, in the main, that Germany must make her own decision when she is united, but

we still believe, and we repeated at the Conference, that this plan for freedom of choice by Germany is the right one.
But, of course, we recognise—and I think that the House must recognise—that there are other considerations which we have to take into account. I am quite sure that Dr. Adenauer and the Western German Government are also ready to do so. Russia—and indeed Europe as a whole—has the right to expect that the unification of Germany shall not create a danger for Russia or for Europe. We have tried to meet this problem, which is really the cardinal problem of Europe today. It is for this reason that we put forward at Geneva certain proposals which we believe are practicable and which are designed to ensure that the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union will be safeguarded.
I must make some mention of these proposals to the House. The first was a European Security Pact, of which the Four Powers who held the Conference at Geneva would be members, with the addition of a united Germany. Under such a pact each country would undertake to go to the aid of any one of them if attacked by another. The guarantees would be reciprocal, that is to say, for example, we should guarantee the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union would guarantee us. The pact would not be linked with existing frontiers but would be solely concerned with resistance to acts of aggression. There is nothing particularly novel in that, as it is the same principle as that which underlies N.A.T.O.
The Russians may prefer a wider pact with membership embracing a larger number of countries. If so, we are ready to examine that, although we think it best to start with the simpler proposition. I think it is also a fact that if those countries are agreed and united in a pact of that character it is unlikely that any other Power in Europe would wish to start up any major trouble. If it is desirable that the membership should be wider, that is not excluded.
The next proposal we made was intended to provide some physical guarantee against a war in Europe, and that is why we suggested an agreement on the total forces and the total armaments on each side in Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany. In our view a united Germany would be a partner in


such an arrangement, which would also provide for reciprocal control and make provision for joint inspection of the limitations which the Powers had agreed upon. I think the House will see that that is a far-reaching proposal capable of making an important contribution to confidence in Europe.

Mr. William Warbey: May I intervene?

The Prime Minister: Must the hon. Gentleman?

Mr. Warbey: Yes, because this is a point about which there has been a good deal of puzzlement. I think the right hon. Gentleman might be able to clear it up at this stage. He talks about agreement for the limitation of forces and inspection on both sides in Germany. If there can be a united Germany, how can there be two sides within Germany? Would he make that point clear?

The Prime Minister: What I was suggesting was that there would be limitation—let the hon. Gentleman put the word "Germany" out of his mind in this context. What I was suggesting was that there should be agreed limitation on the forces and on armaments in a certain area of Europe. I said, in fact, Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany. I suggested that in that area, the countries having agreed on the number of the armaments, that mutual inspection would be agreed upon. There is nothing whatever in the existence of a united Germany to make that either easier or more difficult. It does not affect the problem either one way or the other. I hope that has cleared that.
Finally, we also suggested that we should examine the possibility of a wholly demilitarised area between the East and the West, to interpose, as it were, something in the nature of a protective pad between the armies facing each other in Europe. All these proposals, with others, were accepted for examination by the Foreign Secretaries. They are capable of adjustment and development, and they are of the utmost importance to the twin problems of Germany united and European security.
I called them twin problems, because in my judgment they will only be solved together. In all our discussions day by

day, hour by hour, the Soviet representatives maintained that a system of European security must come first. They argued that the two fragments of Germany should take their place in the new system, and the unity of Germany could come later and by degrees. We could not accept this argument, and I will tell the House why.
We are convinced that no European security is possible on the basis of a divided Germany. That is the deep difference between us at this time. All the parties at the Conference clearly understood the significance of it; all, I am convinced, would like to solve it. Admittedly that is not going to be easy, but I think it possible in time that some solution on the lines I have already indicated may provide a way through.
If some hon. Members are pessimistic enough to believe—and, of course, it is a possible view to take—that no reconciliation of our views on these points can ever be realised, I would recall for a moment the position at Berlin last year, not, after all, so very long ago. Nothing then seemed less likely at the end of that conference than that the position of Austria would be settled by an agreed treaty within 18 months. On the contrary, it seemed then—I confess I certainly thought it—that the problem of Austria would never be settled until the problem of Germany was settled.
But there has been a remarkable change of climate in these last few months. It is not so long ago that we were told that if the Paris Agreements were ratified that would mark the end of any possibility of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Well, despite this, the four Heads of Government have now met with results that each of them considers encouraging. So, despite the difficulties of the German problem and the security of Europe we must continue to seek a solution. If we keep pushing up against our difficulties long enough we shall, in time, find a way through, provided the climate of international relations remains as Geneva has created it.
In this context, I must say something about disarmament. Far-reaching plans have been tabled, as the House knows, at the Five-Power sub-committee of the United Nations which has been sitting in London most of this year. Important progress has been made, and the latest


Soviet proposals come much nearer to those which we and the French advanced some months ago. But in this business of disarmament, after many years experience of it, I believe there is much to be said for starting with practical and limited objectives at the same time as going on to work out far-reaching plans.
It was in that spirit that we put forward at Geneva what the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) may have been thinking of, a proposal about which there was for a while some misunderstanding, though I think it has now all cleared away. We suggested—and we still suggest; we have not changed our proposals —that in view of the known practical difficulties of devising any adequate system of inspection and control—and anyone who is interested in this topic will soon find what those practical difficulties are—and in view of the fact that the disarmament proposals finally depend on being able to find such schemes of control, that a start should be made now with a limited experiment in the control of armaments in Europe. The suggestion was that on either side of the line which divides the armies of the East and West—and this has nothing to do with the wider scheme I outlined to the House earlier, but is purely one small practical experiment on either side of the line—we should establish a system of joint inspection of the forces which now confront each other. We should do that in specified areas and to an agreed depth on either side and with joint inspection teams who would operate there by mutual consent.
This would provide us, if it could be agreed, with some valuable, practical lessons which we could then apply later over a wider field. Of course, this proposal relates only to disarmament. It has nothing to do with any plans to unify Germany or to build a European security pact. If it comes into being it will be an arrangement between the Governments concerned only for a limited period. It would not in any way prejudice the unity of Germany or European security. It is a small practical exercise which I still think is worth carrying out, because if it works there will be a growth of confidence which would encourage countries to go forward and tackle the more complicated issues of wide control.

Mr. Denis Healey: Could the Prime Minister tell me whether he en-

visages the West German Government as providing members for such inspection teams?

The Prime Minister: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Healey: And the East German Government?

The Prime Minister: That is one of the things that would have to be discussed, but what I visualise is joint military teams from the two sides who are carrying out this inspection. I would rather not be committed at this moment to the whole of the problem which the hon. Gentleman has put to me, although it is in my mind. It would be in the main a military exercise arranged by the commanders on the spot once the general directives were given to them.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Would it also, in the view of the Prime Minister, cover atomic weapons in the area to be inspected?

The Prime Minister: They could go and see what was happening on either side of the line. The purpose of the business would be to see what could be done by teams of inspection and whether they can work together as teams of inspection. Some hon. Members of this House may recall that at the end of the war there was a suggestion that the administration of Germany might have been a joint administration rather than zoned, and politically there was a great deal to be said for it, although administratively it was thought to be most difficult to work and it was not done. That is the kind of thought that lies behind this suggestion: to see whether a certain number of countries, working together from either side, cannot in practice work out a reasonable and a limited system of inspection. That is the thought which I want to leave with the House.
As the House may have seen from the directive to the Foreign Secretaries, that proposal together with those tabled by the other three delegations, have been referred to the Foreign Secretaries and to the representatives of the Five Powers in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations. I have already welcomed at Geneva the bold and imaginative proposal of President Eisenhower at the Conference. If such an arrangement could be agreed upon as he there suggested, the whole atmosphere of international relations


could be transformed. M. Faure put forward a number of constructive suggestions, some of them very far reaching in character. Finally we welcomed the advance which the Soviet Government themselves have made towards the Anglo-French proposals on general disarmament.
All this will be studied both by the Sub-Committee and the Foreign Ministers. I think it right that both bodies should be concerned with this task. There are some aspects of disarmament which concern primarily the four Governments, others which have a wider application. What we must do is to use every method to get the results we want.
I wish we had had more time at this Conference to discuss another question to which I attach great importance, though again this is probably psychological rather than political; that is the question of increasing contact between the peoples of our countries at every level. There is much that could be done here. We would like to see increased facilities for tourists, for students, for journalists. We made certain proposals about this which will be examined in the autumn, at the same time as the trade question.
In a few moments I want to sum up my impressions and give the House a certain important item of information. Before I do that, however, I would like to say something about the situation in the Far East. This was discussed in our private meetings. I do not myself think that any more formal discussions would have been helpful in the absence of some of the principals.
The situation in the Far East is more dangerous than that in Europe, definitely more. Even so, there are some problems in diplomacy which time can certainly cure, and this is one of them. Every country concerned must help in this way. For this purpose I am sure that our talks at Geneva were useful. We have to enlist all the help that we can. Meanwhile the House will have been pleased to note that conversations are to begin on 1st August at Geneva between the United States and Chinese representatives. That is all to the good. The talks will be at the level of Ambassadors and they will begin by dealing with certain current practical problems, not of the first order of magnitude. We must all wish them

well. They could be a helpful beginning and Her Majesty's Government have been glad to play some part in these developments.
Finally I would like to give the House some personal impressions of the result of this Conference. I find this very difficult to do because, at a meeting like this, atmosphere has its part to play as much as negotiation, perhaps even more. However, making all possible reserves, I believe that we have reduced tension and that we have created a situation in which the Foreign Secretaries can get to grips with major political problems this autumn. Now they will have to start preparing for what must be very hard work indeed. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will not mind that, I know.
No doubt some people will complain that the practical results of this Conference have been small. That is true, but it was never to be expected that the problems of Europe could be solved in the short time at the disposal of the heads of Governments. What we have done is to set in motion a long process of negotiations. It would be rash to expect rapid and far-reaching results. It may well be that limited solutions will prove the most practical method of approach and then perhaps, as confidence grows, we can advance towards more ambitious proposals. That may be how it will work out. Meanwhile Geneva has given this simple message to the whole world: it has reduced the dangers of war.
Now there is an announcement which I wish to make to the House. In Geneva my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and I had several meetings in private with Mr. Bulganin, Mr. Krushchev and their colleagues. We discussed very frankly our anxieties about the great problems which divide the world. We also considered how to maintain and strengthen the personal relations which we had established at Geneva. As a result of our discussions we have agreed upon the terms of the following communique for announcement in Moscow and in London this afternoon:
During the Geneva Conference the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union discussed the importance of strengthening relations beween their two countries by maintaining the personal contact which they had established at Geneva. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Bulganin, and member of the Presidium of the


Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Krushchev, have accepted the invitation of Sir Anthony Eden to visit the United Kingdom in the spring of next year.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

The Prime Minister: I think that the House has shown that it is glad to hear the first information of this visit and that both the House and the country will welcome it, as a step towards ending that state of mutual distrust which we call the cold war.

5.19 p.m.

Mr. Herbert Morrison: The House is indebted to the Prime Minister for the report which he has given of the proceedings at Geneva. We have all heard with great pleasure the announcement which he made at the end of his speech. I am sure that both sides of the House will be delighted to know that Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Krushchev are to visit the United Kingdom. We are glad that they are coming, and hope they will stay some time so that they may get to know us well, and that those of us who have the opportunity of seeing them may get to know them. I am delighted that it should be so; it is a good thing.
The Geneva Conference has, I think, been useful and of value. The Prime Minister himself in March, when he was Foreign Secretary, did not appear to be enthusiastic about a meeting of the Heads of Government, but the next day the then head of our Government said that he thought it was a good idea. I imagine that since the former Foreign Secretary has become the head of the Government he has become more reconciled to the idea and is now quite pleased with it.
Anyway, it came off, and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that his right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), and also my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, deserve credit for the way in which they pressed the idea. The personal contact between the Heads of Government has been all to the good, and so has the personal contact between the Foreign Secretaries and between all the people who were there. It must have improved relations. It is not only the meetings in the official gatherings and the official discussions; it is the unofficial gatherings,

the meetings by the wayside, the meals, and the little parties, that make all the difference. I myself had an opportunity for social contact with Mr. Bulganin in 1936 at County Hall.

The Prime Minister: Mr. Bulganin remembers it.

Mr. Morrison: I am glad to hear from the Prime Minister that Mr. Bulganin remembers it. He was then in the more modest position of Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, and he came to study London local government and London transportation. I believe that one of the indirect results was the building of the Moscow underground, of which the people of Moscow are very proud.

Mr. Ellis Smith: And rightly so.

Mr. Morrison: I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) is correct when he says "rightly so." As a matter of fact, I am rather proud of London's Underground, too, and rightly so, and a lot of other things which are knocking about this city.
One of the encouraging things about the Geneva proceedings was the absence of the old unpleasantness or abuse on every side. There was an assumption between the main spokesmen of sincerity on the part of the others which was of great value. The Conference really constituted a great public debate, with considered contributions being made by the Heads of Government. It can, of course, be argued whether it was right that it should have been so public, and certainly it was risky, but I think that, as a whole, the publicity did not do any harm in this instance at Geneva.
What has come out of it is agreement upon an agenda for the Foreign Ministers to consider in the autumn. It might be said that that is not much to come out of this high-powered conference, but, believe me, it is. We had experience of this sort of thing at the time I was at the Foreign Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies), then Under-Secretary of State, spent weeks and weeks in discussion at the Palais Rose in Paris in an attempt to obtain an agenda, but those taking part really never got to the substance of the thing at all. It was "tactics, tactics all


the way" which is no good. An agenda was never agreed. That is not the only instance, for there have been other occasions when it has not been possible to get an agenda.
Now the Foreign Secretaries have terms of reference for consideration; they have an agenda. A number of items on the agenda indicate various possible approaches. There is nothing conclusive about the agenda. All this means that there is a great deal of work to be done; there are many alternatives, and, of course, it will take time. There is much to do, and we must not underestimate the difficulties which will have to be faced.
Nevertheless, the situation is better than it was, and all the nations participating in the Conference are to be congratulated on the good temper there. This includes the representatives of the Soviet Union, who made their contribution, as did our own representatives, and the President of the United States, who certainly brought a feeling of good fellowship, particularly between him and those whom he knew previously, as well as the Prime Minister of France.
It is sometimes argued that regional pacts such as N.A.T.O. are wrong and ought not to exist, but I think it reasonable that there should be such pacts. Indeed, a pamphlet has recently been published under Soviet auspices by Mr. Dmitri Melnikov, in which he justifies regional pacts. Therefore, that argument seems to break down and N.A.T.O. seems to be justifiable, as are other things. Indeed, in a way the Soviet Union has a regional pact in Eastern Europe, really much stronger than N.A.T.O., and much more integrated. That is permitted. Therefore, my answer to the question whether such pacts are justified is that I think they are.
It is, nevertheless, the case that the Eastern bloc must constitute a very great strain on the Soviet Union from the point of view of political leadership and administrative responsibility. I would not put it past possibility that there may be a loosening of the grip of the Soviet Union on the satellite States and possibly on Eastern Germany. Let us not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union itself may tire of the great burden which it

involves, especially if the tension continues to relax. After all, that happened in Austria; unexpectedly, all of a sudden, it was agreed to accept that which had previously been refused.
If in addition to that we can get disarmament, which is really the biggest single key to international peace, it will make a great difference. I could not quite follow the scheme which the Prime Minister briefly outlined to the House. I wish he had devoted a little more time to it and given us a little more detail. No doubt the Foreign Secretary can pick up the matter later on.
What I should like to know is the kind of geographical area which it is in mind to cover for the experiment in disarmament. If it is strictly only Central Europe —there may be something to be said for it; I am not saying that there is not—that is quite limited and it is debatable whether it would be good enough. If it is to cover the whole of the Powers in the Western European Union—excluding the United States, presumably—we and France would be involved in armaments limitation, but would the Soviet Union? If not, our balance would be thrown out of gear. On the other hand, is it likely, or reasonable to expect, that the Soviet Union would come into the experiment on the basis of a strict European affair, which would put the Soviet in difficulties vis-à-vis the United States of America? I should have thought that it would be difficult about that.
On the face of it, and without further information, these are the problems that I see, and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will later on give us more detail and more information, including the geographical area. Certainly disarmament is the biggest single problem, and we need a sound and fair scheme with international inspection; that is absolutely necessary and important.
It is good that the Russians have dropped their old idea of a percentage all-round reduction, because it was an impossible proposition which made relatively no difference to the situation. The Russians have recognised that, I dare say that they knew about it all along. I am very glad that they have now abandoned that idea and are prepared to talk in terms of relative figures between the bigger Powers, the smaller Powers, and so


on, so there is a greater possibility of encouragement in that direction. Disarmament would be the greatest single contribution to peace. It would give the nations a greater sense of security and a lessening of fear.
Of course, that disarmament, when it comes and is agreed, must include the hydrogen bomb and the atomic bomb. Real disarmament must be achieved so that the nations do not have at their disposal enough arms to start another great war, and so that the view of the Foreign Secretary when he said "there ain't gonna be any war" may be correct. I saw that Mr. Cudlipp in the "News Chronicle" said that by engaging in Cockney the Foreign Secretary will upset some of his supporters in the Bromley division of Kent. That is next door to me, but I do not mind as long as it does not affect South Lewisham.
That view might be all right, if we can get to that point of disarmament, but at the moment we can be over-optimistic and I am not too sure that the Foreign Secretary was not a little too optimistic in saying that at this stage. It reminded me, with a shiver—although the circumstances are different—of the return of Mr. Neville Chamberlain with his piece of paper which he said meant peace but which did not. Things are better than that, but I am not sure that they are as good as the Foreign Secretary said. Of course, what he said will encourage some of my hon. Friends to continue to press the Government for an inquiry into the period of National Service. We must try to remove the power to make large-scale war, and our Government and others must push on, for there is more hope.
However, the economic consequences of disarmament ought to be studied. There are two economic consequences, one possible and one that might be troublesome. There could be an economic consequence whereby, as proposed by the French Prime Minister, we could devote part of the savings to helping the backward areas of the world. The other one is one on which the Government should set its civil servants, or experts, to work—not that we shall have disarmament in five minutes but there is nothing like being ready. There might be an enormous decrease in the work and operations of the British industries involved in armament production. If armaments stop, there

will be serious economic consequences which will have to be taken into account, problems of employment, problems of the use of engineering installations and plant. It would be well if the Government put their backroom boys to studying how to handle that situation, if and when it arises.
I could not agree more with the Prime Minister than when he said that there is a great need for contacts between peoples. That is important, and if we could get free and individual visits all round among all these countries, irrespective of their political systems, that would be useful. If we could only get freedom of the air and broadcasting, without any jamming against each other, that would be a good thing, too. What is important is that the people of every country shall know what the peoples of other countries are thinking, and that when Governments make pronouncements, or engage in arguments, we should be able to know what the pronouncements and arguments are.
In this connection I should like to welcome the existence of the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council, of which the Chairman is my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) and of which the Vice-Chairman is the hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe). I gather that good work has already been done in welcoming people from the Soviet Union to this country and that contacts are being developed. That body is well worthy of adequate and reasonable support from Her Majesty's Government.
The Prime Minister mentioned the Far East. Another contribution to peace which I hope is not far distant will be a change in United States policy towards China by recognising the de facto Government in China by according to her admission to the United Nations and the Security Council. We have seen some change in the mental attitude of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's spirit at the Geneva Conference was much better than anything which we have experienced before. I believe that the United States is no less capable of change and that it may well change in its policy about China at a not too distant date. That would be a real contribution to Far Eastern peace and to the general peace of the world.
With regard to Germany, we all have to face the fact that Western Germany is now a sovereign State and therefore has the right of self-defence. If it has the right of self-defence, it must have the right of collective self-defence, and it is important that its democracy should develop. Of course, there is a greater degree of armament in Eastern Germany, and has been for some time, and in those circumstances we could not give Western Germany sovereign powers without any armaments at all.
That is a principle which cannot reasonably be resisted, nor do I think that the principle of a unified Germany can reasonably be resisted. It is reasonable in itself and it is right in principle, as is the question of free and democratic elections, with a free Press and free speech at the time of the elections and at other times. Those are rights, and it is wrong for people sometimes to say that those elementary rights, which ought to be universal, cannot be given unless something is given in return which it is not desired to give.
Those are things to which Germany has a right in order properly to function as one of the democratic States of the world. I hope that a united Germany will cooperate with the West, but it is quite clear and has been made abundantly clear this afternoon and previously, that a united Germany will be free to do what she likes in foreign policy and to take what course she thinks is wisest.
I understand the Soviet fear of the possibility of German aggression, and so we must do our best to satisfy the Soviet Union on that score if we can. I do not think that neutralism, that is to say a neutral Germany, solves the problem. If it is a neutral Germany which is armed, there arises the problem of how to keep Germany neutral. If it is a Germany unarmed, there arises the problem of how to keep it disarmed. In neither way is neutralisation really the solution. There may be a demilitarised zone, as has been mentioned and we should like to know a little more about that. Would that demilitarised zone be on the west and the east of the eastern frontier of Eastern Germany—I should have thought that that would be a fair place for it—or is it intended that it should be somewhere else?
The next possibility, as the Prime Minister said, is a security pact. It could be a direct pact between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw organisation. There could be this idea of the five Powers, which seems to me to be the simplest and the most attractive, and is probably the quickest to achieve. It could be a pact of all the European countries, but that is rather elaborate and would complicate the machinery and the administrative set-up very much indeed.
At all events, whatever happens, all these things are worthy of consideration, and we must not under-estimate Russian apprehensions about Germany. We must do all we can to satisfy her. What we cannot agree to—and I gather that the Soviet Union does not now press it—is that the United States should now depart from Europe as well. It is profoundly important that United States troops should be in Europe.
There is the possibility of the new and better chapter for which we hoped far back in 1945 at the end of the war, and for which our late colleague Ernest Bevin worked with great energy. We have now reached a point from which the Powers had moved away, and that is encouraging. It is the duty of everybody to try hard to develop further good relations and peace —ourselves, the United States, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, for I am sure that the people of Russia want peace just as much as do the people of the United Kingdom want peace. Indeed, they have much to gain from it, for the natural resources of the Soviet Union are enormous, and the U.S.S.R. has all the material resources out of which to make a great and prosperous country.
We shall watch the work of the Foreign Ministers with interest. We shall support them, including our own Foreign Secretary, if we think they are right, and we shall not hesitate to criticise them if we think they are wrong. At any rate, we wish them every success, just as we would say to the Government, to our own people, and to the world, "Let us hope that all this means good luck to the cause of peace."

5.43 p.m.

Mr. Richard Sharpies: I am sure that the whole House will welcome the statement that has been made this afternoon by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Perhaps the


most significant thing which he said was that the Conference at Geneva has reduced the danger of war, and if it has done that, then it has achieved perhaps the greater part of what was intended.
I feel also that the whole House will welcome the visit of the Soviet leaders when they come to this country next spring. I should also like to say how glad I am that my right hon. Friend gave the highest priority to the solution of the problem of Germany, because it is my belief that, unless we can solve the problem of Germany, we can have no lasting peace and no lasting solution to all our problems.
After those few words, I hope the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) will excuse me if I do not follow him in the arguments which he advanced this afternoon. I should like to take this opportunity of coming down from the summit for a moment and speaking briefly of the meeting of 190 Members of Parliament which took place in Paris last week—190 Members of Parliament from the N.A.T.O. countries.
To my mind, there were two special features of that meeting. One was that it was the first time that Canadian Members of Parliament and Congressmen from the United States had come together with their opposite numbers in Europe for a free and frank discussion of their mutual problems. It was supposed at one moment that the American Congressmen might not be able to attend, and they even had to go to the length of passing a special Bill through Congress before they were allowed to do so.
It was a great pity that no members of the United States Senate were present at that meeting, but the Vice-President of the United States in fact sent a telegram to the leader of the American delegation explaining why it was not possible for members of the American Senate to go to that meeting. It appears that in the American Senate there is a majority of one, and I believe that it is sometimes difficult to tell on which side that one is likely to vote in any particular division.
I think that a measure of the success of that meeting was that we had only one motion before us; indeed, only one was considered, and that was a motion which referred to the possibility of having another meeting next year and suggested that meetings should thereafter continue

year after year. The measure of success of the conference was that that motion was passed unanimously.
Further, the conference did not burden itself, I think rightly, with the setting up of a vast organisation and a vast secretariat, but contented itself with arranging for one part-time secretary, who happens to be British, to be appointed, to make the arrangements for the next meeting, which we hope will take place next year. Neither did we become involved in any long discussion about rules of procedure and matters of that kind. In fact, we had no rules of procedure, and seemed to get along perfectly well without them.
The second feature of that meeting was that it took place at the same time as the talks at the summit were going on at Geneva. At the same time as those talks were going on at the top, we had that meeting of Members of Parliament from the N.A.T.O. countries going on, as we might say, at the base. I am a very firm believer in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Indeed, it would be very surprising if I were not, having myself worked for two and a half years in the Organisation before I had the good fortune to be elected a Member of the House.
I was particularly glad that before the Prime Minister went to Geneva he made it quite clear in a speech which he made that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation formed an integral part and fact of our foreign policy, and that nothing said at Geneva would in any way alter our attitude to N.A.T.O. It is my belief that there is nothing that the Russians would like better, in spite of the better will that there is today, than to see the disintegration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I believe that they would, perhaps, be prepared to pay a high price to see that Organisation disintegrate, and I hope that nothing that is done now or in the future will allow that to happen.
There is no need for me to remind the House that our security—and probably the fact that no war has taken place up to date—has very largely been due to the fact that we have had this Organisation in being. I believe that as time goes on the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will increase and not decrease. I should like to see an extension of the Organisation, not only in the military sphere, because we already have


the military organisation. As those of us who were in Paris saw, we have a very efficient and a very good military organisation already in being.
I hope that more attention will be paid to the other Articles of the Treaty, particularly to Article 2, which calls for the political and economic integration of the North Atlantic Treaty area. My right hon. Friend spoke of the hope for more personal contact between the peoples of the East and West. I hope, too, that we may see more contact between the peoples of the North Atlantic Treaty area. I believe that the meeting which we had in Paris was a good example of what can be done in that direction. For many of the Canadian Members of Parliament it was their first visit to Europe, and the first chance of seeing for themselves the problems of Europe.
I should also like to see the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have some common policy for counteracting the propaganda which has been coming, and which, I regret, still continues to come, from the East. I am sure that we need a common policy to counteract that propaganda. Let us hope that it will now die down, but just the same I think that there is need for a common policy on that score.
I came away from the meeting in Paris with the feeling that in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation we had a living and vital body, something more than a simple military alliance. I believe that the other Members of Parliament and Congressmen came away from the meeting with the same feeling. If that meeting has done something to strengthen the unity and the common bond between the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, it will have achieved its purpose. I hope that it will be the first of many similar meetings in the future.

5.54 p.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I hope that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Mr. Sharples) will excuse me if I do not discuss the N.A.T.O. meeting in Paris. On the way back from Geneva, I looked in on those assembled there and they seemed to be having a very nice week. But I think that we ought here to concentrate on what I believe to have been an epoch-making Conference. I know that one should not

use clichés like that, but I have a feeling that Geneva was the symbol of the expression of a fundamental change in world relations, a change which, I believe, will have—and I agree very much with my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison)—and should have, profound effects on our own policy in the near future.
Very few of us could disagree with anything that the Prime Minister said in his account of Geneva, and, from this side of the House, I should like to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on one part of his and of the Foreign Secretary's rôle there. Those of us who were at Geneva last year were, of course, aware that the Foreign Secretary, as he then was, was the hero of the first Geneva Conference. He was the man who rescued the world from drifting into war in Indo-China by patching up the peace with Mr. Molotov. It would have been quite human in this Conference, I think, to resent the fact that the right hon. Gentleman, a Briton, did not play the prominent rôle which he played last year —quite human, but I am very glad that there was no sign of it.
We realised in this Conference the fact that the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary was not required to mediate between a present Russia and an absent America, for we must remember that a year before the Americans at Geneva were refusing even to speak to a Russian or a Communist. The fact that we were not required to mediate was surely a sign of an improvement in world relations, and I am not depressed because Britain, in that sense, played a minor rôle, or that Geneva was, as it undoubtedly was, Eisenhower's Conference.
I should also like to add my tribute to the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill). He was so right when we look back at the speech which he made. There were a lot of wise people who said, "They will not be able to do anything. It will all be left in the hands of the professionals." The right hon. Member for Woodford said, "For God's sake let us get the men together without the paraphernalia of the experts, because it does make a difference."
What was proved at Geneva was that those who were there felt in an extraordinary way that though we had the Foreign Secretaries and huge retinues of


officials present, we also had the four big men. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will excuse me for saying that when the Foreign Ministers met, they were very likely in the morning to get into difficulties which could only be resolved in the afternoon by their Heads of State saying to them, "Do not be silly; do not stand on protocol." The personalities of the Heads of State offset the routine atmosphere of the Foreign Office, and I was glad that the Conference took place with the Heads of State for, without them, there would have been another Berlin. There would not have been this change of approach without Eisenhower.
A year ago, I did not think Eisenhower had it in him to do what he did at Geneva this time. I think it showed that he realised that the American people had really taken a decision for peace. America has had some very dangerous advisers. There have been plenty of people in America, and a few in this country, who have said that force is the only language which the Communists understand. Thank goodness the mood has changed, and that, simultaneously with the change of mood in Russia after Stalin, we had a change in the American mood back from the insanity of the so-called "negotiation through strength" to a realisation that peace cannot be attained simply by threatening and refusing to negotiate.
This brings me to the point which I want to put to the House about the Conference. Some people say that the importance of the Conference consisted simply in the fact that, after all, the H-bomb was here and has made war impossible. I suppose that is what the Foreign Secretary had in mind when he said, "There ain't gonna be any war." I agree with him that the H-bomb has made war impossible, if what is meant by war is using the H-bomb as an instrument of policy, because that means that no one can start a war today with any hope of winning it. Therefore, in the conventional sense, the H-bomb makes war impossible.
I do not believe, however, that the importance of Geneva was that the H-bomb had made war impossible. That had happened before Geneva. The men at at Geneva surely saw that. Each side met the other and discovered that it agreed on that point. Each had made up its own mind, but each was still believing

that the other side might be insane and might want to launch a surprise attack. I think that it was this personal contact between Mr. Eisenhower and the other side which finally dispelled from the minds of both sides the belief that one might spring a surprise world annihilation upon the other.
That seems to be the great thing which Mr. Eisenhower achieved; he broke this fear—by meeting and knowing personally each of the Russians; by his contacts at the buffet after the sessions; and also by bringing over Admiral Radford, when he was told that they regarded the Admiral as a "Preventive warrior," to meet the Russians face to face. To my mind this has meant a real break in the cold war, and we should thank Mr. Eisenhower for that. He has done a job which no one but he could have done. It is not something which a British Prime Minister could have done, because the great issue was whether America would recognise this fact in time—and I believe that she has.
I suggest that certain consequences follow. If it is true that war is impossible it is also true that there cannot be negotiation from military strength—for what does negotiation from military strength mean? It means that one side says, in the last resort. "If you will not give way I have the power to enforce my will," and if both sides now appreciate that they have to deny themselves that ultimate threat, then negotiation from military strength is ruled out. Ironically enough, however, it is denied to those Powers with nuclear weapons but can still be used by small Powers which are still fighting with conventional weapons. Small nations can threaten to use their military power, but great nations, with nuclear weapons, dare not do so.
That can be put in another way. If it is agreed that war is impossible, each side can veto any proposal of the other, and there is no way of lifting the veto. Let me give one example from the Far East. I have no doubt that the Chinese and the Russians now have to face the fact that the Americans are going to veto the release of Formosa, for the time being, to become part of Communist China, and if they are determined to veto that they can stop it happening. Equally, we have to face the fact that in Europe the Russians can veto the


integration of a united Germany into N.A.T.O. If they do so, and if war is impossible, we must accept that veto as a fact.
That is the most important thing after Geneva. In the old days, we thought that all mountains were movable if we had sufficient force behind us to threaten the other man. Now, since we have not got that force, each side must accept the ultimate veto of the other side to any main proposal. We must accept the Russian veto of our plans for Germany, and the Russians must accept that whatever changes take place in relation to Formosa, America is ultimately going to say, "No, you cannot have it, for the time being."

ROYAL ASSENT

6.3 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;

The House went:—and, having returned;

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to—

1. Appropriation (No. 2) Act, 1955.
2. European Coal and Steel Community Act, 1955.
3. International Finance Corporation Act, 1955.
4. Miscellaneous Financial Provisions Act. 1955.
5. Wireless Telegraphy (Blind Persons) Act, 1955.
6. County Courts Act, 1955.
7. Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955.
8. Validation of Elections Act, 1955.
9. Aberdeen Corporation Order Confirmation Act, 1955.
10. Stromness Harbour (Guarantee) Order Confirmation Act, 1955.
11. Bournemouth Corporation (Trolley Vehicles) Order Confirmation Act, 1955.
12. Doncaster Corporation (Trolley Vehicles) Order Confirmation Act, 1955.
13. Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Colne Valley Sewerage Board) Act, 1955.
14. Taf Fechan Water Supply Act, 1955.
15. Cardiff Corporation Act, 1955.

16. German Potash Syndicate Loan Act, 1955.
17. Kent Water Act, 1955.
18. Nuneaton Corporation Act, 1955.
19. Sandown-Shanklin Urban District Council Act, 1955.
20. Chatham and District Traction Act, 1955.
21. Corn Exchange Act, 1955.
22. Liverpool Corporation Act, 1955.
23. Dewsbury Moor Crematorium Act, 1955.
24. Maidstone Corporation Act, 1955.
25. Salford Corporation Act, 1955.
26. Bristol Corporation Act, 1955.
27. Cheshunt Urban District Council Act, 1955.
28. Stock Exchange Clerks' Pension Fund Act, 1955.
29. London County Council (Money) Act, 1955.
30. Milford Docks Act, 1955.
31. North Wales Hydro-Electric Power Act, 1955.

FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, GENEVA

Question again proposed, That this House do now adjourn.

6.18 p.m.

Mr. Crossman: I was saying that the effect of the H-bomb has been to destroy the possibility of what has been called in the past negotiation from strength. Since neither side can use the threat of war to back up its diplomacy, that means that each can ultimately impose a veto on any change of the status quo vitally affecting itself.
I suggest to the House that that means that, although we cannot rely on military strength, this has the great advantage that the strength of one's cause probably counts for more now than it did before, and that there is now more chance of each side seeing reason because the ultimate force is denied to it. Any impression which I got at Geneva was that each side now knows that no problem can be permitted to be insoluble.
Six months ago, I think that it would have been fair to say that the Foreign Offices would go into negotiations knowing in advance that no solution was in sight. I believe that after Geneva negotiations will be entered into in a belief in their possibility. That means that, instead of playing political warfare in our


discussions with each other, we shall be seriously negotiating. It does not mean that all negotiations will end in success, but that at least each side recognises the possibility of them.
I want to apply that to the problem of Germany. When the Paris Agreements were signed, many hon. Members and nearly everybody in Germany believed that once Germany had been re-armed then, negotiating from strength, the West would be able to roll the Russians back —a phrase used, I think, by Dr. Adenauer —out of Eastern Germany. Now we know that to be an illusory dream. There is no way of rolling the Russians back out of Eastern Germany, because that would involve war, and war is impossible. The dream that the strength built up in Germany would automatically in some way crush the Russian power must now be abandoned.
What happened at Geneva? The West put forward what we called a "package offer" to the Russians, saying, "If you agree to the unification of Germany and the inclusion of Germany in N.A.T.O. we shall talk about European security, the possibility of a disarmed zone in the middle of Germany, and might consider a disarmament pact, provided you agree that Germany should be re-united and integrated with N.A.T.O." It is clear that the Russians turned that package down unequivocally. It was clear that they did not accept the package. They said, quite simply, "We will stay as we are, and have European security in the first stage and, in the second stage, mutual disarmament." The West turned the Russian package down just as unequivocally. Both packages are vetoed.
Therefore we face the fact that a permanent division of Germany is before as, unless we are willing to move from our prepared positions. I want very much to give my support to the words used by the Foreign Secretary when he said that it might be possible to find, at the Foreign Ministers' conference, a way of reconciliation of those views. It is clear that we stand pat on the package we offered at Geneva and that there is a permanent division of Germany until such time as the Russians make a bilateral deal with the West German Government; for that is the real danger which faces the West. We stand pat on a change in the status quo which is unacceptable to the Russians. They can effect a change in

the status quo without asking our advice, if ever they can persuade the West German Government to do a bilateral deal with them.
Therefore it is to the advantage of the Russians to have no agreement. It is we who seek agreement on Germany and are keen to get it in the short run; while the Russians can always hope that when Dr. Adenauer is dead other people in West Germany will, sooner or later, enter into some arrangement with them. We can be quite sure that Dr. Adenauer will come back from Moscow not having sold out to the Russians. This is a rather melodramatic story which will not come true this year; but if the division of Germany remains for three, five or ten years more, the possibility of a bilateral deal will grow.
Is it in the interests of Britain that we should stand pat on the integration of a united Germany into N.A.T.O.? We know that we shall not get it from the Russians. If we hold out for too long the Germans may become impatient and do a deal with the Russians. The Minister of State shakes his head. We cannot know that the Germans will never get bored of having their country divided, and will not do what they have done in the past. I am saying, not that they will, but that the risk is on our side, because the Russians can offer unification to them and we cannot.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Anthony Nutting): What we are standing pat on is not that Germany, when re-united, shall be integrated into N.A.T.O. but that the Germans should have freedom of choice.

Mr. Crossman: That was one passage of the Prime Minister's which I found a trifle disingenuous. After all, we should not stand for freedom unless we were certain that it benefited us.
I must point out to the Minister of State that West Germany is bound under the Treaty to forfeit large sections of her sovereignty. We have not said that West Germany shall be completely free. We have tied her up in all sorts of ways in the Western European Union. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that there would be unlimited sovereignty for a re-united Germany, and that we could then start making an agreement with the Russians.
It is an astonishing suggestion that reunited Germany should be the only country in the world with absolute freedom of movement. We do not mean it. We want to integrate Germany with the West. The Russians understand that quite well. The Minister of State must see that it is not much use talking to the Russians like that, because they know what all these things are about.
I congratulate the Prime Minister on not being rigid on the point and upon seeking to reconcile these conflicting positions at the Foreign Ministers' conference in October. It is no use standing pat on the principle of integration or of neutralisation. I believe that the Foreign Secretary would agree with me that there are literally dozens of methods of finding practical solutions which, at the end of the conference, would neither be integration nor neutralisation. There are ways in which the great job that Britain can do can come, not at high-level talks, but at the Foreign Ministers' conference. Our great job of diplomatic skill will be to put forward these proposals, knowing that time is not on our side and that we mean to re-unite Germany. We need it united and we need to be the mediators.
I would say just a word about the position of this country. If, as the Prime Minister suggested, the cold war comes to an end, one of our problems is that the Russians as a whole, when they change their minds, do it with a will. They do not mind eating their words. When they about-turn they do it, completely unaware that they have been doing the opposite six months ago.

Mr. Frederick Lee: The Tories can give them one or two points on that.

Mr. Crossman: My hon. Friend has taken the words out of my mouth.
I was going to say that I hoped that the power of the Conservative Party for change that it has shown on the home front will be shown in the cause of world peace. I have a feeling, now that the Russians and Americans have made up their minds to try to co-operate, that they may move very fast in that direction. It will be a great mistake for this country to be left in a cold-war vacuum in a world of peaceful co-existence.
During the last ten years we have all become accustomed to the cold war and to being a kind of aircraft carrier in the North Sea. In a period of peaceful coexistence the value of aircraft carriers goes down. In an era of peaceful coexistence we shall be at a loss to a greater extent than we have been during the last ten years. We, as a country, have had to distort our economy more than has any other in order to achieve rearmament. America has scarcely distorted hers at all; ours is as badly distorted as that of the Russian satellites.
If peace is really breaking out, we shall make a grave mistake if we do not undertake a complete reassessment of the situation. By the Paris Agreements we agreed to send four divisions to Germany and station them there permanently, meaning that we might have a two-year National Service for ever. We did that in a period of cold war, but almost as soon as it has been done that period is being transformed into one of peaceful co-existence. On my way back from Paris I spoke to a friend of mine who had been commanding an armoured unit in Germany. He said: "The problem of keeping up the men's morale is getting worse and worse because we cannot see the function of an armoured division in the light of present developments, and it is demoralising for a soldier to know that all this costs millions and millions to keep up, and it is ruinous to the economy."
We introduced the two-year National Service at a time when we really thought that the Korean war would spread. We did it also—let us be frank—in order to persuade the Europeans, by giving them a lead, to follow us. None of them did follow us. First the emergency went; now the cold war has gone and we live in a period of peaceful co-existence with a spell of two years of military service which bears no relation to our requirements, and which is an appalling burden on our economy.
Thirdly, our trade has been more affected by the embargo on East-West trade than is the case with any other country, for one simple reason, namely, that we keep our promise. When we accept an embargo we accept it; but not all our Allies have done the same. There are gentlemen in West Germany who are ardent anti-Communists ideologically, but when it comes to trade


they seem to have a strange facility for evading their obligations.
All I know is that with peace breaking out there will be a race into the East-West market. Who it to get in there first—the Germans, the Japanese, the Americans or the British? Are we to remain cold-war warriors, sitting with our ideological preconceptions, or are we to change quickly enough to keep up with the Americans when the time comes? I believe that in the next six or nine months this House will really have to sit as a Council of State and think over the basis of our foreign policy and our defence policy. I think that the basis has been transformed—and thank goodness it has been transformed—by the Geneva Conference. The only question is—can we British move quickly enough to keep up in the race?

6.34 p.m.

Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Despite what was said earlier this afternoon from the other side, it would seem that hon. Members opposite can scarcely wait to begin their holidays. I will therefore be extremely brief and resist the temptation to follow the interesting and imaginative observations of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). I want merely to address myself to that part of the directive given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the other Heads of Government to the Foreign Ministers on the development of contacts between East and West. In that directive these words are to be found:
The Foreign Ministers should, by means of experts, study measures—including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations—which could…bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between peoples.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East touched on some of the economic aspects of the present international situation, and I want to approach the economic side of the Iron Curtain which divides the main Powers today. There have been various stages and skirmishes and incidents in the cold war since Potsdam—and even before Potsdam. We have been divided from the Soviet camp by ideals and interests and faith, but historians may, I think, decide that even more important in the story of the cold war than, say, the Berlin air lift was the decision, which we regret, made by the Soviet camp not to take part in Marshall Aid.
That decision meant that the world was divided into two economic sides, one of which had a rigid, regimented, totalitarian economy with a State monopoly of foreign trade; and on the other side was the free world containing nations, some of which might be socialistic and some of which might be capitalistic, but which were dominated by principles of non-discrimination in their trading relations—principles which were irreconcilable with the sort of system which had appeared in the Soviet world.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) referred to the Foreign Secretary's excursion into the vernacular. He said that my right hon. Friend was talking cockney. I was under the impression that it was American. Be that as it may, I think that my right hon. Friend will agree that whether or not we are entering into a post-war era, in a new sense of the word "post-war"—I hope it is so—this is a period when it is even more difficult than usual to read the future. We can, however, speculate. As events unfold, there may be a disengagement of the forces of the major Powers in Europe. It may be—we hope so—that the Germans in the West will be reunited with their compatriots in the East.
It may be that it will be made possible for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have been vassals in the Soviet empire, to regain their freedom of action. But I think that we shall delude ourselves if we think that if that happy event takes place those countries now on the other side of the Iron Curtain will suddenly embrace principles of free trade and free enterprise. It is more likely that the peoples' democracies will continue in one form or another, perhaps on the pattern which we can see today in Yugoslavia. It is possible that even if the Soviet Union removed its forces and its direct influence from these countries it might be able to maintain its control over them by economic means because they have the same social system and because their currencies are tied to the rouble.
I am rather afraid that we may get nothing very much more fruitful than coexistence; that we may, as was said by the hon. Member for Coventry, East, remain in a cold war stance unless we can solve some of the economic difficulties


between the free world and the Soviet Empire.
Reference is made in the White Paper from which I have quoted to
…organs and agencies of the United Nations…
I have been told by hon. Members who know more than I do about these things that the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has already been helpful in the promotion of East-West trade, but civil servants and international civil servants—and even politicians—are, I think, inclined to be afraid or chary of departing from precedent. There is always a tendency to try to adapt oneself to an existing system rather than to change a system if that should be necessary. I believe that we shall have to change in the free world the present system of non-discrimination in economic relationships if we are to erode the economic Iron Curtain.
This is a time of change and of hope. We are glad indeed of the announcement made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and we shall all welcome the leaders of the Soviet Union. I believe that we are getting somewhere when the hon. Member for Coventry, East is heard in this Chamber praising the diplomacy of the President of the United States.
We should all pay tribute to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary for what they have already achieved on behalf of our country during the Geneva Conference. In the discussions which are to follow I believe that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will have even more to contribute, because in the Commonwealth and the sterling area we have special experience of the kind of system which enables countries and groups of countries of different outlook and civilisation and differing economic strength to work together and exchange mutually economic advantages. I believe that if we have the courage to tackle the fundamental economic problems in the world today, Britain may succeed in helping all the countries of Europe to form a system which will give them sovereignty, solvency, security and self-respect.

6.42 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: I consider that it will be the general view of the House that the report of the Prime Minister was all the

more effective because he did not claim that any dramatic results flowed from the Geneva Conference. I for one do not consider that that lessens in any way the value of the Conference, any more than I consider the fact that the advent of the hydrogen bomb acted as a spur on the Heads of the four Governments who attended the Conference, lessened the value of the Conference. The fact that, as the Prime Minister said, for the first time in ten years the Heads of the four countries represented at Geneva met was a very important portent in international relations.
The Prime Minister has made it quite clear today that the personal relations which were established at that Conference between the Heads of Government has produced a good will which has, for the time being at any rate, put in abeyance the cold war and has resulted in a definite relaxation of international tension and provided an opportunity for obtaining the political solutions of the international problems which have divided the world in recent years.
I agree with the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison), that the nation as a whole will warmly welcome the announcement which has been made this afternoon by the Prime Minister that the Government have invited the Russian Prime Minister and M. Kruschev to visit this country. The more there are personal contacts between the Heads of Governments and, indeed, Ministers of Governments, the better for international relations. I have always regretted that the custom that grew up in the inter-war years of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers regularly attending the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva has not since been followed by Governments in the years after the end of the Second World War. Therefore, the fact that for the first time for many years the Heads of these four Governments have been able to meet is of considerable importance.
When we are dealing with personal contacts between East and West we do not have to limit them to the politicians. The more that we can break down barriers between nations, whether on the field of sport or in any other sphere of national life, the better it is because it makes people realise that people of other countries are very much the same as


themselves and that they have the same hopes and aspirations.
Although one takes the view that in spite of the fact that no dramatic results flowed from the Geneva Conference it was none the less vitally important, it does not alter the fact that formidable problems which have so far divided East and West still remain to be solved, and I think that the directive is interesting because it has rightly focused attention upon the most important of these international problems—the problems of European security, united Germany and disarmament.
I hold the view that fear has played a far greater part in preventing a solution of these problems than any other factor. Russia, for example, cannot forget the suffering she had to endure during the Second World War. Speaking at the Berlin Conference on 1st February last year, Mr. Molotov gave some extremely interesting facts. He stated that 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 towns and villages in Russia had either been wholly or partially destroyed or burnt, that direct damage on Soviet territory during four years of Hitlerite occupation had amounted to over £40,000 million in value, and that the Soviet Union had suffered a loss of about 7 million people on the battlefield and as a result of the expulsion of populations.
On the other hand, the Russians should remember the great sufferings of the Western Nations. Death in war is no respecter of nationality. The peoples of Britain, France, the United States and their war allies hate war and aggression just as much as do the people of the East. But we saw in the years following 1945 that Russia was maintaining great armies and air forces while we in the West were largely disarming. We were only too conscious of the dangerous implications of the Berlin blockade and of the cold war.
Also both East and West should keep in mind that their strong feelings against another war are shared by the masses of the German people who will long remember the bitter consequences of the military aggression into which Hitler forced them. They now, like other nations, have experienced what it means to have devastating war sweeping across their own territory and bringing in its train the destruction of their homes, villages and

towns, the division of their country and the disintegration of their national life. I think the last thing in which the new German democracy intends to get itself involved is treading once again the disillusioning and catastrophic path of military aggression.
In those circumstances it is clear that what is required today is an effective system of security which will remove the fears of both East and West. As far as one can gather from the statements of policy and the speeches which have been made by the statesmen on both sides, there can be no doubt that both East and West want to see a reliable European security system established. I agree very much with what the Prime Minister said today—that such a security system cannot be achieved as long as Germany remains divided. A secure Europe means a united Europe, and that presupposes a united Germany.
I am convinced that the problems of security for Europe and of unity for Germany are inseparable problems. Indeed, I again find myself in agreement with the Prime Minister, who referred to them this afternoon as twin problems. I believe that a reunited Germany is essential to an all-in or even a limited European security system from its inception. If we are to build up an effective system of security for Europe, whether it be on an all-in basis or on the five-country basis suggested by our Government, a united Germany must be in it from the inception.
On the other hand, I am also convinced that Soviet Russia will not agree to German reunification except within some satisfactory and reliable system of European security of which Russia herself is a member.
It seems to me that the British proposal for a five-Power mutual defence pact, to which the Prime Minister referred this afternoon, has a great deal to commend it as the means of eventually establishing an over-all European security system. In the first place, as I understand it, the four war Allies would be associated—that is, including Russia, one of our war-time allies—with a united Germany, in a common defence pact against aggression. As the Prime Minister said, by its terms each country could declare itself ready to go to the assistance of the victim of aggression, whoever that might be.
In my view, such a pact should do much to reassure Soviet Russia and to allay any legitimate apprehensions which she may have about her own security arising from the reunification of Germany, since Russia herself would be a direct partner, with her war-time Allies, in the collective maintenance of peace in Europe and in defence against aggression.
The second British proposal to which the Prime Minister referred was that to limit the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany. I agree with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) said about the vagueness of this proposal, and I very much hope that the Foreign Secretary will throw a little light upon it when he winds up the debate.
If it means what I think it means, then it appears to me to be a positive and constructive proposal which should help to bring agreement on the problem of German reunification. It would give strength to the proposed five-Power pact because, as I understand it, it would mean that the armed forces of a reunited Germany would be limited and would be subject to a system of control and inspection. If that be so, surely it is a further assurance to Soviet Russia. Such an arrangement, if it were acceptable and properly carried out, could, in my view, have an important bearing on the achievement of a comprehensive disarmament agreement.
In support of questions asked by my right hon. Friend, I want to ask the Foreign Secretary exactly which area the Government have in mind. Is the proposal to be effective within Germany—affecting just East Germany and Western Germany; or is it to affect a belt of country extending not only into Germany but into other countries in Central Europe? Is it to apply to the forces of Russia and the countries associated with Russia in the Warsaw Pact? Does it stretch as far as that?
Is it also to apply to the defence forces of Western European Union, including our own? Is it to affect the forces of Canada and the United States at present located in Europe? Does it mean that there will be an agreed limitation of strength of the armed forces—Army, Air Force and Navy? Does it mean that the

inspection organisation, the officers from the various countries, is to ensure that those limitations are not exceeded or is the inspection to make sure that no warlike preparations are being made?
I hope it means that there are to be limitations of forces, with an inspection to ensure that those limitations are observed, in which case it may play a useful part in the build-up of this Five-Power security system.
The third proposal to which the Prime Minister referred was the possibility of a demilitarised area between East and West. I imagine that that is related to the proposal for the limitation of defence forces in the areas referred to in the second proposal—or is it something quite apart from the second proposal? It is not clear to me what the offer means, and I hope it will be elaborated in order to make clear what is intended both as to the geographical areas concerned and as to the practical significance.
We must remember that we are living in the days of jet aircraft. In one sense distance is of no importance. Aircraft can fly 50 miles in a matter of seconds. A demilitarised zone has therefore not quite the same significance as it might have had in the days of a conventional war. Nevertheless, I am glad to see that these proposals are embraced by the directive relating to European security and Germany and will therefore be considered, with other proposals, by the Foreign Ministers in October.
I certainly hope, as I am sure does the House, that out of that consideration will emerge an agreed plan which will combine European security and the reunification of Germany, twin aims which, as I have said, can be fully realised only in unison.
May I say a few words about the situation in Asia? In my view there is equal need for political settlements in Asia. The problems of Korea, Formosa and Indo-China cannot be isolated from the problems of world peace, and it is just as important to secure political solutions in Asia as it is to secure them in Europe. I am sure hon. Members on both sides will endorse the welcome which was given by the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South this afternoon to the news that discussions are shortly to take place between representatives of the United


States Government and of the Peking Government on the question of the repatriation of American prisoners-of-war now in Chinese hands.
This is only a beginning. I for one therefore welcome the proposal of Senator George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposing that an American-Chinese Republican conference at Foreign Ministers level should take place in the autumn. I understood the Prime Minister to say—or, maybe, it was my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South who expressed the hope —that our Government will co-operate with the United States Government and the Chinese Government on those lines. I hope also that our country will make a definite contribution to these peace efforts. I ask the Foreign Secretary whether it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to co-operate with Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, in securing a high level conference on Asian matters?

Mr. Ellis Smith: Would the right and learned Gentleman also note that Mr. Chou-En-lai recently said that he would welcome such a conference?

Mr. Henderson: That endorses the importance of the policy being pursued by Mr. Nehru.
I wish to say a word on the third matter referred to in the directive, disarmament. I realise that many hon. Members are familiar with the situation in which the world finds itself with 20 million men under arms and with an annual expenditure throughout the world of £40,000 million a year on armaments. The countries have in their possession tens of thousands of war planes, tanks and warships, yet we must realise that a few hydrogen bombs could well paralyse the whole of them. In spite of that fact, in spite of that vast expenditure and that vast mobilisation of manpower, we know that two-thirds of the population of the world are living in conditions of poverty and hunger. I suggest that finding a solution to these economic problems cannot be indefinitely delayed.
In the course of his speech at Geneva, President Eisenhower made reference to this vital problem. He said:
As we think of this problem of armament, we need to remember that the present burden of costly armaments not only deprives our own

people of higher living standards, but it also denies the peoples of under-developed areas of resources which would improve their lot…Armament reduction would and should ensure that part of the savings would flow into the less developed areas of the world to assist their economic development.
While I entirely agree with those words, I cannot but regret the attitude of the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government in relation to the establishment of S.U.N.F.E.D., the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. Surely a beginning could be made with this vital project without waiting for a disarmament agreement? I ask the Secretary of State if he can say what action was taken at the recent meeting of the Social and Economic Council in considering the latest report by M. Scheylen, the Belgian official charged with the conduct of this investigation?
While it is true that President Eisenhower's proposal for unrestricted air reconnaissance facilities was an admirable gesture, indicative no doubt of the sincerity of the United States in the search for peace, I am afraid it is not likely in itself to secure disarmament nor to prevent war. Disarmament, if it is to mean anything at all, must be translated into concrete reductions of manpower and, above all, of the weapons of war, war planes, tanks, warships and other instruments used in time of war. It must also mean the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and high explosive bombs and guided missiles.
I am afraid that some people think that if we got rid of the nuclear weapons everything would be all right from the point of human welfare, but there can be just as much damage done, perhaps on a less extensive scale, by high explosive bombs as by nuclear weapons. The big question is, will Governments face the risks involved in real disarmament? I believe the people will. An agreement providing for a substantial measure of controlled disarmament would in itself be a powerful contribution to the solution of many of the political problems at present poisoning international relations. I hope the Ministers on the Front Bench are listening to this as I consider it very important.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Harold Macmillan): Yes.

Mr. Henderson: As the Foreign Secretary knows quite well, disarmament has long left the academic realm and is now one of the most vital problems facing the country. I express my best personal wishes to the Foreign Secretary in the arduous tasks that confront him and his colleagues. At the conference in October there is going to be no short cut to a solution of these problems. There has to be hard work, patience, give-and-take and an attempt to understand the point of view of other countries.
The tasks given to the Foreign Ministers in the terms of the directive for consideration at their meeting in October are indeed formidable. No one can deny that, but, with the increase of mutual confidence and trust engendered by the recent Geneva Conference, and with the common desire to achieve common security, it might well be possible to make steady progress towards genuine world peace and disarmament.

7.7 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Pickthorn: I know that we are on the Adjournment, but I shall try if I can to stick very closely to what I thought was intended to be the main topic for discussion today; that is, what we know of what was said at Geneva and what we may reasonably suppose the words to mean. I shall do my best to stick fairly closely to those things.
I am bound to say at the beginning that in approaching all this I do not feel very optimistic either about what is happening, or about my capacity to understand it very clearly, or to explain it very effectively. It seems to me that there are two or three matters in which we are having assumptions, and having a rather light-hearted use of language where, even if the task be not a very gracious one, someone ought to stop and question the implications.
I thought that the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), who addressed us in his usual impressive manner, carried too far the principle which I share with him—I suppose he is explicitly conscious of it. He certainly always rather acts upon the principle that in any great human affair there is always a factor of paradox, and that if one expounds a great human affair without any paradox one is almost certainly wrong. I thought he carried the tolerance of paradox really a little excessively far this afternoon when

he told us all about how nations want power—how it is relations of power we have to discuss—and how the more powerful the weapons are which nations have, the less are those nations in a position to exercise power.
I am not quite sure that the world is quite so paradoxical as that, and when it appears to us, as it well may appear at the moment, that little nations with little power can fairly easily get their own way by using weapons of death and destruction, and that great nations cannot, I feel reasonably certain that there is a new chapter just round the corner which we do not yet understand.
When the hon. Member was speaking, I was not quite sure exactly what was meant by "status quo." My recollection, on which I would not bet very heavily, is that in the old days "status quo" always meant, not the state in which things now are, but the state in which things were before some event or other—before, for instance, a war which is now being conducted. But "status quo" now seems to be used to mean things as they are, and the whole of the hon. Member's argument is very difficult to understand unless one is quite clear which he did mean, and whether he always meant the same thing by "status quo" during all of his paragraphs.
Of course, the status in Europe now is extremely different from the status quo before the war, and there is one thing about which nobody has said anything at all today. Although it is perhaps a little like saying rude words in the drawing room, someone ought perhaps to say a word about it before the day is over. Nobody has made any reference at all to the condition of Eastern Europe and to the fact that the whole of Eastern Europe is occupied by that Power which has, at least to that extent, so far defeated us in the cold war, which it was fighting when we were fighting a hot war side by side and which it still is fighting. We ought not to forget Europe. We should remember that Eastern Europe is still there geographically. [Laughter.] It is a rather important thing to remember.
The second thing that I should like hon. Members to question in their minds before they assume it in argument is the phrase that atom bombs, H-bombs, and so on, cannot win a war. I know very little about war. I have survived


three of them and I have not liked any of them. Of the one or two things I do know about war, one is that the next war is neither so much like the last war as one thought it would be, nor is it at all like what the inter-war experts said it would be. Those things we can be quite certain of.
Another thing of which we can be reasonably certain is that however destructive weapons become, unless they get to the absolute point of destruction where they destroy the whole of our biological species, which Lord Russell told us the other day was the only thing to care for, short of that point there will be two sides left when the war is over. And I would sooner be on the one which can be said in any sense whatever to be the winning side than on the one which can be said in any sense whatever to be the losing side.
I cannot believe that it is wise that we should approach foreign politics continually asseverating that if there is ever again another war, it will not matter which side wins; I cannot believe that that is political wisdom. Nor can I believe that it is political wisdom for us to asseverate—in the way that right hon. and even hon. Gentlemen who have been at Geneva have done, who, if they did not have quite such long red carpets, still had their entrées and still were near enough to greatness, as we were told—to "feel" that, for example, "the Foreign Ministers got into a mess this morning, but the Prime Ministers got out of it again after lunch," and so on. I cannot help believing that it is risky to attach that amount of importance to the personal contacts and to the little that one can see of the personal contacts, in a world in which one of the two great Powers—up to date the more victorious one—is founded upon not believing in personal contacts, is founded upon the principle of dialectical materialism.
Let us get whatever we can get by being on as good terms as we can be with any foreigners anywhere, and, for all I have said to the contrary, most of all par excellence, with the Russians. But do not let us go about telling ourselves and our people that these personal contacts are, and are likely to continue to be, a decisive factor in international politics. I believe that that makes both home and foreign government extremely difficult

for the future. It almost certainly prepares disappointment and it makes quite certain that if there is disappointment, it will be greater than it otherwise needed to be.
In that connection, I am bound to be candid enough to go so far as to say that when it was assumed this afternoon that everybody in the House was delighted that these two honourable, noble, eminent gentlemen are coming here in the spring, I could not feel, and cannot feel, "delighted." I wish I could be sure that I knew enough about either the world or these men to be sure that in nine or ten months' time, whenever it is, it will be a very good thing that we have now been publicly committed to their coming here then. It may be so; I very much hope that it is so. I believe that it makes the task of our statesmen more difficult, it makes the risk of disappointment for our people more serious, if we should all begin with enthusiasm, in the eighteenth century sense, taking for granted "delight" and words like, which seem to me excessive.
I come now to the third thing that I should like to say about the whole of this discussion which we have been having for the last six weeks, before, about and after Geneva, and to which we are now having a sort of Parliamentary wind-up. I believe that it is a profound mistake—and the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South this afternoon very explicitly made the mistake, if it is a mistake—to talk about disarmament being the key. I feel certain that in so far as one can in these matters distinguish cause from effect, we must regard disarmament as a desirable effect and not regard it in the main as a method. I feel sure that that is true.
Even if I am mistaken about that, I feel even more deeply convinced about what I am about to say, which is closely connected with it. The latest weapons are not controllable. Quite a few years ago, they probably still were controllable. There was a point at which it would have been possible for statesmen, advised by scientists, to find means of knowing where the necessary materials for the most powerful weapons were and of keeping an eye on them, of keeping a tab on them and of knowing where they were, and what could be done with them. I believe that that is no longer true, and that


almost certainly it will get less and less true, and more and more obviously untrue.
Nor am I alone in that belief. I have here a phrase, and I hope that the House will forgive me if I stumble a little over it, because I am quoting it from the Germany, translating as I go along. It says:
Even if such a control"—
The speaker, of course, is using the word "control" in the French or German sense of control, in the sense in which a ticket collector is a contrôleur, not because he tells a passenger that he must go to Southend and not to Southport, but because he keeps a check, and so on.
He says:
Even if such a control"—
that is, of atomic and H-weapons, plutonium and so on—
were possible, it would be ineffective, for if no confidence subsists, a circumvention of this control would be possible.
And then he goes on to say:
It would be all the more probable because the technology of atom production makes possible quickly and without very exceptional difficulties 
the utilisation of atomic materials and so on which are there for peaceful purposes for purposes of armament. It was Marshal Bulganin who said that.

Mr. Crossman: Then why in German?

Mr. Pickthorn: Because I happen to have here a quotation from a German paper—

Mr. Crossman: How does the hon. Gentleman know that it is true?

Mr. Pickthorn: I do not speak Russian or read Russian.
We all know very little; but I think the hon. Member may take it that that is a fair record and as likely as usual to be true.
I am quite certain you are not going to have the Earl Russell atomic paradise without the enemy, any more than you had the paradise where your first parents were without the enemy. There is not any way now any longer of making sure that international inspection will know where atomic weapons and materials are and making sure that they are in such condition or place that they cannot be

utilised for war purposes. I believe that that is true. If there is competent advice that that is not true, then I hope to be told. But if there is no such competent advice, then we have got to regard —even more is it plain that we have got to regard—disarmament as a necessary result of confidence, when we can get confidence.
And if we can get confidence while so much of Asia is dominated, as it now is, while half of Europe is occupied, as it now is, if we can get that confidence, nobody will be more glad than I. But it is fair to say, and that there is nothing either cynical or defeatist about saying, that to assume that you are taking long steps to such confidence at any point before there are concrete guarantees of it to which you can point, to make any such assumption is running the risk of being the greatest deceiver of your people that any governors have ever been.

7.23 p.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: I should like to begin by animadverting on one point made by the hon. and learned Gentleman—

Mr. Pickthorn: Not "learned."

Mr. Zilliacus: Sorry—the hon. Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) —

Mr. Pickthorn: But very honourable.

Mr. Zilliacus: He referred to the question that we are not certain, as he put it, that nuclear weapons will bring the extermination of the human race in their train; and until that is certain he would prefer to be on the winning side. I wish to quote to him what the Prime Minister said in his opening speech at Geneva. The right hon. Gentleman said:
There was a time when the aggressor in war might hope to win an advantage and to realise political gain for his country by military action…Nothing of the kind is possible now. No war can bring the victor spoils; it can only bring him and his victim utter annihilation. Neutrals would suffer equally with the combatants.

Mr. Pickthorn: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would forgive me if I remind him that that is not the view of Marshal Bulganin, who has stated exactly the opposite.

Mr. Zilliacus: I confess that, unlike the hon. Gentleman, I prefer the judgment of the Prime Minister to the judgment of Marshal Bulganin on this point.
I may say that in this debate I find myself in the position of the Irishman who, for once, was fighting on the side of the police. I should like to begin what I have to say by congratulating the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on their really great achievement at Geneva, and to say that I think that the Prime Minister pitched his claim too low. I think that he was too modest in merely saying that what the Geneva meeting had done was to change the political climate. I think that something more happened. I think that the Heads of Governments that met at Geneva did nothing less than sign the armistice in the cold war and that that armistice is now being endorsed and ratified by the public opinion of the world and by the Parliaments of the participating countries, including our Parliament today.
Once you have signed the armistice after a long and gruelling struggle in which the peoples have grown war weary and tired of the sacrifices and the burdens and the prospect of endless strife; when that comes to an end, then there has been a psychological revolution. After that it is almost impossible to renew hostilities; and today, anyone who wishes to start the cold war again will have to climb a long and steep psychological hill before he can start it over again. And part of the job of these meetings is to make that hill longer and steeper, until it becomes an impassable and unsur-mountable barrier to the reopening of the cold war. From that point of view I warmly welcome the news that Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khruschev are visiting this country in the spring.
Here I should like to make the first suggestion, which I hope the Government will not turn down out of hand, but will consider benevolently—although, of course, they will not commit themselves. A good deal has been said lately on the need for breaking down the barriers to intercourse between the two sides at every level. I suggest making a modest beginning at the Parliamentary level. Our Parliament were the guests of the Soviet Parliament not so long ago. Let us issue a return invitation at a time to coincide with the visit of the Soviet leaders to this country. Let us suggest that it is not enough to have junketings with the delegates, but that the Soviet Parliament should be invited to select a strong and representative delegation—say,

thirty; that our Parliament elect, by proportional representation, a delegation of thirty; that they should not be handpicked by party leaders or Government, but that they should really be a cross-section of Parliament; that these two delegations should then meet and discuss current issues; that the Parliaments, our respective Parliaments, should find time to debate the reports of the proceedings at these discussions which should be partly public and partly private.
When I discussed this with a friend, he said, "Oh, but you are expecting much too much. Soviet leaders would never allow their M.P.s to be pitched into free discussion with M.P.s of the West. It would be too dangerous." My reply to that is twofold. In the first place, the Soviet Parliament quite recently passed a resolution saying that they believe the responsibility for peace rests on Parliaments as well as Governments; that more contacts between Parliaments would strengthen the cause of peace. And, even more recently, the Soviet Parliament applied to join the Inter-Parliamentary Union. So I think there would be a good chance of these proposals being accepted, and I believe that it would have some very good results.
Now let us turn to the actual issue confronting us which the Prime Minister described as a twin issue—German reunification and European security. I would say that the issue of disarmament is intimately connected with those two, so that the issue is really triplets—if we care to put it that way. I do not believe, in fact, that Governments would come to the point of decision on disarmament unless they had made some progress on the side of political settlement and of security arrangements. On this point we are, unfortunately, deadlocked. The deadlock is due, I think, to mistakes by both sides —I will come to the reasons for those mistakes as I see them.
The West wishes to include a united Germany in the Western Alliance. The Russians are no more likely to accept that than we would accept the reverse arrangement; and when we say it is a matter of Germany being free to decide, we know perfectly well which way the decision would go. If the Russians were equally sure, they would not mind having Germany free to choose the Eastern Alliance. We should have as strong objections as they have to that freedom.
But I object in principle to the notion that Germany should be free to do what she likes. Why should she? I do not want to dictate to the Germans, but nor do I wish them to arrogate to themselves the right, for instance, to rearm without limit. Nor do I wish to see Germany use her arms in order to press for a change of her frontiers under the threat of war.
In that connection I would draw attention to a recent article—published 18th July—by Mr. Walter Lippman of the "New York Herald Tribune," who is a very sober and responsible observer, outlining Dr. Adenauer's position. He states that Dr. Adenauer would not accept even what he calls the Eden Plan because he will not renounce the lost territories, and that he prefers to wait for two or three years, and then he adds:
Dr. Adenauer made it clear enough during his American visit this spring that his policy is to be armed by the United States, and then with the loyal support of the whole Western alliance, led by the United States, to negotiate a German settlement with the Soviet Union. Dr. Adenauer believes that in two or three years, when there is a German army in N.A.T.O., his position will be strong enough to obtain reunification with frontiers that are much better than Potsdam.
We know perfectly well that no West German Government who go in for revising the frontiers will be content with minor readjustments of the Polish-German frontier. What they would try for would be a new partition of Poland. The Poles will never submit to that. We are committed to the main lines of the bargain—I am not saying whether it was good or bad, but only that we are committed to it—by which the Poles received certain eastern German territories in exchange for eastern Polish territories they gave up to the Soviet Union.
I think it is necessary to clarify our position. I think our position is that Germany should be united within the Potsdam frontiers, but neither in the matter of armaments nor in the matter of alliances should Germany have complete freedom—any more than the rest of us. I think all of us must subordinate political sovereignty and defence sovereignty to international obligations.
On the other hand, I have no use for the Soviet proposal, which suggests embedding a divided Germany in a universal all-European alliance. I do not

think that the division of Germany is a solid basis for organising the whole of Europe for peace, and more than that I am completely sceptical about the whole idea of a universal military alliance, which postulates the readiness of everybody to fight anybody. That readiness simply does not exist. In both the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Charter of the United Nations the idea of compulsory universal military sanctions was dismissed out of hand, and quite rightly, and we tried to make economic sanctions compulsory, leaving military sanctions to be voluntary. Even that system did not work in the League of Nations, and it has been deadlocked by the impasse of the great Powers in the Security Council of the United Nations up to the present.
This whole conception I regard as completely unworkable and unreal. The idea of a neutral Germany was condemned and dismissed by M. Faure at Geneva in a speech which gave, I thought, an extremely academic dissertation on the conception of neutrality as known to international law before the First World War but which bore no relation whatever to the world in which we are members of the United Nations. That is the starting point for a constructive suggestion I would make.
It is a strange paradox that at the tenth anniversary of the United Nations at San Francisco the member Governments swore their loyalty to the United Nations Charter and said that it was the foundation of their policies. Mr. Dulles went further and said that if only the Soviet Union would agree to observe the Charter in its relations with other countries the cold war would end. I say that is perfectly true but that it is only half of the truth. The whole truth is that if all the great Powers would agree to do so the cold war would end. Instead of that they went to Geneva and worked out a lot of ideas and then proceeded to deadlock each other. Some of them were very ingenious, but none took any account whatever of the application of the machinery of the United Nations. Except for one or two passing references indeed, the subject of the United Nations was not even mentioned.
The great Powers have been driven by the sheer excess of their military preparations in the system of the balance of power


on which they fell back after the war to adopt the position which they were pledged to adopt by the Charter of the United Nations ten years ago. They have now got so far with their preparations as to be able to exterminate each other in the event of war. So diabolically successful have their preparations been, that they do not dare to go to war. They prefer to talk. That was precisely the position they undertook to adopt under the Charter. The wheel has now come full circle. For good or bad reasons we abandoned the Charter and fell back on the balance of power. Now we have piled up so much power we do not dare use it.
We cannot negotiate from strength, as my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) said, because we are too strong. I would put it this way, that we cannot resort to mailed fist diplomacy, which is the less pretty but more telling name for the kind of diplomacy that used to be employed in the old days; we cannot resort to mailed fist diplomacy, because if we clutch a hydrogen bomb in our fist and try to hit the other fellow we shall blow up not only him but ourselves and the whole world too. We just cannot use it. So we have got to talk, and we have discovered that both sides dread war and are frightened of getting into a war because of the consequences.
Very well, let us accept the risks of the Charter and of the peace-keeping system as envisaged by the Charter. The Charter took the line that once war broke out between the great Powers the whole system would collapse and there would be nothing left. So the United Nations in the Charter directed their energies to building up economic and political arrangements which would make the outbreak of war progressively less likely and raise psychological, economic and political barriers to the outbreak of war. They did not attempt to do the impossible, to organise any kind of collective arrangements that would ensure victory in case of war. Any such arrangement would be a return to the balance of power which, as Mr. Lester Pearson said, has become a balance of fear and reached a dead end. The operative word is "dead."
What would a solution be on these lines? First, of course, the unification of Germany through free elections under international supervision; then the admis-

sion of all the European ex-enemy States to the United Nations. That means Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania on the other. Since Germany cannot be a permanent member of the Security Council without a revision of the Charter—and that takes a long time—let us see Germany take her due place in an all-European organisation, a regional agreement based on Articles 52, 53 and 103 of the Charter. It would grant power to the E.C.E. of the United Nations, to co-ordinate the economic machinery of East and West Europe and promote intra-European trade and economic development. E.C.E. could then play the part it was originally designed to play when it was set up by the General Assembly.
It could include a political conference of the European members of the United Nations, which would elect an executive committee, of which Germany would be a member, and which would not only watch over the carrying out of decisions of the conference, presumably with the help of a secretariat, but also advise the Security Council on all matters concerning disputes or disturbances of the peace between the members of the United Nations.
I should like to suggest a transition, as it were, between rival alliances and the security system of the United Nations. I would suggest inserting an article in the text of the European regional agreement, based on the United Nations Charter, by which the parties to the agreement would undertake that so long as the agreement remained in force they would not take enforcement action nor exercise the right to collective self-defence—I emphasise "collective" because I leave untouched the exercise of the individual right of self defence—under any other treaty without the authorisation of the Security Council. This would not scrap the existing treaties or pull Germany out of them. But it would subordinate their military obligations to the peace-keeping system of the Charter. We should really try to apply the system by which we, the permanent members of the Security Council, trust each other to settle our differences peacefully and pull together in trying to keep the peace of Europe.
These various compromise arrangements of five-Power pacts and all the rest


of it postulate that kind of trust. We suggest obligations in which the Soviet Union would participate in refraining from helping an aggressor and would join forces against an aggressor and so on. But why not simplify the situation by saying that as we literally cannot afford to fight, for it means death for all of us, and as we have to trust each other to talk, let us trust each other to keep the obligations which we have assumed under the Charter. Let us try to work the system and put the Security Council in charge of keeping the peace, as it was meant to do under the Charter, and not try to do its job and take it out of its hands.
The political conference which I have suggested could be a bridge between the international political institutions built up in Eastern and Western Europe. The economic arrangement would be a bridge between East and West economic institutions. The various proposals for the control of armaments might take in not only the inter-allied system of W.E.U. in Western Europe, which might be internationalised and the Soviet Union brought into it on some limited basis. We might also see whether we could not combine these things in some form of Articles 43 to 47 of the Charter, suggesting how the Security Council should organise international military action when required to keep order.
These suggestions might be put together as part of our disarmament plans and linked with implementing the Charter as a basis of security. That is not neutrality and not alliances. It is something new, and it would inject a fresh element into the situation. I may he wrong in every detail of what I have suggested, but I implore the Government not to close their minds to the possibility that the time may now have come when we can make a start at making the Charter of the United Nations the real and effective basis of the relations of the great Powers.
It might be that this is a new angle, a new factor which would enable us to break the deadlock that has arisen, largely because we have thought solely in terms of neutrality versus alliance and rival alliances versus the chimera of a universal alliance. It may be that here there is a kind of compromise basis that

has elements common to all these schemes but has something new that differentiates it from all and which might give us a practical basis for advance, if not at once, at any rate by stages.
Finally, I suggest making a political virtue out of our economic necessity. We are in the unhappy position that Nature has disarmed us unilaterally. We can be wiped out by six hydrogen bombs whereas it might take 50 to wipe out the United States and perhaps 80 to wipe out the Soviet Union. Moreover, we cannot manufacture more than a few hydrogen bombs as compared with dozens, scores or hundreds manufactured by the others. On that basis, therefore, we are bound to come in a poor third.
Let us be the first among the States to have the courage to catch this tide at the full and be swept on by it to a new vision of the unity and peace of humanity. Let us suggest an immediate standstill in tests of the hydrogen bomb and in its manufacture. Let us make slashing cuts in our defence programmes. Let us clear the clogged channels of East-West trade. Let us not forget that our present towering armaments are not the result of close calculation. They have been very much a hit-and-miss business with a great deal of error and guesswork. Preparations for war, like war itself, are based on a balance of errors, and we should not be too meticulous about waiting for the other chap to act.
Let us not be afraid to set an example in showing that we are not afraid. Let us show that we have the moral courage and political wisdom to give leadership to the longing of the peoples of the world for peace. Let us realise that something has changed and broken and that this evil enchantment that has held mankind in thrall has gone and at last we see the possibility of living together and using tremendous forces, not for our destruction, but for raising civilisation to heights hitherto unimagined.

7.47 p.m.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) for the first time in these debates. A great deal of what he said on disarmament and the hydrogen bomb I hope to deal with later in my slender remarks this evening. I am quite certain that the hon. Member's


constituents and political associates in the country will fully take the point that he made earlier—that he would rather listen to the Prime Minister than to Marshal Bulganin. Like him. I sometimes feel that there is a certain amount of joy in Heaven. As one looks at the development of foreign affairs today, one wonders if one is the sinner that repenteth or whether one was right after all and the world has come round a little.
I am certain that the whole country will want to make haste tomorrow to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the momentous announcement that he made today. It was in my view both a skilful and a brilliant move to issue the invitation and to have it accepted. It was skilful because it would seem to ensure in advance at any rate a partial success for the conference of Foreign Ministers in October, and it was brilliant because I know full well that when it takes place the traditional British welcome will be in full play and at full range. Even if this is not a Royal occasion —and I do not know whether it will be and whether Marshal Bulganin can be defined as President of Russia for the purpose—the British people will afford the friendliest welcome to these two Russian statesmen that it is possible for them to give. I am quite certain of that.
What a curious phase we are in, and what a curious turn of events it is when one reflects on the shocks and bruises the world has suffered in the last ten years. Geneva, 1955, and this invitation to the Russian leaders; Potsdam, 1945, and the hopeful accord of the victorious nations there and the plans that they jointly made for the defeated enemy. One can imagine how relieved somebody could be who had been able to sleep for these past ten years of discord and had been able to wake today to see the whole process of international friendship go forward.
That brings me to something I should like to say about my right hon. Friend's speech this afternoon with regard to the plan he outlined for an area subject to inspection along the Iron Curtain. When that proposal was made in Geneva I frankly admit that I thought it had a content of propaganda in it. Perhaps it was because it followed immediately after President Eisenhower's very grandiose plan for allowing the Soviet Air Force to fly high, wide and handsome across the

United States, so typical of American foreign politics and diplomacy, at one moment fierce, forbidding McCarthyite, and Olen in another moment expansive, broadly friendly, clapping people on the back and making impossible proposals. We have only to look at the machinery for a scheme like that to see that it is wildly impracticable.
So it was rather in that atmosphere that my right hon. Friend's proposal followed, and I thought it, too, had a content of propaganda and was not immediately realisable. Then I must admit that when my right hon. Friend was developing the theme today at the Box, and I thought of the significance that he gave to it in his speech, there seemed to be in it practicality, idealism and wisdom. I look at it in that light and against the atmosphere of Potsdam, on which I tried to enlarge at the beginning of my remarks, because my right hon. Friend himself said just now that there was this proposal immediately after the war for a joint occupation of Germany by the victorious Powers, that is to say, Russian troops, British troops, American troops, and later French troops on the ground, in intimate association all over Germany.
I am glad that such a proposal was even thought about. I remember writing an article in the "Observer" on that very theme. My right hon. Friend referred to the studies which the Chiefs of Staff had made at that time, and it was found to be impracticable. So we had this division of Germany. Now, in the atmosphere of Geneva ten years afterwards, we come back to it and we ask ourselves, can it be done? I do not want to go into the technicalities except to say that I think it is something on which the House should concentrate, because even if it achieves nothing purposefully from the point of view of disarmament, and, of course, there can be no element of government in it now, at any rate there is friendly association in working out a joint convention on the ground and that may be of value to the cause of peace.
I have only one other thing to say to the House, and that is on the subject of disarmament and the hydrogen bomb. I hope I am not being vainglorious in saying this, but how is it possible for Members like the right hon. Member for


Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) and the hon. Member for Gorton to say that we should disarm completely and utterly, and that that should include the hydrogen bomb.
For is it not the existence of the hydrogen bomb that has brought about this great detente? Was the cartoon by Cummings in the "Daily Express" a few days ago not right? It showed the statesmen in Geneva decorating this monster with medals and ribbons. Is it not the bomb which has guaranteed peace, and if so why do we want to get rid of it? If we get rid of it, we shall be back again to the old era of conventional arms, and even if there is control of these arms, we may not be able to ensure that the populations do not break apart and start fighting again with hand weapons so that we should be back to the Middle Ages and all that went with them.
I am firmly of the conviction, and I have said it before in the House that the hydrogen bomb is not only the greatest force for peace that the world has ever seen, but that it achieves stability in the nations that make it.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Because both have it.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Because both have it.
What has caused this detente after 10 years? Is it the building up of N.A.T.O.? Is it the fact that we have a few more divisions on the Continent of Europe? Or is it the fact that the Russians have invented the hydrogen bomb, and by the process of inventing it have acquired what might be called a great-Power mentality, which means that they think solidly as a nation, that they are in no state of jitters, that they can discard all the apparatus of international propaganda and polemics and return to a sensible, robust sanguine atmosphere? I think that is a significant factor in what has taken place. The Russians have achieved a great Power mentality, they have become formal and correct in their diplomacy and are now prepared to go into conference in a more genial atmosphere.
I believe the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) was right

—and there are others who have referred to this in the debate—when he said that war is no longer an instrument of foreign policy. That is a very novel factor in the world. There has never previously been an era where war was not an extension of foreign policy. A nation always went to war hoping that better conditions for itself would result, and there was always that prospect. Now a nation goes to war with the knowledge that that is not the case, and that must produce a tremendous reaction in the thinking of statesmen all over the world.
Indeed, I think that factor began to operate before the atomic bomb was let loose upon the world. If we had been able to say, in 1939, "We know that the City of London, the Cities of Exeter and Coventry and others will be smashed to pieces," and if the Germans had been able to say then, "We know that the Ruhr will be devastated, as well as Hamburg, Munich and the rest," would those two Powers have gone to war? In my judgment they would not. So 1940 to 1945 was, in my view, the moment of historical change. We know now that if war breaks out between the great Powers there is no chance of victory or even the maintenance of civilisation.
It is sometimes said that the physical scientists are evil genii who make the world terror-struck, that all apparatus should be taken away from them, that they should be confined in one place, that we should hand over the world to the historians, the artists, and the so-called liberal professions. But I believe that John Milton was right in that famous, prophetic passage in "Samson Agonistes" when he wrote,
Oh how comely it is, and how reviving To the spirits of just men long oppress'd When God into the hands of their deliverer Puts invincible might
To quell the mighty of the earth, th' oppressor,
The brute and boisterous force of violent men …
He all their ammunition
And feats of war defeats
With plain heroic magnitude of mind …Renders them useless, while
With winged expedition
Swift as the lightning glance he executes His errand on the wicked …
With very great humility I say to the House that if, in that context, the atomic scientists are the handmaids of God, then they must be blessed in their generation.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: May I be permitted to congratulate the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) on a very moving speech and to say that I am not as surprised as normally I should be to find myself in almost complete agreement with everything he has said. Because this is certainly a unique occasion, particularly in a foreign affairs debate. The fact that there has been practically no dissension, no controversy in any part of the House on this occasion, is the best indication of the significance and import of the Geneva talks.
I would not, however, be so completely optimistic as some of my hon. Friends seem to have been. My hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) went so far as to say that now the cold war is over we are in an entirely new situation and we can proceed to do all kinds of things that yesterday or the day before we could not do. I hope that that is the case. The debate indicates that every hon. and right hon. Member here fervently hopes that it is the case, but we do not know yet. All we know is that, after ten years of cold war, we have suddenly found what appears to be an entirely new situation but, of course, we cannot forget what are the basic purposes of Communism.
It is legitimate to consider the possibility that the present leaders of the Communist world may have undergone a change in their conceptions of how best they can lead that Communist world, whether towards the classic conception of Communism or, by some other means, to a different kind of conception, which could be born out by their recent history, by the changes in the leaders of the Russian world. But that we do not know yet. All we know is that the tactics which that Communist world has been pursuing for the past ten years have failed completely and that its leaders are apparently now conscious of that fact.
I agree with the noble Lord that a great deal of the responsibility for this change in their conceptions is no doubt due to the existence of the hydrogen bomb. From the beginning I have always held that the hydrogen bomb, although it is certainly the greatest physical danger the world has ever known, might well be a means of bringing about a change

of mind in the statesmen of the world which would lead to the end of war.
Indeed, it has been throughout my experience a common thing to hear the ordinary people of this or any other country say that war would only end when the statesmen and others who make wars realise that they will be the victims of war. And they will be victims of any future war, because what the Kremlin and Wall Street and Washington and Berlin and everyone else knows is that the hydrogen bomb is no respecter either of ideologies or of bank balances. Therefore, I believe that is the most significant and potent factor in the situation which seems now to promise us the possibility of peace in the future.
The other factor which I think has contributed—and here I differ from some suggestions that have been made by several of my hon. Friends—is that the Paris Agreements were ratified. It is a secondary but an important factor, and the timing of the events that have taken place during the last six months seems to bear that out. What has happened as a result of the Paris Agreements has been the sudden change of attitude on the part of Russia in regard to the Austrian Treaty.
The Prime Minister said this afternoon that it was a change which took everyone by surprise, which even he, with all his experience and his close contacts, had never anticipated. It was followed by the overtures to Marshal Tito; and it has been followed by other significant, although smaller, developments such as the release of prisoners of war, who should never have been prisoners of war anyhow, but who are now being released in greater and greater numbers to Austria and elsewhere; by the change in attitude towards British wives in Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere who, in many cases, for years have been trying to get permission even to go home and see their relatives and have been refused in most cases. All these little things are pointers to the fact that there is a change in the whole situation.
Finally, of course, there has been the development of the meeting of the Heads of the great Powers. The purpose of that meeting was twofold: first, it was to discuss the problem of Germany; and, secondly, to discuss the problem of security in Europe with which the


question of Germany is inevitably bound up.
It would appear, from reading the communiqués and the White Paper, that the Russian attitude is definitely and positively against any question of the unification of Germany. That was the declaration the Russians made earlier, that the ratification of the Paris Agreements would make the discussion of the unification of Germany impossible. They are maintaining that attitude at the present time, but these are only the opening gambits. Nothing positive has come out of the Conference. There have only been exchanges of broad views and the reference of certain questions to the Foreign Secretaries. Therefore, I do not myself take it as final that the Russians will not be prepared to budge on the question of the unification of Germany so long as the Paris Agreements remain operative.
As I mentioned earlier, and as the Prime Minister said today, if that had been the case there would have been no Austrian Treaty. If it had been the case with regard to the threats made by Russia against Yugoslavia up to fairly recently, there would have been no agreement with Yugoslavia. But, as my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) has pointed out, the Russian Government are in the peculiarly happy position of not having to be accountable to an electorate from time to time. They can make dramatic changes in policy, they can make dramatic concessions in negotiations of which we are not so capable, and I believe they are prepared to make dramatic concessions in this matter as well.
Even if it is true, however—and I have many reasons for thinking that it is true —that the Russians are prepared to concede the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections, despite the existence of the Paris Agreements, including the reason that the situation in Poland is not a particularly comfortable one at present, I believe that there are small indications, such as the fact that Stettin is now the only major town under Polish control which has not been rebuilt and which there has been no attempt to rebuild since the end of the war, that what they call the peace frontier in all their propaganda is the frontier at which they are eventually aiming.
Yet it is clear that we shall not immediately get the settlement of the unification of Germany on any final frontier. If the outcome of the Geneva Conference is to have any practical results, I am satisfied that they will only be achieved after long negotiations, which may go on for a period of twelve or eighteen months or even two years. I almost hope that that will be the case, because I am convinced that we cannot get a complete solution of all the complicated issues involved in this situation by some sudden decisions. If we begin to embark on long-term negotiations which start to deal with even small things at the beginning, I shall be more hopeful than I should be of dramatic declarations emerging from the Foreign Ministers' negotiations which would, in the end, be as impracticable as the Potsdam Declaration.
The unification of Germany—I agree with everyone who has spoken in the debate that that is the most important contribution which can be made to the settle-men of Europe and the world at the present time—cannot eventually be achieved except in two stages. We have, first, to agree upon the central German authority which will emerge from the free elections which constitute the only basis on which to begin the unification of Germany. That central authority must be one over a territory defined prior to a peace treaty, and at that stage the defined territory can only be the four zones of occupation, British, French, Russian and American, or what is now the Federal Republic plus the Russian Zone.
Then would come the definition in the peace treaty of the final frontiers of Germany on the east and on the west. It is generally accepted that the frontiers on the west are settled, but so far as the east is concerned, whatever may be the purposes of the present Russian manoeuvres and the preparedness of the Russians to negotiate, we must continue to maintain, in conjunction with our demands that the unification of Germany is inextricably bound up with the question of European security, that the eastern frontiers of Germany, whatever may be the temporary area for the provisional authority, must be left until the peace treaty, and the final authority in Germany must be consulted before the frontiers can be finally settled. That is vital and obvious.
Mr. Molotov, in a statement in Berlin, in January, 1954, made it much clearer than I could that to impose a settlement upon Germany as something imposed upon a defeated country—bearing in mind that, if we agree to establish any united Germany, we are establishing a free democratic Germany from which Nazism will have been abolished and whose regime and constitution will be acceptable to the treaty Powers—to impose upon such a Germany in a peace treaty frontiers which she would refuse to accept and could not be persuaded to accept would result in a situation which would be little less dangerous than the permanent division of Germany and the present frontiers.
Mr. Molotov said:
…the Versailles Treaty … far from ensuring the security of Europe, was one of the main preconditions of the Second World War … it was a robber treaty … it was hated by the German people—hence it was doomed to inevitable and ignominious failure.
We might not agree with every expression in that statement, but I think that most of us would agree, that the Treaty was hated by the German people and that it was, therefore, doomed to inevitable and ignominious failure. That might not have been the way in which it was destroyed, but ultimately the Treaty could not last, for the reason which Mr. Molotov stated.
Mr. Molotov continued:
…can anyone believe "—
this is relevant to the present negotiations and the present consideration of the possibilities of getting Russian agreement about a unified Germany irrespective of the Paris Agreements—
that for an indefinitely long period the Germans in Western Germany"—
this applies to a united Germany—
will tolerate a situation in which they are unable to settle independently either their internal affairs or questions of their foreign relations with other countries?
These are the words of Mr. Molotov:
How can one picture…a situation 19 which in some parts of Germany, and in this instance in Western Germany, three Western countries—the United States, Britain, and France—could at any moment interfere in the internal life and introduce a state of emergency whenever they wished….
If that is an untenable situation in Mr. Molotov's view, it is a little difficult to understand why, in the Russians' suggested pact for mutual security in Europe,

it is proposed that the four Powers shall each reserve the right to enter into the territory which they previously occupied in order to re-establish order. In view of the very careful statement which Mr. Molotov made in Berlin in January, 1954, I do not think that the Russians could stick to that attitude. I do not think it would be difficult to remind them of the implications of Mr. Molotov's own words.
Then there is the question of security, which is tied up with the matter of German unification. Again, I do not agree with a number of my colleagues who repeatedly refer to the fear that Russia has always had about the possibility of another German aggression. For a number of reasons, I do not believe that that fear has existed at all. As was pointed out by the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), it is not only the people in Moscow, Washington and Great Britain who are aware of the impact of the hydrogen bomb. The people in Berlin and Bonn are equally aware of it, and if ever a country suffered from even high-explosive bombing and the other effects of a modern war, it was Germany.
The Germans are aware that the hydrogen bomb makes aggressive war impossible. They are aware that there is no question in future of Germany, Western Germany alone or united with the Germans in the East, declaring war against Russia and all the Eastern countries associated with her—China and countries in Central and Eastern Europe —and probably, within the Charter of the United Nations, the Western Allies. The conception is a fantastic one, and I do not for a moment believe that it is one which is in the Russian mind at all.
Furthermore, I do not believe there exists the terrible fear of Germany which one finds advertised everywhere in Poland and elsewhere. One would get the impression, by looking at the newspapers and at the posters and slogans on the walls of shops and factories in Poland, that already there are poised on the eastern frontier, for the invasion of Poland, twelve fully armed German divisions under the command of two Nazi generals. I have forgotten the names of the generals, but one was released from prison a few months ago because he is


a very old and dying man, and the other one would certainly not be appointed in charge of the German Army anyhow. The Russians do not believe that; otherwise there would be no logic or sense whatever in the steps which they have taken to arm the Eastern German people and to bring them into the Warsaw alliance alongside Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. Therefore, I do not believe that to be a serious proposition.
My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East made a proposition about the idea of negotiating from strength having been completely discredited. I was not able quite to follow the logic of his argument when he said that negotiating from strength means negotiating with the threat of war if one does not get one's way. I never understood that negotiating from strength meant that. I understood that* it meant negotiating as equal partners with someone who was no stronger than oneself and when one was in a position at least to defend what one had before one bargained for something else.
I understood, too, that in the House over the last ten years the feeling has overwhelmingly been in recognition of the necessity of our at least having the strength to defend our own position against possible aggression when we were engaged in negotiation. I think the history of the last six months has justified that view.
If it is not true that the Russians are so afraid of aggression from Germany, united or otherwise, it should not be so difficult to find a method of establishing an effective security system in Europe. We must not, of course, since the Paris Agreements are quite clearly among the factors that have made it possible for us to persuade the Russians to talk and not to threaten, and to realise that aggression, irrespective of hydrogen bombs, is not going to be a paying proposition, scrap everything at the beginning of the negotiations.
Obviously we cannot surrender the right of united Germany to the control of her own foreign as well as domestic affairs, as Mr. Molotov pointed out. That is not a practical proposition. I would again remind the House of something that Mr. Molotov said, this time at the Berlin Conference. Referring to

the proposition about free elections he said:
Indeed, will Germany, after the elections proposed to it, be really free in its own home and foreign affairs? The Soviet Government desires that, as a result of the all-German elections, the German State should be really free, should have a really free hand in both its home and foreign policy.
He went on:
In so far as Mr. Eden's plan evidently follows from the assumption that, after all-German elections, Germany will not be free to decide the question of whether or not the Bonn and the Paris Agreements now being imposed upon Western Germany, shall remain in force, there can be no talk of a really free Germany after these elections.
What Mr. Molotov was saying was that the elections cannot be really free unless a Germany emerges which will be entitled either to accept the Paris Agreements or to reject them. That is precisely our position here. I understand that it was not our position in Berlin, and it is useful to have the record of what the Russian attitude has been until now, and I assume still is. It is that after the elections Germany shall be free, united, independent and democratic. In the context of other statements made by Mr. Molotov, "independent" means freedom in deciding its own relations with other countries and to build its defence and everything else. It should be equally free to decide whether or not to be a party to any pacts with East or West.
In saying this I am not suggesting for a moment that the Paris Agreements are necessarily the last word. They are a conception which has evolved from a situation which we now hope to change in these discussions. If the ground is changed as the result of these discussions and in the course of the negotiations which are now going on, and we and our Allies are satisfied that we in fact are facing the possibility of a practical solution and agreement with Russia, there is no reason why we should not re-examine the Paris Agreements or the relationship of any one party to the Paris Agreements, or evolve some entirely new conception, always bearing in mind that we are not giving up our own right of self-defence, individually or collectively, in some form or another.
Whether this solution will be found on the basis of the Paris Agreements, or an agreement with the Russians, or a European security pact adjusted according to


our own conceptions of how to implement such a pact, or on the basis of the smaller conception submitted by our own Prime Minister of a five-Power pact, we obviously cannot say at the moment. We are in a region of speculation. I would not rule out of consideration any solution which was genuinely directed towards establishing mutual security in Europe based on the conception of a united, sovereign and democratic Germany.
It is an interesting sidelight on this debate that, so far as I know, there has been no attempt, in all the different viewpoints we have heard, to advocate the idea of a neutralised Germany. That used to be the burden of the attitude of most of the opposition, but it is generally ruled out now, as a result of the Geneva negotiations, as an impracticable conception in regard to Germany.
I have heard the question very often in this House, if Sweden and Switzerland can be neutral why cannot Germany? If that were all, perhaps I should have no objections. Sweden can stop being neutral whenever she wishes. She is neutral because she wants to be. If that conception is applied to Germany, it does not mean anything, but a neutralised Germany, armed or disarmed, is something that does not fit in with the facts of modern life.
Whatever may be the solution that is attempted for this new approach to a European security agreement which will satisfy everybody, I hope that it will be realised by the Government, as has been emphasised by every hon. Member who has spoken on this side of the House, that fundamental and vital to it all is a really practical approach to the question of disarmament. Whatever pacts of security we get—whether an all-Europe security pact, a five-Power pact with mutual inspection over a limited area, the Paris Agreements, the existence, if we will, of a divided Germany, with the Warsaw agreement on the other side—so long as the world is divided into two over-armed camps, with troops lined up on a narrow frontier facing each other, carrying most of the economy of their respective countries on their backs, while every country is suffering from and fearing that situation, the world is still in danger, in spite of all the security pacts. That is why my hon. and right hon. Friends believe that an effective approach to the

disarmament question is fundamental and vital to everything else in this connection.
While it is true, as my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East said—I am sorry he is not here at the moment—that the hydrogen bomb has now ruled out aggressive war, it has not, as he also pointed out, necessarily ended war. It has, however, put the fear of death into all statesmen, Governments and people to the extent that none of them now, including Germany united or divided, will dare in the future to launch war as an instrument of national policy or for the purpose of aggression. There is, however, no assurance whatever that so long as armies are poised against each other, with hydrogen bombs stacked up behind, that a panic or an explosion of some kind will not lead to the conflagration which everyone fears. That is the danger.
Disarmament, with the necessary inspection which must accompany it, has to be worked out. The Government may say that a committee or a sub-committee are discussing certain proposals and will report on them, but I hope that the Government will see how much further they can get in the definition of "aggression" and With the evolution of an applicable form of sanction which will prevent aggression. That has always been the snag, and I have not yet seen the answer.
The idea of everybody piling in and starting shooting because someone has run across a frontier—because some Arabs have shot some Jews over the Israeli frontier or vice versa, or because Communists have broken a barrier in Berlin—is nonsense. Once the small incident is ruled out, there remains the definition of the size of the incident which brings in the large Powers. Is it to be another march into the Rhineland? That was an incident in which we did not think we could persuade others to join us in resisting. The Sudetenland and the other incidents were matters of security, but there was all this hesitation as to extent and so on. The key problem to be solved is that of defining not only when and where an incident begins but when it begins to be a danger and what steps can be taken about it.
Finally, I want to refer to the importance of those other matters discussed at Geneva which have been referred to the Foreign Ministers. There are the


questions of the opening of trade and of visits. Even if the visits are only formal at first they will still be visits. If it were permissible to mention the Galleries of the House I would speak of my wish to see the attendance there of as many Russian people as possible to hear us. I think that they would be impressed. The more who come the better. That applies to all people. Already there are the beginnings of the introduction of English and American books, papers and publications into Poland.
It is important that in these negotiations we should not forget—while having no illusions about the liberation of the countries behind the Iron Curtain—the importance of getting some small understanding that those driven from their homes in the Sudetenland, Poland, Silesia, Pomerania and elsewhere should at least have the right to return there, if only temporarily. I can assure the House that many of them would not want to go back permanently, but to have the principle established that they are entitled to go back would be a great moral gesture and would be very worth while.
I therefore welcome the statement made this afternoon by the Foreign Secretary. I am glad of the unanimity with which all who have taken part in the debate have welcomed the outcome of the Conference and the spirit which has animated it, which I think we all look forward to presaging a new development in the peace of the world.

8.32 p.m.

Mr. Raymond Gower: The hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) has made perfectly clear that in the world of today and tomorrow many problems will continue to arise, and many will remain for solution. It is an important and good thing that he should have done that, because a feature of so many of the speeches we have heard today has been, perhaps, some kind of notion that we had in one step achieved a golden age in which we need have no fears at all for the future. I have always thought that there will always be serious problems, there will always be stresses and strains, and possibly for a very long time there will often be stresses in the international field. I fear that it is too much to hope that mankind has suddenly and internationally achieved perfection when we

know that mankind as represented by the individual is a long way from perfection; when we know that we as a people in this country are so terribly imperfect and so guilty of faults towards one another.
Is it, therefore, reasonable to imagine that nations can be so superior to the people who compose them? I suppose that many hon. Members would say yes, and their reason would be that nations have been forced into this position by some overpowering fear. I hope that that may be the case, but I fear that all the evidence of history is that in the lifetimes of nations and of people there are occasions when unreasonable risks are taken. For that reason I agree with the hon. Member for Attercliffe that while it is probably true, as the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) suggested, that it can no longer be deemed advisable to go to war to attack from strength, it is probably much more true, as the hon. Gentleman said, that our idea in negotiating from strength was the idea of negotiating from a position in which we were able to defend ourselves to some degree. I think that is the interpretation that the hon. Gentleman gave.
I have also taken the view that ultimately, although it may be many years yet, the ideals and ideas of my countryman, the late Lord Davies, including the idea of an international police force and some considerable sacrifice of sovereignty on the part of all nations of the world, will be a prerequisite to the sort of conditions for which we all wish. It is possible that we may achieve much without going so far, but I feel that ultimately the nations of the world will have to face the necessity for that situation, because although we may never have a large-scale universal war of the kind that we have been discussing today, it is still feasible that in some parts of the world there may be small incidents reaching considerable dimensions, and who is to say that some international machinery or court or sanction beyond any sanction contemplated by the hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) will not be necessary?
Nevertheless, it was indeed for all of us a very dramatic moment when my right hon. Friend came towards the end of his speech this afternoon and said that he had an important statement to make. I suppose many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House felt, as I


did at that moment, a hope that something would be announced for which we had wished but for which we had scarcely dared to hope. In that dramatic moment we found that it was true, that the chief members of the present ruling administration in Russia are to come to this country. I suggest that that kind of visit may be just as important—perhaps more important—than some of the conferences. I agree that the conferences have their place and must be held, but I respectfully suggest that meetings of this kind and visits at the top level may be of even greater importance.
I think that one of our chief jobs is to convince the present rulers of Russia not necessarily that they need not fear attack from Germany—the hon. Member for Attercliffe has dealt with that matter—but to convey to them vividly and forcefully when they are here— and they will have every evidence of this—that they need never fear any kind of attack from this country. That surely is some positive gain. If they are really convinced of that, I think we can go further and convince them that they need never fear any aggressive attack from any country associated with this country, in the British Commonwealth, and that will be an even greater gain. We may be able to go a step further still and convince them that they need not fear any conceivable attack from any country in what we have for so long described as the free world.
I was very much impressed by the remarks of my right hon. Friend about the possibility of an interchange of visits between the citizens of the countries East of Europe and the Western countries. I differ from the hon. Member for Attercliffe. I want more of the free visits, not the organised delegations of Members of Parliament and people in that sort of capacity.

Mr. J. Hynd: So do I.

Mr. Gower: They have their use, but what we long for is the day when some of the ordinary people, people in all walks of life, will be able to take short unescorted holidays, perhaps in Poland or Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria, and when the people of those countries will be able to come here on unescorted holidays.

Mr. Hynd: The hon. Member said he differed from me, but in fact he does

not. I said that I welcomed these visits even if for the moment they were only of delegations.

Mr. Gower: I readily ackowledge that.
I hope that in the happy meetings next Spring my right hon. Friend will be able to convey to Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Kruschev how important it is that the ordinary people shall see each other and get to know each other, because I believe that that is a vital way of ensuring that the ordinary people of the one country will never contemplate an attack from the ordinary people of the other.

8.41 p.m.

Mr. William Warbey: We are speaking today in the light of a conference which has created a new atmosphere in the world, and that atmosphere has been infecting the House, for we have had far more unity on foreign affairs than we usually manage to achieve in the different quarters of the House.
I very much welcome what the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower) said about the impending visit of the Soviet statesmen in this country and I express the hope that it may be possible for the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) to be present to receive those Soviet guests when they arrive in this country. There is a special reason for that. This will be a remarkable and historic moment when it arrives. It will be the first time since the Russian Revolution that the head of the Russian Government has visited this country. In that time 38 years will have gone by during which the contacts between the Soviet Union and this country have varied from indifferent to extremely bad.
This may be the opening of a new chapter and the conclusion of an unhappy chapter which began at the time of the Russian Revolution. Over the past year or two the Russians in their propaganda have not ceased to call attention to the fact that it was the right hon. Member for Woodford who played, from their point of view, a rather unfortunate part in the activities directed from the West against that nascent force in Russia. It has been clear from the reiteration of their attacks upon him that they find it extremely hard to forget the rôle which he played on that occasion and at times afterwards.
Yet we come to this curious cycle of history; we have a new situation created to a large extent by the initiative of the right hon. Member for Woodford. We have to recognise, from this side of the House, that it was he, above all, who pressed constantly for the holding of this Conference at the summit. There were times when we had to point out that, having expressed a desire for it, he seemed no longer to have retained his enthusiasm for it, but we saw that there were difficulties, we understood them and we knew that they were not entirely of his creation. It was perhaps unfortunate for him that we had to have a British General Election to make that summit conference finally possible.
In the end, it came about and it very largely took the form which he thought it ought to take—namely, an exchange of views on a friendly human basis between the Heads of States and of Governments without the accompaniment of hordes of officials and agendas and masses of paper. It is true that they were all there around them, but they were nevertheless able to get away from those trappings and get together on that friendly basis as a result of those very intimate contacts.
So intimate were they that the journalists of the whole world, hundreds of journalists assembled in Geneva, were not able to discover the results of some of the conversations which took place and which have only been revealed here to us this afternoon. That shows the degree of intimacy and closeness of relationship it was possible to establish at Geneva. That is really a very great thing and has proved—contrary to the views of some people in this country and perhaps in different parts of this House previously—that a conference of Heads of States can achieve something in the creation of a new confidence and a new relationship between peoples because the Heads of Governments represent in a peculiar way the feelings of the masses of the people in their own countries.
We saw at this Conference how those Heads of Government were able to step outside the narrow circle which undoubtedly was drawn for them and which is always drawn for foreign secretaries by the Foreign Offices and Chancelleries of the world. Time and again we saw examples—and I am sure there were

many in private discussions of which we know nothing—in which the Heads of Government were able to step beyond what their Foreign Secretaries would have dared to say, and certainly what the hordes of officials around the Foreign Secretaries would have allowed them to say. When, for example, President Eisenhower assured the Russians in particular that his only aim was peace, that he had no desire to go to war, Marshal Bulganin replied, "I believe you."
I cannot imagine Mr. Molotov making that reply on the spot. He would not have dared to. The whole burden of tradition, of past experiences, of diplomatic dealings and manoeuvres would have prevented him making that spontaneous gesture. He would have had to think about it, consult his officials, and consider what would have been the political consequences of giving a reply of that kind. The Head of Government was able to step outside that, achieve a contact, and say something which marked a new factor in history.
The new factor is that each great Power has now gone beyond convincing itself and its own people that it does not desire war. That they had already done before the Geneva Conference, but now they have gone further and, so far as we can see, they have really succeeded in convincing the other side that they do not want war. That is the really new factor which has emerged at Geneva.
It is destroying what General Macarthur six months ago, in a remarkable speech, described as the great illusion, the illusion held on both sides of the Iron Curtain. There was the illusion on the one side held by the Russians and Communists that America and her Allies were preparing for the moment when they would launch an attack upon the Communist world and the equal and opposite illusion on the other side that the Soviet Union and the Communist countries were preparing to launch an aggressive attack on the West. General Macarthur described last January how that illusion was dominating the world and preventing the relaxation of tension by impelling forward a continuous, competitive arms race which could lead only to disaster. That illusion has been destroyed by the Geneva Conference.
I think another illusion has been destroyed, although not all my hon.


Friends will agree on this, as was apparent from the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd). I believe that the illusion that has been destroyed by Geneva is that the build-up of powerful forces, including within it the ratification of the Paris Agreements with all that may follow, or was originally intended to follow, from that, has brought about concessions from the other side. In fact, it has not brought any concessions from the other side at all. I should have thought that that was one thing that the Geneva Conference has demonstrated.
It has demonstrated that, as far as Germany is concerned, the build-up of Western strength and the ratification of the Paris Agreements has not compelled the other side to budge one inch in regard to its previous position about Germany. It has now admitted it quite frankly instead of, as it were, wrapping it up in a propaganda disguise. Mr. Bulganin said quite openly that the reunification of Germany was not on the orders of the day and would have to be postponed—he made his idea quite clear—until N.A.T.O. and the Soviet Alliance were dismantled. That is what he said. I say this merely because my hon. Friend gave the impression that in some way the Russians had budged from their previous position; but they have not. They have reaffirmed it.
After all, there were illusions before the Conference began, rather foolish ones written by diplomatic correspondents telling inspired stories that as a result of Russian weakness and relative Western strength, the Russians would now make a lot of concessions and that it would, therefore, be possible to expect them to withdraw from Eastern Germany. It was said that it would be possible to create a demilitarised zone in the Soviet Zone of Germany, which, of course, would mean a unilateral withdrawal of the Russian troops from Germany, leaving the Western troops in Western Germany. That illusion had to be very speedily abandoned.
I notice that the Prime Minister, in putting forward his proposals for a demilitarised zone in Eastern Germany, did not say "the Soviet Zone of Germany." In fact, as the Conference progressed, this demilitarised zone moved visibly towards the West and it became a demilitarised zone in Germany between East and West:

in other words, a demilitarised zone which could be based partly in the West of Germany and partly in the East.
I was very glad to see that the Prime Minister showed some flexibility in the proposals that he put forward. He quickly recognised that a deadlock had been created by the insistence of both sides in holding to their previous positions in regard to Germany and that if there was to be any ultimate settlement of the German problem, one would have to begin to break away from the previous rigid position.
I congratulate the Prime Minister on beginning to break away from those previous rigid conceptions, first in the concept of a demilitarised zone both East and West of the line dividing the two forces within Germany—in other words, the beginning of a little power vacuum inside Germany that some right hon. Gentlemen opposite and some of my hon. Friends have been so worried about creating in Europe. They have created one, by the way, in Austria. They have accepted a power vacuum in Austria, in what from a strategic viewpoint is a very important position in the centre of Europe.
They have accepted a power vacuum in Austria and they are now beginning to think in terms of a possible small power vacuum inside Germany. Gradually, perhaps, they will be able to extend this concept until it becomes later larger, and there will then gradually be a rise in the concept of a mutual disengagement, which, of course, is the only way in which the German problem can be solved.
I am glad to see that there are signs that the Americans are moving in a similar direction. I notice that Mr. Dulles said—and it is remarkable that it should have been said by him and not by General Eisenhower—that when, in October, the Foreign Ministers came to discuss the twin questions of European security and German reunification, there would have to be mutual concessions. I think that the Americans may move quite fast in the recognition of the kind of concessions which may have to be achieved in order to bring about the ultimate reunification of Germany in agreement—and it will have to be in agreement—between the Germans and their neighbours; because that is the only secure basis on which a future for Germany and for Europe can be founded.
I had hoped to underline the arguments used by others of my hon. Friends about the importance of this question of disarmament. I wish only to say that I hope that the Government are now going to make up for a certain amount of lost time in this matter. We have not really moved very much forward since the last meeting round about 11th May. We then had the rather staggering Russian acceptance of ceilings for armed forces which, if they are carried into effect, will certainly be to the disadvantage of the Russians compared with the present position. That is something which we ought to take up and follow up very quickly, and I hope that the Government really mean to get on seriously with the disarmament question.

8.56 p.m.

Mr. Peter Smithers: I hope that the hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) will forgive me if I do not immediately follow up some of the points which he raised. I hope that later I shall be able to point out what divides the hon. Member from me in his analysis of the position. I should like to welcome the tribute which he paid to my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) for the foundations which he laid for the present situation, which, however we may analyse it, has at any rate the benefit of being mobile.
This afternoon when we heard the Prime Minister's momentous announcement to the effect that two of the most important living Russians were coming to this country, I think we must all have immediately asked ourselves what our personal reaction should be to this—if I may so call it—extraordinary event. For, as the hon. Member for Ashfield rightly pointed out, it is an extraordinary event, and I think that it goes a good way towards demonstrating that the talks at Geneva have in fact produced a radical change in the situation, whatever that change may be.
I am sure that our reaction to this visit should be one of seeking to ask ourselves in all honesty what it is that continues to divide the world. Were we able to stand back a little from the important events of our time and look at history in the large and ask ourselves what is the dominating political tendency of mankind through the centuries, I am

sure we should answer that it has been the tendency to unite in ever larger political societies.
Perhaps I am very conscious of this as I represent the city which was the first capital of a united England, the place where a number of small warring kingdoms were first brought within a single rule. From that time onwards down to the present day the whole progress and organisation of political society, in the mediaeval and the modern period, has been one of the gradual formation of larger and larger political units. The question we have to ask ourselves with this impending visit before us is, are we now or are we not in a position in which we can approach the final step and, by a skilful playing of the cards in our hand, begin the formation of what Mr. Wendell Willkie, in an imaginative phrase, called "one world."
In the presence of this strong natural tendency of mankind to unite, what is it that continues to divide us? The old divisions of nationalism are not, I believe, what separate us now. A nationalist war today is a physical impossibility; and economically and socially the temptations of the benefits of internationalism are so great that nationalism in itself is no longer a very attractive proposition.
I do not believe either that it is a division between the European and Asiatic civilisations. Visiting the countries of Asia, one cannot help but be impressed by the fact that everything tends to make them and us complementary to one another. In all those countries one cannot help but observe that they have achieved escape from or independence within somebody's empire. They do not want to fall freshly into the Communist empire and lose their new-found independence. The more we consider their economies the more we find that the part they can play and the part we can play are complementary. The more we consider their political structure the more do we see that it is divided into fractions of various kinds and of all political colours, much as is our own political society, and that amongst those peoples we have many natural friends and allies. So that I do not believe that is the real division.
Is it, then, that the structure of the United Nations is inadequate and has failed to give the world in the post-war


period the unity which we all sought? I do not believe that that either is the answer. Generally speaking, the Charter is a good formula for co-operation if the will to co-operate is there, but it has been demonstrated time and again that up to the present the will to co-operate has not been there.
Now I come to the reason why that will to co-operate has not been present, and here I part company from the hon. Member for Ashfield. In his argument he gives the preponderance of weight to the importance of fear. I think that feat as between ourselves and those on the other side of the Iron Curtain is an important factor, but I do not think it has been nearly as important as the factor of hope—the hope on the other side of the Iron Curtain that some day Communism will dominate the world.
I believe that during this impending visit my right hon. and hon. Friends of the Foreign Office would be very wise to brush up their Marxist-Leninism and see whether it is not in fact the Marxist-Leninist theory which alone up to date has prevented the unification of Europe into one single political society, and which alone has meant the perpetuation of armaments.
This theory, as I see it, is three things. It is a revolutionary appeal to mankind in certain circumstances. Those circumstances are gradually passing away in many countries, and the appeal is becoming of less and less interest. It is in part an attempt to deduce what the course of history will be. It is thirdly and most important an attempt from those deductions to deduce what national policy ought to be.
I believe that the most dangerous and most destructive assumption which has continued to divide the Communist world from our own is the assumption that ultimately the West will collapse through its own internal contradictions and that ultimately, even if temporary concessions have to be made by the Communist Powers to the West, those concessions will sooner or later be recovered and a Communist-dominated world will come about.
The importance of this visit is that it begins to give an opportunity to the leaders of the Soviet Union to see how slender are their chances of ever achieving Communist domination of the whole

world, and of demonstrating to them how vigorous, healthy and progressive is our own society. Once these facts begin to penetrate behind the Iron Curtain, the Communist theory will begin to appear to people behind the Iron Curtain as obsolescent as it appears to most of us on this side of it. When that process begins to take place and Marxist-Leninism ceases to be the element of hope that has separated the ambitions of the Iron Curtain countries from those of most of the free world, I believe that we shall be approaching a situation in which we shall be able to negotiate something like a permanent settlement.
How, then, should we react to the Soviet visit? First of all, I would say, with very great satisfaction that the Soviet leaders will have an opportunity to compare the predictions of the Marxist-Leninist theory, which has governed their policies for so long, with the actual state of the world outside the Soviet Union. I do not believe that the reports of Soviet embassies submitted to the Soviet Chancellery and digested and passed on to their leaders have ever given to the Soviet leaders an adequate picture of the state of the outside world. I believe, therefore, that their policy has been based on unrealistic assumptions, and it seems to me that this visit is a real opportunity—

Mr. Ellis Smith: The same applies to ourselves.

Mr. Smithers: Perhaps that may be so. It will afford a real opportunity to import an element of realism into Soviet policy.
Secondly, we should make a great effort to understand and meet the difficulties which immediately divide us. The third and very important thing is to attempt to break down the Communist belief in the ultimate victory of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This we can best do by maintaining the power and unity of the West. If we now begin any process of unilateral relaxation and unilateral disarmament we encourage the Soviet leaders to think that the process of dissolution for which they have so long hoped is beginning to come about and we shall send them back to the Soviet Union encouraged in intransigence rather than inclined to make concessions.
Therefore, now more than ever before, we should persevere in building the political structure of the free world, in


consolidating the ties which bind the United States and Britain, in consolidating the ties of the Commonwealth and in consolidating Europe as a powerful political unit in a free world. We should also strive our utmost to bring about in South-East Asia a league of independent and free nations which have so much in common with ourselves in defence of the common aspirations and ideals. I am sure that if we combine in perseverance in building the structure of the free world we shall be taking the longest step towards the construction ultimately of the "one world" which we so much desire.

9.10 p.m.

Mr. Alfred Robens: I am afraid that I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Smithers) when he analyses what it was that divided East and West by saying that it was not fear but rather hope on the part of the U.S.S.R. that eventually Soviet Communism would gain world-wide acceptance. I do not think that is what has separated us at all. I believe it has been fear.
Indeed, during the time I spent in the United States in 1945—when in this country we were still talking of our gallant Russian allies, when Mrs. Churchill, as she then was, was still building up that great fund of friendship and money and goods for Russia—I was amazed to find that in the United States there was, possibly because of the feeling that they were in sole possession of an atomic bomb, a great deal of loose talk from their responsible people about switching the war and that this was now the time not to withdraw troops but to turn them and smash the Communist menace that might arise. I was much affected by that because I was so surprised that, barely was the war with Germany over, and when the war with Japan was still on, eminent people could have held those views, although it may well be that they were in a minority.
I believe that fear is the real problem and that we have first to get rid of fear if we are to get anything like unity between East and West. I believe that the Geneva Conference has had a profound effect upon the ordinary people of this country because of that very factor. Indeed, it is almost impossible to engage

in conversation with workers, in a canteen or anywhere else, without at some point the conversation turning to the H-bomb, to the possibilities of war, to conscription. Always, therefore, there has been hanging over people's minds, it may be subconsciously, and only seeing the light of day in casual conversation, that shadow, that feeling that war was possible and that in any war there was not much hope for civilisation.
The Geneva Conference, therefore, has had an uplifting effect. It has had a good effect upon the morale of people and it would be ungracious on our part if we did not congratulate the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on the part they played in what has been a great and momentous occasion in the history of the world.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ash-field (Mr. Warbey) felt that perhaps the Paris Agreements and N.A.T.O. itself had not made a contribution towards making the Conference possible and had not caused the change. He is entitled to his view and he may be right, but I cannot help feeling that the fact that there is a much more even balance of power in Europe today has had a significant effect upon the Conference and upon the decisions reached. Indeed, when we consider the question of disarmament it will surely be on the basis of maintaining that evenness of balance, even if we get right down to dispensing with almost all arms. Therefore it is likely that, because there is a more even balance now, the Conference was possible and was so successful.
Yet it would be very wrong, too, to give an impression to the country that because this Conference has been succesful there is not a lot more to be done. In my view, this Conference was not the turning point but a new starting point. For the first time we have had unanimous decisions on the part of the four great Powers to give a directive to their Foreign Secretaries to deal with specific things and, indeed, the most important things that could be imagined.
I think the value of personal contact was very largely responsible for the fact that within such a short time these decisions could, in fact, be unanimous. One cannot help but be impressed from reading in the Press of the way in which President Eisenhower put over his personality. The way in which Marshal


Bulganin replied "I believe you" to President Eisenhower when he said that the United States did not want war was an indication of the way in which personal contact had done so much. It is interesting to recall that the very first time President Eisenhower came over to Europe as President of the United States was to meet the Russians and to talk about European problems.
I am sure we are all delighted that the Russian Prime Minister and Mr. Kruschev are coining to London. I would add to what my hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) said earlier, that it would be very nice if, in point of fact, Parliamentarians in this House could at the same time entertain a number of Russian Parliamentarians and respond to the hospitality that was extended to Members of this House when they were in Moscow.
I hope sincerely that the Foreign Secretary might communicate the wish of backbench Members of this House to entertain in a friendly way our Russian Parliamentary friends so that they could see how we work democracy and at the same time see at first-hand what we mean when we use the word "democracy." Then they might try to explain to us what they mean when they use "democracy," because we both appear to use it and we appear to be sincere about its use, but we do not appear to agree on what "democracy" really means. If that opportunity were taken, it would be all to the good.
I revert to the subject with which I began. I believe that it is fear that causes a difference between us, and the real weapon against fear is confidence. What the Geneva Conference has done, in my view, is to give some sort of confidence, and that is a very important thing. There is no question at all that the two major contending parties, the United States of America and Russia, are fearful of one another. The Americans are certainly fearful of Soviet Communism, and it is believed that the Soviet Union has designs upon them and would be ready to march and wage war. But it is equally true that the Russians fear the Americans, and believe that the Americans, with their enormous productive capacity for armaments, would like to attack Soviet Communism. Therefore, I believe it is fear on both sides that causes the problem.

Mr. Smithers: The right hon. Gentleman has been good enough to deal at some length with my argument about fear. I do not deny it is a very important element in the situation, and it has been a very good thing to try to remove it. All I was saying was that the removal of fear does not of itself mean that we shall be able to achieve one world.

Mr. Robens: I am going to develop the point, because I think that the hon. Gentleman is mistaken. I was going on to say that this defence ring looks very different according to whether one is inside or outside it. If, in fact, Russia and her satellites are encircled by what is known as a defence periphery, it might well be that the people who look at this ring as a purely defensive measure are right. However, if one is outside the ring, then one may look upon somebody else's defence as perhaps more offensive than defensive.
There is N.A.T.O. I am not quarrelling about N.A.T.O. and I am not arguing that we should not have it. For the moment I am trying to put the Russian position. Unless we are prepared to look at the point of view of the other chap we are never likely to get an agreement. To us, N.A.T.O. is a purely defensive organisation. Not a single person or country associated with N.A.T.O. would want to use it for any other purpose than defence. However, I cannot help thinking that if I were a Russian diplomat I should think that perhaps it was also designed for offence against my own country. Therefore, I think the hon. Gentleman is wrong when he seems to suggest that fear is not the real problem that divides us. I think that Geneva may have done a lot to dispel or lessen the fear.
The Foreign Secretaries now have an enormous task in front of them. I am sure that no one envies the job of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary. He will have a very difficult task indeed, and he will spend many hours cogitating and arguing in order to try to find a solution which is acceptable to the four Powers.
I believe, of course, that German unity is essential. I do not think that anyone in the House today has said anything to the contrary. Indeed, I do not believe that there is the least chance of a lasting settlement without German unity. Until


German unity is established, no matter what arrangements are made about a European pact, I am certain there will be uneasiness. Therefore, the German problem is one that must be resolved.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Will my right hon. Friend agree that there could be a partial settlement without reunification of Germany with a view to playing for time in order to bring about a long-term settlement?

Mr. Robens: I am going to say something about that.
I feel that we shall not get German unity—I believe that this meets my hon. Friend's point—until we have effective European security. I do not believe that any European security pact based on a strictly divided Germany would be a good pact or a lasting one. It may well be unnecessary to agree as a priority on German unity; we may move, as my hon. Friend has suggested, to a European pact within which arrangements could be made which would enable German unity to follow. However, I repeat that it would be wrong to have a pact which was designed for and based on German disunity, because, if so, we might lose the opportunity for the unification of Germany for very many years and then any arrangements which we had would be very uneasy ones.
I also believe that a European pact which is merely a treaty of non-aggression is valueless. After all, it is implicit in the Charter of the United Nations that we should not undertake aggression against one another. There would seem to be no real point in merely having a treaty of non-aggression and signing a paper which said that we would not be aggressors against one another and that in the event of aggression each of us would go to the aid of the country suffering from aggression. That in itself would not be of very great value, for it is provided within the Charter of the United Nations and it has not prevented little wars from breaking out here and there.
It seems to me, therefore, that any genuine disarmament or collective security pact for Europe must be based upon effective control and inspection of arms. Indeed, unless a pact is based upon inspection and control there cannot be full confidence. Control and inspection

of arms are the keys to a collective security pact that will be valuable and effective. President Eisenhower dramatically offered that the Russians might take aerial views of strongpoints in the U.S., provided that the Americans might do the same in the U.S.S.R. Apart from that being dramatic and catching the popular eye, there was not a great deal in it. [Interruption.] No. If I were a militarist I should be more concerned about what went on in the tunnels driven into the hills than on airfields that I could see from an aeroplane.
I would very much rather that President Eisenhower had been speaking in that way on behalf of the three Western Powers. It would be a great mistake, and I hope that it does not arise at the Foreign Ministers' conference, for bargaining to go on between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This really must be a four-Power conference, without dramatic interventions by the two biggest boys, leaving the other two countries rather on the side. We do not want bargains between any two.
When the Foreign Secretaries move to the problem of disarmament, and if they are successful, what they do will have a tremendous effect upon the economy of the nations of the world. Whatever else happens, we must not move forward with real plans and ideas for a reduction of armaments without at the same time planning how to utilise the surplus production that will arise as the result of the non-production of armaments. That is a very important factor.
I was rather glad of the speech of M. Faure. He really made a great contribution when he pinpointed that matter and said that one of the best uses to which we could put some of the surplus that we saved from the production of arms would be the development of the underdeveloped territories of the world. I hope that the Foreign Secretaries will be seized with the necessity, even on economic grounds, of developing the various parts of the world to rid them of the poverty, ignorance and disease under which many millions of people still live.
Personal contacts between citizens of various nations is highly important. I remember being very impressed in 1946 by a speech to which I and many other people listened, by a man who is no longer with us, Ernest Bevin. He said,


"I want to grapple with the whole problem of passports and visas. A diplomat asked me in London one day what the aim of my foreign policy was, and I said: 'To go down to Victoria Station, get a railway ticket and go where the hell I like without a passport or anything else.' I stick to that."
In that speech, Ernest Bevin laid great emphasis on the importance of the interchange of people and of personal contacts. We are much more fortunate in this House than many people in the country because we have very great opportunities to meet people from various nations. Either they cone here or we go to them. None of us has attended international conferences without realising that the most valuable contacts, apart from the conference itself, were those made outside the conference chamber, when, we learned to understand and to know the other people.
I wonder if the Foreign Secretary can do something before the conference starts? We need to establish many more contacts but there are some which we could, I think, do without. I wonder if it would be possible to get an agreement that at least until the Foreign Ministers' conference is over we might stop this war of words on the radio over Europe —the abuse that goes on from both sides—[An HON. MEMBER: "Oh no."]—night after night. An hon. Member says "Oh no," but, with great respect, Russians listening to certain radio stations in Europe would certainly describe as abuse what is broadcast. It is no use looking at only one side of the scale, so to speak. Such a step would be a good thing. It would get rid of some of these tensions.
It would also be a good thing if people were not so trigger-happy—shooting down planes that may stray over their territory by a few hundred yards. It would be a good thing, too, if, without waiting for the Foreign Ministers' conference, the Government said to the President of the Board of Trade "Get on to the job of looking at that restricted list once more to see if there are not some things with which, in the new light, we can dispense. Before the Foreign Ministers' conference opens let us see a greater development of trade between the countries." I think that that would be all to the good.
My final words are these. The Foreign Secretary has before him an onerous,

difficult, heavy and very responsible task. Success and agreement between the Foreign Ministers could usher in a new era for the peoples of the world. The removal of the fear of war, relief from the huge burden of defence, and a combined world attack upon poverty and ignorance, wherever it exists, could put civilisation upon a new and a higher plane. The peoples of the world could then reap the rich harvest which waits to be gathered from the work of scientific achievement in the realms of nuclear energy and the application of electronics to industry. The Foreign Secretary goes to this conference to speak, not for party, but for Britain. I wish him God-speed in the task to which he will shortly put his hand.

9.33 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I must begin by expressing on behalf of the Prime Minister his apologies to the House that he is not able to be present to hear the end of the debate. He has already, I think, informed the Leaders of the Opposition. He has, unfortunately, a very long standing engagement at an important Commonwealth Conference, which he thought the House would wish him to fulfil.
I hope that I may be allowed to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens) on what I might call his maiden speech in his new capacity. He will not, of course, expect me to hope that in this case the shadow should be changed at an early date into the substance of a Foreign Secretary.

Mr. James Griffiths: That will come.

Mr. Macmillan: Nevertheless, I could not wish for any more agreeable shadow to live with—and, I hope, for many a long year.
He and I, of course, are both amateurs in this field, and he will already have discovered, as I have, that this is one of those subjects in which almost everybody is an expert. He will also have found that he has been cast for a rôle which to anybody who suffers from any sense of responsibility has serious drawbacks. A Foreign Secretary—and this applies also to a prospective Foreign Secretary—is always faced with this cruel dilemma. Nothing he can say can do very much


good, and almost anything he may say may do a great deal of harm. Anything he says that is not obvious is dangerous; whatever is not trite is risky. He is forever poised between the cliché and the indiscretion. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) appeared to think that I had been guilty of an indiscretion in expressing in colloquial terms my view that war was impossible. The newspaper which gave publicity to this statement was also good enough to give the reason which I gave. It is because in modern war there can be no victor.
I should like to thank the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South, as I do the right hon. Member for Blyth, for the very gracious and kind words which they have said. They are a great help and inspiration to us all. Fortunately, this debate does not call for any detailed or argumentative reply. While, of course, there have been differences of emphasis and of interpretation, there has been an unusually large measure of agreement. The right hon. Member for Blyth said—and I agree with him—that we are only at the beginning of a chapter. Until last week there had been no meeting of the Heads of Governments for ten years. In the last two or three years there has been much talk of such meetings, but no one did more to prepare the way than my right hon. Friend the former Prime Minister. It was very sad for me that he was not able to render in person this last service to the world. But in spirit, if not in physical presence, he was there with us at Geneva.
If there was any doubt before as to the wisdom of the choice of date, I think there can be none now. The long hesitations over E.D.C. lost us three precious years. Even after the London-Paris Agreements were signed last October, final ratification and deposit could not be made effective until 5th May this year. Immediately after that, I think within a week, on the initiative of the British Government and on terms which I arranged with the French and American Foreign Ministers in Paris, the invitation was sent to the Soviet Government.
In the last Parliament it was commonly said—indeed, it was vehemently argued—that if the Paris Agreements became effective and if Germany were to be brought

into N.A.T.O., all hope of any such Four-Power meeting was at an end. That was the argument. In fact, the invitation was sent out and accepted within a fortnight after these events. Moreover, having sat through six days of the formal discussions, and in some parts of the night the informal, I was more than ever convinced that to have held such a meeting before these Agreements had been ratified would have been a very grave error. We should have been in a position of great weakness and indecision.
At any rate, all these confident prophecies were confounded, and within a few weeks, I repeat, of the completion of the Agreements, which were supposed by some to be a final bar to negotiation, we have spent a most useful and certainly agreeable week in formal and in informal discussions with the leading figures of the Soviet Government and system.
Of course, as has been widely said in all parts of the House—and it is well that it should be said in all parts of the House —a great gulf remains between us as regards the methods by which European security may be assured of the conditions in which the German problem may be solved. The Russians argue that European security comes first. Security, they said, must pave the way to unification. We maintain that there can be no security in Europe until Germany is reunified.
They said, "We must study first one and then the other." We have made this reply—and I think the whole House thinks it is a wise reply: "Surely they must be studied concurrently and implemented at the same time." In the form of the directive this compromise is implied. That, I think, is its importance; the linking words are a contribution towards a hope of solving this problem—to take them together and to deal with them together.
Like all compromises, it can work only if both sides want it to work. I am afraid I must tell the House that Marshal Bulganin's last speech, which is printed at the end of the White Paper, left us in no doubt that, irrespective of the wording of the directive, the Soviet Government have not been shaken from the point of view that Germany must not be reunited until after a system of security has been created in conformity with the Soviet Government's own ideas. The language


used by the Marshal was firm and clear on this point.
I must therefore strike a note of warning against any premature optimism about the task which will lie before us in October. I observe that that note was struck on different sides of the House, notably by the right hon. Member for Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd) and my hon. Friend the Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn). As I have said, there is a gulf between us and between the two points of view, and it is no good pretending that the gulf has been bridged at the Geneva Conference. It has been defined. That is a great advantage. Suggestions have been made which could prove to be helpful. But the gulf has not yet been bridged.
What will happen in October? At least this will happen: the meeting will take place in October. That I do know. If, last July, with the events of that time and the confusion of E.D.C. having been rejected by the French Assembly, anyone had declared from this Box that within a year the Western European Union would have been negotiated and implemented, that Germany would have become a member both of the inner group of European nations and of the wider group of N.A.T.O., that a friendly meeting would have taken place between the Heads of four Governments, including Russia, to be followed by a meeting of their Foreign Secretaries to discuss not what the agenda should be—as has so often happened in the past—but an agreed and precise agenda, that a visit of the leading figures of the Soviet Government to the country would have been arranged for the following spring and, if I may add these words, that a newly elected Tory Government would be announcing this news to an approving and even enthusiastic Opposition, he would have been called not a prophet but a lunatic. But there it is; as one of the characters of one of Mr. Kipling's stories observed, "Nature beats art every time."
There has been very general agreement in the debate. The Opposition below the Gangway appeared to agree more or less with the Opposition above the Gangway. That is all right. The Opposition above the Gangway appeared to agree with us. That is quite usual, but it is quite all right. The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) seemed

to agree with the Americans—or perhaps I should say that he seemed to think that the Americans now agreed with him. It is very novel, but it is all right. The hon. Member went further and did a thing I have not known him to do before—he appeared to agree with himself. That is almost a miracle.
There is one important point to which I must now turn. We have had a great deal of discussion in past months about the neutrality of Germany. I agree that there may be a different tone in which that word can be used. Some have strenuously argued that the only hope of getting the Russians to agree to a reunified Germany lay in the creation of a permanently neutral Germany. Others, with equal sincerity, have maintained the exact opposite and have stressed the impossibility of a great country being permanently deprived of the right to operate its own foreign policy, for that really is what imposed neutrality implies. I say, "imposed neutrality."
Curiously enough, the Russians did not in fact propose neutrality as a solution at Geneva. Taking the long view, I have no doubt they felt it neither practicable nor really desirable. They, like everybody else, could not find an answer to the question which the Prime Minister posed a few months ago, and which the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition rightly repeated today. If Germany is to be neutral and armed, who is to keep her neutral? If she is to be neutral and disarmed, who is to keep her disarmed?
Indeed, the Russians did not seem to have a policy about Germany in the sense that we have one. What they proposed was really that everybody should be neutral, that N.A.T.O. should be dissolved, that the Warsaw Pact—it is quite fair to add—should equally be dissolved. The result would be a kind of universal European security, of a type they have had in mind and have often put forward. Until that final and almost Utopian stage could be reached, they seemed to want the German settlement to be indefinitely postponed and the division of Germany maintained.
I must make our view as clear as Marshal Bulganin made his. We have no intention of allowing N.A.T.O. to be dissolved. The Prime Minister made that quite clear. On the other hand, we regard the continued division of Germany as in


itself a source of insecurity. What we have to do, as has so often fallen to the British in their history, is to propose something in between the negative and sceptical view that nothing can be done and perhaps the over-idealistic view that everything must be done at once. We have somehow got to solve the problem of Germany by devising at the same time such a degree of European security as will give full satisfaction to the legitimate apprehensions and anxieties of the Russian people.
To that end of course the way will be long and difficult. I have no doubt that there will be many snags and many disappointments. We shall try in October to get to grips with this problem, but I cannot promise the House that we shall reach a solution in a short time. As the House knows, and as the Prime Minister has today repeated, the British delegation —I believe speaking on behalf of the whole country and the whole House—was able to put forward a number of proposals which we think are practicable, are workable and effective. Of course they are only put forward in outline at this stage; that is what the meeting of heads of Government was for. I think the Russian delegates were impressed by the sincerity with which they were put forward, even though they did not accept them as such. It is now, therefore, our task to persuade them of the practicability of such a method.
The deputy-Leader of the Opposition asked a question about the geographical area to be covered by the Prime Minister's proposals for mutual inspection of forces and armaments, and subsequently referred to a quite separate proposal for the control and limitation of forces and armaments, including perhaps a demilitarised area. I will try to answer both questions. My noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) asked the same question, as did the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson). My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister really made two proposals at the Conference on successive days. One was for a practical but modest experiment in international co-operation. It was to be a kind of interim measure. In this there was to be no question of limitation of armaments. What he contemplated was an inspection of what was physically on

the ground at present in Central Europe, where the forces of East and West confront each other.
The area was not defined. It might be modest. Its extent, of course, would be the subject of negotiation. It might be wide. One might think that the narrower it was to start with, the more quickly we might be able to get agreement about it; or the wider it was, the more effective its work would be. But within whatever area the suggestion applied, it would apply, in our minds, to all forces, of whatever nationality—American, British or, indeed, any N.A.T.O. forces, on the one side, and Russian, Polish and all the rest, on the other side.
It was, I repeat, not a limitation or control idea. It was simply to be an experiment which might be a useful foundation for more extensive and more ambitious schemes later on. It would be a kind of practice in the teams of both sides getting together and learning how to work this kind of thing.
Then, I come to my right hon. Friend's second proposal, which was connected with the security question. This was a proposal for the control and limitation of forces and armaments and was to include the idea of a demilitarised area. This was advanced as one of the series of suggestions which my right hon. Friend thought might be studied by the Foreign Ministers to help to bring about the conditions of security in which Germany could be reunified.
The suggestions were not detailed; that was not really the function at this stage. The object was to give security. One way was by mutual engagements and the other by concrete safeguards. The pact was to be the method of mutual engagements, and the limitation and control were to be the concrete safeguards.
While speaking of the pact, I should like to underline—I think it is important —that the very fact that the Government of the United States accepted that it would join a five-Power or larger pact of this kind, is a very important development of United States policy and one which has great significance for those who have studied some of the difficulties of United States Governments in the past.
One matter about which I ought to say a word is the Far East. These proposals were not discussed at the formal meetings


but, of course, they were in all our minds. Much useful exchange of thought took place with all our colleagues. The position remains one of serious anxiety. There is a lull, but it is an uneasy lull.
In the early part of the year, when the situation was more critical, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out the British policy in very simple terms: negotiation, not force. Sooner or later, if force is to be avoided, negotiation must begin. It is, therefore, with great satisfaction, I am sure, that the House will have heard that contact is to take place between the American and the Chinese Governments. It is true that it is limited in the first instance, but it is the beginning of a contact between the two Governments. I would like also to add my tribute to the useful, helpful work of the Indian Government in helping to reduce tension in the Far East.
There is only one other warning that I would venture to give. It is not cynical, I think, to say that such success as there may have been at the Geneva meeting, or may be future meetings, is largely—I put it no higher than that—based on the acceptance now of the view that power —war—as an instrument of policy is an obsolete conception. What that can imply, in such a new age, we hardly know ourselves; but that is really an accepted fact.
I remember when I was a boy before the First World War a book by Sir Norman Angell which had a great vogue. It was called, "The Great Illusion." Its theme has often been misrepresented. The author did not say that there would not be a war, but that there could be no victor in a war. The author was before his time, and two great wars had to take place and a vast development in modern applied science before this illusion could

finally be dispelled. We now all know that there can be no victor in modern war. But I think that we must be careful that a new illusion does not take its place. For this proposition that there can be no victor is only true if the will to resist and the power to resist is maintained until these final settlements are made, in spite of temptations of relaxation during these dangerous formative years.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East said, I think truly, that you can no longer negotiate from strength, if he meant by that, that you can no longer impose your will through strength. Nor can you negotiate from utter weakness, and that is the answer to the hon. Gentleman who proposed that we should immediately unilaterally disarm. Surely the truth today is that what you need is military equality and political cohesion.
We are now entering—as we told the people last May we hoped to do—upon a new process of negotiation. This will subject the free democracies to new and severe pressures. It will be tempting to relax effort in all directions in an atmosphere of premature optimism. But in my opinion, if we do that, we are lost. But if we show courage and determination; if we show understanding of both sides of this question, which we must do; if we have perseverance and are able to survive what may be a prolonged test of nerves and patience and strength of will, then I really believe that we may be at the beginning of a new and fruitful period in the history of man's life on earth.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. P. G. T. Buchan-Hepburn): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES [MONEY]

Resolution reported;
That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to extend the powers of friendly societies, and amend the Friendly Societies Acts, 1896 to 1948; to make provision with respect to the furnishing of information by the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance in connection with claims for benefit from friendly societies and trade unions; and for purposes connected therewith, it is expedient to authorise—

(a) any charge on moneys provided by Parliament which may result from treating as expenses incurred in carrying into effect the Acts relating to national insurance such expenses as may be incurred by any Government department in connection with the furnishing of information relating to claims and awards under those Acts by the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance to any registered friendly society or branch, or to any registered trade union or branch of a registered trade union; and
(b) the payment into the Exchequer of any increase attributable to the said Act of the present Session in the fees payable under or by virtue of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896.

Resolution agreed to.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES BILL

Considered in Committee; reported, without Amendment; read the Third time and passed.

IMMIGRANTS (TUBERCULOSIS)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Colonel J. H. Harrison.]

10.0 p.m.

Dr. Barnett Stross: My purpose tonight is to draw attention to the problem of tuberculosis as it affects immigrants into Britain, and I hope to indicate, within the short time at my disposal, a little of the background of the problem, and what its size is, and to offer some suggestions of a tentative nature for an attack upon a disease that has so long ravaged mankind. This problem is one which is of universal, world-wide application, but I wish to confine myself to its application to ourselves and to those who, for one reason or another, come here to Britain, to our large towns and cities.
The problem in the main is of those who enter this country and who are of rural stock, for they have poor immunity against tuberculosis. They are peculiarly susceptible, especially those in the age group from 15 to 25, and many of them are in a tuberculin-negative state. They come to our great cities and large towns where the risk of infection is, of course, high and where the stress of adjustment to a new life is severe.
Some of us, and I am one, and for myself I apologise, have misunderstood the problem. It used to be thought that many of these immigrants entered the country already suffering from tuberculosis. This may be true of some, for we know that in Eire, for example, the death rate from tuberculosis is at present 1,500 per year, and that is a serious figure. However, the fact is, I think, now recognised that the majority of those coming here are free from tuberculosis and, not only that, are negative reactors. A high percentage of them are. They are descendants of people who had little or no contact either with human or bovine tuberculosis.
Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that they are more vulnerable to infection than the English, who were ravaged by this disease, mainly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and have, as a result, acquired some immunity. It is


noted that a high percentage of the immigrants, especially of young Irish women, tend to develop pleural effusions and progressive primary lesions, and these are serious types of tuberculosis. I heard this morning that in the past five years, it is claimed in Eire, 1,300 Irish immigrants have returned there from this country to enter sanatoria there. That is some evidence of the size of the problem, for many others stayed here during those years to be treated in our own English or Scottish sanatoria.
The immigrants are by no means all Irish. There are immigrants from the West Indies and, to a lesser extent, from Africa, Cyprus, India and Malta. Some of them come here to study, but the majority come here to work; and many students have to work as well as study to be able to carry on their studies. From Ireland, I am advised, at present the number is approximately 20,000 per year. I should like to point out to the Parliamentary Secretary, though I am sure she is cognisant of it, that here has been a change in the type of immigrants in the last few years—more women as compared with the number of men, and more from rural areas and the West and South Coasts of Ireland. The numbers from the West Indies total about 10,000 a year, and of them I say no more at the moment than that they are less vulnerable because they belong to older age groups. However, we do not know very much about them. From other territories the numbers are far fewer.
In limiting my remarks to the Irish immigrants, my excuse is that it is of them that we know the most, and that is the only reason why I do so. I want to make it clear that the problem as it affects them is much the same in quality as it affects all others. It applies to people in Britain itself as they move about from one part of the country to another. The inhabitants of Wales, Northern Scotland, the Outer Isles, the Shetlands, face much the same danger when they come to our cities, especially if they come from rural areas. Their problem is much the same, and the solution of the problem which I am suggesting for the Irish or the West Indians should be considered for them too.
The following facts about the 20,000 who migrate to this country each year are significant. Firstly, the majority are females, I think about three to two and

perhaps an even higher proportion. The great majority of them are in the 15 to 25 age group. About 90 per cent. come from rural Ireland, in the main from the western and southern coastal areas. The percentage of negative reactors is approximately 50. In some counties like Roscommon it is over 60 per cent., which is a very high figure showing that they have not been in contact with tuberculosis of any kind and have developed no personal active immunity.
They enter in the main the catering, clothing and building trades, mostly in London, Glasgow, Coventry, Newcastle, Manchester and Birmingham. The majority tend to live in lodgings and hostels when they first come here. To the factor of overcrowding there must be added the problem of overwork, owing to overtime working, because when people wish to establish themselves in any new country that is what they tend to do. Nearly all are married and most of them send money home.
In spite of a background of some poverty, they eat better on the farms in Ireland than they do in lodgings in this country during their first few months. By no means all break down and become infected but many of them do, and that is the thesis of my argument. When they are infected and they go back home they may unwittingly damage the health of their own families by infecting them. They may have also infected contacts in this country. In any event, whether here or in their own country, they reach a stage of hospitalisation, and hospitalisation is prolonged, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health will agree and, for that reason, is very expensive.
We think now that, for the reasons I have given, native-born Irish tend to be more susceptible than the English or the Irish born in England, because immunity is quickly acquired in one generation where people are original negative reactors. It is significant that the death-rate from tuberculosis per hundred thousand in Liverpool and Glasgow, where many Irish go, is very high for the population as a whole. It is 57 and 72·7 whereas in Leeds and Bristol the rate is 37 and 38.
I am also told that in the North-West Metropolitan Region, the number of Irish who occupy beds which are devoted to the treatment of tuberculosis is one in


nine as compared with one in seven for London-born people. When the population ratios are approximated, it suggests that three times as many Irish are being treated in these hospitals as London-born citizens. If that be at all true, although I am giving a sample from figures which are not very high, it would suggest that special care should be taken to prevent the disease in those who come from Ireland.
The Irish are very sensitive to the problem and they understand its gravity. I notice that in the "Irish Press" today there is a note stating that an appeal to young people is being made by the Ministry of Health there urging them that if they are going to live or work in towns and cities, either in Ireland or abroad, they should avail themselves of B.C.G. vaccination and mass radiography. That appeal was made last night. They understand the problem because they suffer from it, and they are undoubtedly doing their very best.
The purpose of my speech is to try to secure some liaison with our own Ministry, of an informal nature, so as to help these people both over in Ireland and when they come over to this country. The propaganda of St. Ultan's in Dublin of the need for B.C.G. vaccination for negative reactors if going abroad or into their own cities is excellent, but I am sure the authorities there would like to see it done on a very much wider basis. I do not think it should be difficult to evolve some loose machinery of an informal and voluntary nature under the guidance of the Ministry of Health which would give us liaison with the health authorities over there and in the other countries on which I will touch in a moment.
Before making tentative suggestions as to how this might be done, I want to urge one point. We must make it absolutely clear that under no circumstances whatever is there any hint of compulsion or restriction about anything we intend to do. I am sure the Minister of Health had that in mind when he answered me on Monday, and I absolutely and entirely agree with him. One way to spoil everything would be to suggest restriction or compulsion about the free entry or exit of the people whom I have in mind.
The tentative suggestions I have got are as follows. In the first place we should have a committee of representatives, principally medical, from both countries, which should be established at the suggestion of the Minister of Health in Britain. The functions of such a committee would be to consider, on the basis of the two countries being equal partners, means whereby tuberculosis in migrants would be prevented. That should be the first and primary consideration. A second function would be to consider means whereby tuberculosis, present or developing, in migrants should be detected and treated as early as possible.
Thirdly, we want effective liaison between the medical services of Britain and Ireland in this matter, with perhaps particular regard to the exchange of case records and X-rays of patients, if such are available. I think these will become more available in the future. Fourthly, there might be some means of collecting further information than there is already relating to this problem. Something has got to be done in Ireland, and equally something must be done here. I hope I shall give no offence if I make a few suggestions quickly.
I suggest that in Ireland there should be chest radiography and tuberculin testing of intending migrants, with B.C.G. vaccination of negative reactors. This should be left entirely to the Irish authorities. There might be established some central record office in Dublin, and it might be advantageous if a form of health record card could be devised and retained by the migrant. There should be means of contacting any intending migrants, and there should be careful examination and appropriate health propaganda to see that people do not slip through the mesh, because these young people have very little care for their health and we must recognise that when they are of that age one must think for them, as they are not always prepared to do so for themselves.
Migrants should be advised to attend at mass radiography units when they come to Britain, and they should do so at six-monthly intervals for the first two years. When they return to Ireland they should be advised to have radiography there for two years in order to make sure they are all right. Our part in Britain should be the antithesis to this. It should be primarily supervision of the health of


the migrants, and I need hardly say the main point should be we should be able to find where they are, and those who have not a clean record should have the services made available for them here. I would plead that liaison officers of Irish nationality should be made available in the great cities where these people tend to go in great numbers, so that they can be followed up at their place of work, worship and entertainment to make sure none of them neglect themselves.
For the West Indies, Cyprus and the African Colonies the technique would be the same, but it would mean that we should have to bring in and consult with the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Home Office and local authorities, as well as medical and social welfare workers. If such a committee be formed, I hope that the trade unions and employers will be consulted.
To revert to the Irish question, think what great help could be given to such a committee by the great employers of labour, such as McAlpines, with their recruiting offices in Cork and Dublin. In the cities where the problem is most grievous there should be a concentrated diagnostic campaign in order that nobody who needs attention and care should be missed. The special occupations I have mentioned—clothing, building and catering—should be subjected also to a diagnostic survey. Perhaps the Minister, who has now the necessary power, would consider ultimately a pre-employment X-ray and tuberculin test for all employed in the handling of food and drink, particularly when they are working in catering establishments.
I apologise for rushing this speech and I am very conscious of the fact that I have only been able to touch the fringe of a great and world-wide problem. Tuberculosis, as we know it, has afflicted mankind ever since urban life commenced on this planet. Ever since then the youth from the countryside has poured into the towns and cities all the world over to become grist in the mill of this deadly plague. Today, for the first time, we have the knowledge and the means to halt the assault of tuberculosis on these people, and I am sure that we have the will. I know that the Parliamentary Secretary agrees that something can be done and will be done.
Lastly, may I express my thanks to those who work in medicine and to whom I am greatly indebted for the little knowledge that I myself possess.

10.17 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): The House knows very well the genuine interest the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross) takes in the problem of tuberculosis. I am grateful to him for the broad terms in which he has dealt with this problem among immigrants, because there has been a measure of publicity on this matter and I should like to take the opportunity to clarify the position of the Ministry on one or two items. The hon. Gentleman brought forward two main points: the threat of the infected immigrant and also the position of the susceptible immigrant who comes here in an unprotected state and succumbs later to the hazards of urban life.
So far as a temporary immigrant is concerned, the interest of this country, and indeed of the country of origin, is identical and there is no conflict between us in our desire to help to eradicate this disease. However, it is obviously difficult to pick out any selected group of nationals for special treatment which would entail either statutory measures or, alternatively, focussing attention on those nationals as against preventive measures for the rest of the community.
I want particularly to bring this problem into proper perspective in relation to the incidence, the control and the cure of the disease now operating in this country, because I would not like it to be thought that this was a problem which was seriously jeopardising our record in development against tuberculosis or that it was of a magnitude to cause grave harm to the progress we have made.
I think it fair that I should give the House a few figures to get the matter into proper perspective. The overall mortality from the disease—the immigrants are included in the country's figures—has dropped dramatically in the last 30 years, having fallen from 58,000 to 26,000 between the wars and since 1939 to 8,000, a very remarkable result. Despite the very intensive efforts that we have made


by mass-radiography to seek out as many new cases as possible, notifications, which include many of the immigrants, dropped from 52,000 to 42,000 between 1948 and 1954, and we are now engaged in an active drive still further to reduce the disease's toll. In all these measures, the immigrant, as a resident in the country, is equally concerned, and all the facilities of the health service are equally at his disposal.
Before dealing specifically with the Irish problem, I want to say a word about B.C.G. Frankly, we have been more cautious in our approach to B.C.G. vaccination than some other countries. At the moment, the Medical Research Council is carrying out widespread investigations into the long-term protection which it gives. The vaccine is available on an experimental basis for school children, contacts of tuberculosis patients and hospital staff if they have a negative reaction to the tuberculin test.
The hon. Member will know that we have 7,000 more beds for pulmonary tuberculosis than we had in 1948. Therefore, despite the immigrant problem, we have the disease well under control. We have better methods of detection, and despite that, far fewer cases are being recorded. Facilities and treatments are more widely available, and the preventive services, in which the immigrants share, are in an increasingly better position to take vigorous and effective action.
I wanted to make that point because I was anxious that undue publicity to the problem should not mislead the public into thinking that the whole progress of our tuberculosis campaign was in any way being halted.

Dr. Stross: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way. I will not keep her a second. I am sure she is right, and if we had had an hour or two in which to deploy our arguments I should have brought that out strongly. However, the main thing is to prevent tuberculosis in negative reactors who are entering the country in large numbers.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: The hon. Gentleman has not left me much time. With regard to the immigration problem, it is

true that health services and conditions vary from country to country, and where one country is getting to grips with and defeating the disease there is a certain appeal in the idea of a cordon sanitaire thrown round the country to prevent the entry of people who may be infected with the disease.
This aspect of the infected immigrant was brought to our attention by the Central Health Services Council which some two years ago was attracted by the idea that we should take action to ensure that people from abroad seeking work in this country should be free from the disease. I should like to deal with this aspect of the infected immigrant first.
The matter was, very rightly and properly, referred to the Standing Tuberculosis Advisory Committee, which definitely expressed the view that the position did not indicate a serious menace to the health of the country, and, on the basis of very special inquiries which were made, it was established that the number of immigrants entering with active tuberculosis was very small indeed. I realise that the hon. Member has to that extent agreed with me as he is more concerned with those who succumb to the disease after arrival.
I realise that the problem has been of particular concern to the North-West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board because a quarter of the cases discovered in the survey were located within its region. Consequently, that board has a greater concern about the matter than the rest of the country. The majority of the cases are either Commonwealth citizens or citizens of the Republic of Ireland over whose entry into the United Kingdom there is no statutory control.
Therefore any measures to implement a health check on such citizens would involve legislation. We could check the very small minority of foreigners coming from abroad, but even that would mean the establishment at the 61 ports where there are already port health authorities of a new medical check in order to pass many thousands of people through a very fine net, with all the administrative problems and all the delay, to trace the very small number of infected people who might otherwise come in. We felt on balance, that this did not justify the vast administration that would be required,


not to mention the difficulty of establishing what evidence we would consider acceptable from the various countries as a medical record of being free from the disease.
I turn to the question of those who come into the country and are susceptible because, as the hon. Member said, of changed conditions of their lives from rural to urban, and the strain of living in a new country. There is also the effect of a change of diet to urban from a rural farm diet. They may succumb to the disease. We have to be very careful not to exaggerate the numbers. A high percentage of those who come from Ireland are adolescent females, and to that extent they are the most susceptible of all the groups. We have to recognise that there is a conflict of view on the reason for their susceptibility. It is suggested that many of them come from the western counties and have not previously been exposed to tuberculosis infection, or that many of them have had minimal lesions which have broken down as the result of the strain.
The hon. Member made three suggestions, which were that there should be a committee, that measures such as X-rays and tests with B.C.G. should be taken before they leave Ireland, and that immigrants to the United Kingdom should be examined by mass radiography. We do not think that a permanent committee is necessary, because there is very close liaison between the officers of my Ministry and the Republic of Ireland. In the second place, it is clearly not for us to lay down what the Republic of Ireland should do on its side in the testing of immigrants.
On the question of a check there is very real difficulty. I was glad that the hon. Member was careful to say there must be no compulsion. To make special arrangements to examine one nationality of people who come here for employment would be far more likely to scare them off from taking the test than it would to encourage them to take it. The best method is that boards and local authorities which have this concentration of immigrants and are alive to the conditions in their area should deploy its mass radiography units so as to seek out the danger spots. The local authority should organise the general publicity and preventive medicine campaign so as not to single out this particular group and make it feel that it is being attacked as containing tuberculosis suspects, and so scare them off from taking any of the preventive measures, which we want everyone in the country to avail himself of.
The solution lies in close co-operation between regional hospital boards of areas where there is known to be a dense concentration of these people, and the medical officers of health and mass radiography units. We have more to gain in drawing these people in than by any specific attack on one set of nationals who, if they come here for employment, might well be deterred from taking—

The Question having been proposed at Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.